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FOCUS

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: EMERGING POWERS

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The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Helen Suzman Foundation.

The Changing International Order: Emerging Powers



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This edition of *FOCUS* continues the exploration of the changing international order, which was first considered in *FOCUS 84*. Here, the spotlight falls on emerging powers. China obviously plays a central role in these reflections. A particular concern is the impact that China will continue to have on Africa, and especially South and Southern Africa. This is not to argue that India's role, for example, should not also be considered. But China looms large, both on the international stage and our consciousness.

Chris Alden addresses the broad question of emerging powers in Africa and Africa's place in the new international order. His article examines how emerging powers use the past to foster, mobilise and explain their contemporary engagement with Africa. There is a difficult past, one in which the contours of contemporary globalisation were framed, layered over engagement stretching back to antiquity and up to the onset of the harsh realities of colonialism. China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea project upon Africa a moral purpose to explain their role which, in many ways, echoes the European discourses on Africa that accompanied their engagement in an earlier age of imperialism.

John Keane tackles the realities of the new Chinese "empire", which are far more complex than many of its critics have so far supposed. The term 'phantom democracy' is developed to describe an authoritarian state in which the very fear of democracy forces a "democratic style" of political management and leadership. What is emerging as China's phantom-democratic political order will have consequences for international constitutional democracy.

Stephen Chan explores the dynamic of resistance to hegemonic norms (not always because of the norms themselves but because of the nature of hegemony), touching on China, ISIS and the decolonial movement. The search for new thought, norms and anchors for society is exposed as an urgent but highly complex endeavour. Asking what resistance to the norms of the Liberal International Order means for "international morality", Chan charts a global path towards "normative equality" as 'a staging point for something better'.

William Gumede draws lessons from the "East Asian Tigers", which have successfully used aspects of their traditional cultures to combat corruption, make company cultures more inclusive and foster a common national identity. It is argued that these countries offer alternative models for development, which could be adaptable to countries like South Africa.

Charles Simkins considers the economic outlook for emerging markets. The term 'emerging market economies' to describe a group of countries has been around for nearly forty years. It is vague and unsatisfactory in many respects, but it has endured for lack of a better description. This study offers criteria by which to delimit the group, and discusses their growth prospects over the medium term. In doing so, it addresses issues of the convergence of emerging markets and advanced economies and, among emerging market economies themselves, the distribution of fundamental characteristics and the risks they face.

We end with book reviews by **Dan de Kadt** (on Francis Fukuyama's *Identity*) and **Dennis Davis** (on John Dugard's *Confronting Apartheid: A Personal History of South Africa, Namibia and Palestine*).

Emerging Powers and Africa – recognition, remembrance and Africa's place in a New International Order

This essay examines how emerging powers use the past to foster, mobilise and explain their contemporary engagement with Africa. There is a profound past, one in which the contours of contemporary globalisation were framed, layered over engagement stretching back to antiquity and up to the onset of the harsh realities of colonialism. China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea project upon Africa a moral purpose to explain their role which, in many ways, echoes the European discourses on Africa that accompanied their engagement in the age of imperialism.

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Africa

First it needs to be recognised that the importance of Africa for emerging powers is commonly held to be its material wealth in resources and, more recently, as a growing market for goods and services. Certainly oil, strategic minerals and timber have featured as drivers for state-led and private firms' engagement in these sectors and, as such, can exercise a determining influence over aspects of relations. How can we make sense of, for instance, China's relations with Angola without any analysis of the overwhelming commercial ties based around the energy sector? Or, equally, Malaysian involvement in the joint Sudanese oil production with Chinese, Indian and Sudanese national petroleum companies? The battery of annual trade data, detailing how emerging powers have balance sheets with African economies that are heavily weighted towards commodities, is a stark reminder of the fundamental content of bilateral relationships.

However, this purely commercial reading of the central motivations for sectoral involvement in Africa misconstrues the significance of the continent for emerging powers in telling ways. For instance, the numerical assemblage of Africa's fifty-five states within the UN General Assembly and their capacity to deliver bloc votes which can sway the proceedings one way or the other is an important political resource that Africa deploys on the international stage. On security questions involving Africa, which occupy up to seventy percent of the UN Security Council's agenda in a given year, the voices of non-permanent African representatives are meaningful arbitrators of multilateral responses and questions regarding the deployment of peacekeeping missions in the affected areas. In other parts of the UN system such as the Human Rights Council or international institutions like the World Trade Organisation, African votes can be critical to securing support for a given policy position.

Emerging Powers

More generally, the great power status sought by emerging powers is something that is conferred through recognition by the society of states in the international system.[1] Established great powers play a crucial part in this process and, during the bipolar Cold War system, provided recognition or withdrew such support in line with ideological and material imperatives (as apartheid South Africa knew well). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States came to occupy a position as a 'hyper-power' in the liberal international order, actively situating regional powers in a 'hub and spoke' arrangement within the unipolar international system.[1] George Bush's comment at G8 summit in 2003, that South African President Thabo Mbeki was 'the point man' on the Zimbabwe crisis, summarised this relationship in a colloquial fashion.[2] The inclusion of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa at G8 summits from 2007, as part of the Heiligendamm Process under the auspices of the 'Outreach 5', signalled that these regional powers were in line for integration into the mechanisms of global governance.[3]

South Africa's privileged status as the only African country offered a seat on both the G20 and BRICs (following Beijing's invitation to join Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2010), again underscored how significant recognition of emerging power standing is to acquiring the trappings of formal power.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008, China's own standing as a global power assumed greater visibility amongst African states as they launched a plethora of 'Look East' policies. These sought to capture new financial resources and accompanying opportunities available through bilateral and multilateral (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or FOCAC) engagements. The hasty creation of the G20 in 2009 to address the global financial crisis became the most representative gathering of leading countries outside of the UN and, as such, put into sharp focus how emerging powers had become a key component to global governance. South Africa's privileged status as the only African country offered a seat on both the G20 and BRICs (following Beijing's invitation to join Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2010), again underscored how significant recognition of emerging power standing is to acquiring the trappings of formal power.

For all of these reasons, any emerging power aspirant to global power status necessarily has to be able to articulate and even deliver on an 'Africa policy' to declare credibly to have an international stature. What are operationally speaking regional powers (with the exception of China) with global aspirations consistently put forward African agendas. Indeed, since 2000, the AU's Global Partnerships Office has been inundated with requests by emerging powers to establish regional summits such as the Turkey-Africa Forum and the Africa-South America Summit, so much so that they have had to put a moratorium on new partnerships after 2008. Emerging powers have not been deterred and approached other continental institutions or sub-regional bodies: For instance, the African Development Bank co-sponsors the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Ministerial Conference while the Brazil-Africa Forum is co-hosted with the East Africa Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture.

Examining the content of emerging powers' economic agenda for Africa demonstrates that the differences in their stated over-arching aims are limited: All adhere to a policy of supporting the developmental aspirations of Africa and doing so within the context of the rubric of 'South-South Cooperation'.[4] Admittedly the specifics of policies do vary: For instance, in some cases, there is a greater emphasis on the substance of programmes (technical cooperation in a given sector) or the modality of delivery (grant aid versus loans or project-based initiatives).

What is most striking, however, is the discourses that underpin engagement, that is to say, how an emerging power explains its relationship to the African continent and in so doing represents 'Africa' as well as where the continent is situated in their visionary depiction of international system. This narrative on Africa articulates, in effect, an insight into the

moral purpose of power in the international system as projected by these countries. In this respect, emerging power tropes on Africa can be clustered around a number of themes, namely framing, historical narratives, and visualisations.

Emerging powers frame their engagement with Africa along two axes, either restorative or transformative. The restorative discourse generally aligns itself with the pan-Africanist litanies on a renaissance in the making, bringing the continent back to a position of dignity rooted in its historical past.

Framing

Emerging powers frame their engagement with Africa along two axes, either restorative or transformative. The restorative discourse generally aligns itself with the pan-Africanist litanies on a renaissance in the making, bringing the continent back to a position of dignity rooted in its historical past. The transformative discourse emphasises the supine position of Africa in relation to ex-colonial powers and the United States (sometimes conflating the two through use of the term 'the West' or 'North'). In both cases ideas of 'Africa rising' feature prominently and the role of emerging powers is defined as one of being an ardent supporter of this process precisely through their economic engagement with Africa. In this context, the international system is portrayed as being dominated by Western powers through its institutions, financial structures and productive capabilities – all legacies of the colonial era. Emerging powers distinguish themselves from the West through their shared standing – or point of origin at least – in the international system, as developing countries and through their colonial or imperialist experiences. Common points of reference are the Bandung Conference in 1955 and foreign policy principles such as non-interference in state sovereignty, which give policy expression to notions of solidarity.

Historical Narratives

How emerging powers represent their own historical links with Africa differs considerably and is especially telling. For instance, the Chinese use of the 15th century Admiral Zheng He and his voyages to the Horn and Eastern Africa's coastal littoral are celebrated to communicate something about contemporary Chinese ties: first, that China arrived in Africa before the Western powers; second, that the nature of the engagement was trade-based; and finally, that they did not go on to colonise the continent. Beijing's role as a supporter of anti-colonialism and liberation movements – although sometimes on the 'wrong side'

as was the case in Angola – features prominently in diplomatic utterances. For Brazil, the story of the past is one which the architect, Lula Da Silva, characterised as a debt that Brazil owes Africa. This emanates from the slave trade that brought so many Afro-Brazilians to the country and produced the vibrant Brazilian culture with its proximity to the continent. Turkey's handling of its Ottoman past, which ruled over North Africa and much of the Horn, focuses not on imperialism and slavery but rather on the common heritage of Islam from that period and goes so far as to characterise its contemporary role in Africa as that of a 'humanitarian power'. Indonesia, when constructing its recent Indo-Pacific 'maritime fulcrum power' policy, gives emphasis to the arrival of Javanese peoples in Madagascar in the 9th century to justify its reach across the Indian Ocean.

Visualisation

Africa is visualised in ways which, surprisingly, reflect many of the conventional tropes of the West towards Africa. Imagery accompanying bilateral summits portrays the continent through pictures of wild animals, tribes and untrammelled landscapes. Similarly, advertising for tourism groups from emerging powers, not unlike its Western counterparts, focuses on the fecundity of the continent, its wildlife, (generally East African) peoples and the open savannah. At its most absurd, posters of tribesmen from Papua New Guinea (mistakenly used by the organisers), along with various pictures of wildlife, were featured as part of the decorative displays of FOCAC III in Beijing in 2006. Chinese films, such as the contemporary blockbuster *Wolf Warrior II* (filmed in South Africa) shows us an Africa as a kind of frontier of warlords in cahoots with racist Western mercenaries that threaten the lives of ordinary Africans, Chinese traders and humanitarian workers. Indian films like *Dhoom 2* locate scenes in Namibia's undulating desert landscapes as a backdrop to thwarting an international criminal network trading in stolen national treasures. Here, African individuals are virtually absent.

What all of this tells us is, first, that emerging powers approach Africa through the lens of shared experience and common heritage. The centrality of the colonial era, economic dominance and Western intervention are the ties that bind them together.

Interestingly, the fact that it has been the openness of the West's liberal international economic order that provided the context by which export-oriented economies like China, Turkey and South Korea industrialised and ultimately developed is not acknowledged in emerging power discourses on Africa. A tacit admission, however, of this core economic condition can be found in the global uproar that has accompanied the rise of protectionism in the United States and, concurrently, President Xi Jinping's forthright declaration at Davos in 2017, that China would step in to preserve and lead the same liberal international economic order.

Some (tentative) conclusions

What all of this tells us is, first, that emerging powers approach Africa through the lens of shared experience and common heritage. The centrality of the colonial era, economic dominance and Western intervention are the ties that bind them together. Africa's importance as a region is underscored in language that echoes African sensibilities – the renaissance and rising discourses – but also carries some specifics that reflect particular historical trajectories of emerging powers. The slave trade, whether originating in the historical conduct of Brazil or the Ottoman empire, is reframed or 'forgotten', while revolutionary and development solidarity is foregrounded. At the same time, despite the patent desire to demonstrate their distinctiveness from the West, emerging powers see Africa in ways that surprisingly cohere with the imagery of exoticism or even 'primitivism' found in traditional Western portrayals of the 'dark continent'.

Emerging powers standing in relation to Africa is one derived from a shared critique of the inequalities and structural impediments to development, reflective of a moral universe where colonialism and its crimes are fixed in time as is the accompanying necessity of South

solidarity. The uses of power by emerging powers are therefore ethical and encouraged as they contribute to the furthering of this wider emancipatory agenda pursued by the Global South. It is for this reason that the contemporary criticism levelled at Chinese loans practices and growing levels of debt amongst African countries has, unlike other putative warnings from Western circles, struck a chord across the continent. More than any other act conducted by an emerging power, it runs against the grain of fundamental precepts of solidarity, development and righting the wrongs derived from the colonial period. In this respect, more than any other fact or exercise of power, the Chinese management of creditor-debtor relations has the potential to transform emerging power-Africa relations in ways that are perceived by Africans to resemble traditional Western ties.

Emerging powers standing in relation to Africa is one derived from a shared critique of the inequalities and structural impediments to development, reflective of a moral universe where colonialism and its crimes are fixed in time as is the accompanying necessity of South solidarity. The uses of power by emerging powers are in effect ethical and encouraged as they contribute to the furthering of this wider emancipatory agenda pursued by the Global South.

Finally, what insights can be gained by examining how so-called traditional powers of the West portray emerging powers in Africa? There are a number of academic studies which analyse, for instance, media reportage on China in Africa and conclusively demonstrate that these sources systematically portray the Chinese in a negative light. At the same time, emerging power discourses on partnership and equality with Africa have brought about a shift in at least the rhetorical declarations of Western countries. At events like the EU-Africa summit, governments reframe their own narratives away from patronising language of the past. And, if emerging powers too often portray Africa in recognisably 'Western' ways, how does the West visualise emerging powers in Africa? One of the most compelling examples is Henning Mankell's crime novel *The Man from Beijing*, set in contemporary Mozambique, which describes how a shadowy Chinese agent colludes with Frelimo contacts to bring tens of thousands of Chinese farmers to the countryside. Fear of China's long-term intentions in Africa percolates below the surface of many Western perspectives but the place of other emerging powers in Africa doesn't seem to resonate in the same way.

Emerging powers in Africa are reshaping the continent and contributing to a new appreciation of its significance in the international system. Reconciling the facts of engagement and the exercise of power on the continent has encouraged the formation of narratives shaped by history, Africa's development aspirations and the complementarity of emerging country engagement. Nevertheless, however powerful discourses based on remembrance and forgetting are, the contemporary conduct of emerging powers in relation to the continent is bound to require a reset of narratives to provide new more critical reading of this evolving relationship.

NOTES

1 See Laura Neack, 'Middle Powers Once Removed: the diminished global role of middle powers and American grand strategy', paper presented at the *International Studies Association Conference* (14-18 March 2000), Los Angeles. Also see Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira 'The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil and India and Trilateralism', *Third World Quarterly* (September 2005), 26(7), pp. 1077-1095.

2 Carroll, R. 'Bush backs Mbeki on Zimbabwe', *The Guardian* (10 July 2003)

3 Leninger, J. 'The Heiligendamm Process and Emerging Powers: more of the same or a genuine global governance innovation?' (January 2010)

4 See FOCAC VI Declaration; India-Africa Summit Declaration; Brazil-Africa Forum Declaration.

The New Chinese Empire

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We live in Shakespearean times marked by a strange but striking fact: despite mounting evidence of waning American global power and the birth of a strident global China, few people dare openly use the word empire. It is as if things cannot be called by their proper name.

In China, public talk of empire (*dìguó*) is frowned upon. It is a pejorative term directed at others; the word is almost never applied to China itself. State officials and media platforms instead emphasise past victimhood ('the century of humiliation') at the hands of Western imperialism. They claim as well that China today respects the 'sovereign independence' of all countries. It is anti-imperialist. In a case of unexpected symmetry, in the United States, the word empire also triggers robust silence. Americans regard themselves as a benign global power, as a democratic force for good. Former defence secretary under George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, said it clearly: 'We don't seek empires, we're not imperialistic. We never have been.' His words could just as easily have come from the mouths of Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders.

But if by empire we mean a jumbo-sized state that exercises political, economic and symbolic power over millions of people, at great distances from its own heartlands, without much regard or respect for the niceties of sovereignty, then technically both the United States and China are empires. Our planet is falling under the sway of two global empires. Measured in GDP terms, for instance, the American economy currently yields a third of world output. In such fields as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and aerospace, its global corporations set the pace. McDonald's, Google, Apple and Facebook are globally influential cultural brands. The United States is commander-in-chief of the global war on terror. It has military bases and installations in 130 countries. Even though it has tasted few victories against non-Western forces during the past half-century, some 15% of its federal budget and roughly half of discretionary spending is dedicated to its armed forces. The United States currently spends more on weapons systems than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, United Kingdom and Japan combined.

China's global reach is, meanwhile, spreading fast. Unusually, the new Chinese empire is deeply entangled with the US and its partners. Beijing-financed mega-projects are reordering the lives of many millions of people, from South Africa, Nigeria and Sri Lanka to Cambodia, Chile and Hungary. The Communist Party-state economy has outflanked the US as the world's largest trading nation. It is now Africa's biggest trading partner and rivals the US in Latin America, where Chinese investment, extraction of resources and trade jumped tenfold in the first decade of this century.

Global military and diplomatic operations are under way. A new naval base has been built in Djibouti, and there are rescue missions (in Libya and Yemen) and extensive military involvement with global organisations such as the United Nations, plus first-time policing experiments in cities such as Dubrovnik. Military expenditure is mushrooming (the People's Liberation Army has enjoyed two decades of double-digit budget growth). China is meanwhile actively supporting cross-border institutions like the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). During the past two decades, it has helped build and now leads more than

20 new multilateral institutions, most of them founded on pragmatic agreement, not formal treaty alliances. There are freakish moments, as when the Chinese government, the enemy of general elections, outshined the European Union and the United States by providing Cambodia with computers, printers, voting booths, ballot boxes and election monitors in support of its corrupted mid-2018 general election.

A New Cold War?

These various overlapping trends should remind us that empires with a genuinely global footprint are rare. Whatever their visions of world conquest, the territorial reach of the Mongols, Muslims, Ottomans, Ming dynasty and British and other European empires was geographically limited. For the first time, during the years of bi-polarity (1945–1989), two relatively detached global empires vied for world dominance. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States tried to do something no empire had ever done: to exercise hegemony over the whole planet alone. It failed. So now it has to deal with the realities of spreading Chinese power. The upshot is that our planet, for the first time in human history, is shadowed by two globally entangled empires marked by different political styles, practices and aims.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States tried to do something no empire had ever done: to exercise hegemony over the whole planet alone. It failed. So now it has to deal with the realities of spreading Chinese power.

For many observers, the novelty is perplexing, which is why so many pundits and politicians within the American *imperium* are now peddling warnings of an imminent Chinese takeover of the world. Some are sharpening their swords. 'If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades,' says John J. Mearsheimer, a leading American scholar, 'the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war'. He adds: 'the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its share of world power and eventually dominate the system'.[1] Such language encourages those who want a new Cold War to sort out which empire is in charge. Their first move is to stir up public sentiments against what they call the 'authoritarianism' or 'totalitarianism' of the existing Party-led regime. Beyond the borders of China, they see acts of silent

espionage and systematic takeovers of businesses, governments, universities, newspapers, churches and various civil society bodies. They warn of threats to 'sovereignty' and the coming end of 'liberal democracy'.

There is some validity in these warnings. They remind us that empires are never angels on Earth because their mission is always to change the balance of power in their own favour. Just like the United States, China has its fellow traveller intellectuals, propaganda media, front organisations, lobbyists and dark money peddlers. It is in the business of establishing imperial concessions (in Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sihanoukville in Cambodia, for instance) and meddling in overseas media platforms. The critics of Chinese expansion are also helpfully burying the hubristic 'end of history' presumption that the strategy of containment and engagement with China would ultimately ensure that it became just like America: a capitalist 'liberal democracy'.

In these new circumstances, when many things seem both strange and out of joint, an urgent priority is the opening of minds: a new willingness among political thinkers, journalists, citizens and politicians to dissect their own ignorance about China; to craft fresh ways of thinking that enable all of us to see that the realities of the new Chinese empire are far more confusing, complicated and contradictory than many of its critics have so far supposed.

The new cold war rhetoric nevertheless has definite downsides. It understates the irreversible entanglement and cooperation of the two empires. It prematurely turns its back on the need for dynamically re-balancing the US-China power relationship, especially in the Asia Pacific region, along with the need for continuing positive cooperation in such fields as scientific research, higher education and renewable energy. The point is there is no Thucydides trap – the idea that conflict is almost inevitable when a rising power challenges the established one, à la Athens and Sparta – except in the heads of the new Cold War Warriors. Their grasp of the history of empires, and China's role in rethinking the whole subject, masterfully analysed in John Darwin's *After Tamerlane* (2007), is feeble. Get-tough-with-China talk attracts racists and Orientalists; in effect, it functions as a cry of pain from within 'the West' and a call to stay on top of the world. The rhetoric relies too heavily on stock phrases such as 'liberal democracy' and 'authoritarianism'. Seemingly unaware that it might well reinforce the emperor trends in today's China and the United States, the rhetoric is strikingly silent about the current disfiguring of power-sharing democracy within its heartlands. The less palatable side of the American empire (repeated military invasions in the name of democracy, repeated failures) is typically ignored. Worst of all, simplification and wilful ignorance about the daily life and complex and kaleidoscopic political dynamics of China are commonplace.

Phantom Democracy

In these new circumstances, when many things seem both strange and out of joint, an urgent priority is the opening of minds: a new willingness among political thinkers, journalists, citizens and politicians to dissect their own ignorance about China; to craft fresh ways of thinking that enable all of us to see that the realities of the new Chinese empire are far more confusing, complicated and contradictory than many of its critics have so far supposed.

As China rapidly moves to the centre of the international order, the pertinent question is what kind of political system is this new global power? In the booming business of China-watching, the standard answer is that it is an 'authoritarian' regime, with qualifiers such as 'soft authoritarianism', 'hard authoritarianism' and 'authoritarian capitalism' commonplace. All accounts seem to agree that China is reckoned the antithesis of a 'liberal democracy' defined by open competition among freely formed political parties.

Some Chinese analysts celebrate the advantages of this 'authoritarianism' and welcome the triumph of a 'post-democracy' (Eric Li), freed from the curse of free and fair elections and 'showbiz democracy' (Weiwei Zhang). Outsiders find this inference alarming. They warn of the rise of a globally menacing 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian' China. Still others announce the onset of 'dictatorship' or 'autocacy' as the party leadership concentrates titles and decision-making in the hands of one man, Xi Jinping.

They may prove to be right about the dangers. But what is wrong with their prediction, and their grand interpretation of China's authoritarianism, is not just its liberal bias; or its reductionist view of democracy as synonymous with free and fair elections; or its silence about the political need to clean the Augean stables of actually existing democracies, more than a few of which (Brazil, India, Britain, the United States) are in a parlous condition. The most serious weakness of the new Cold War Warriors is their failure to understand the striking paradox of Chinese domestic politics today – its vaguely democratic sensibility, strange as it may sound.

The most serious weakness of the new Cold War Warriors is their failure to understand the striking paradox of Chinese domestic politics today – its vaguely democratic sensibility, strange as it may sound.

From Xi downwards and sideways, state officials understand well the old Chinese proverb that when trees fall monkeys scatter (*shu dao husun san*), which is why they have no love for the open public scrutiny and restraint of their arbitrary powers. Public monitoring of power, or monitory democracy (*jian du shi min zhu*), is not their thing. That is why the slightest whiff of a challenge to their power can bring down the hammer, as evidenced in mass detention camps in Xinjiang, crackdowns on universities and underground churches, and the attempts to silence dissent in Hong Kong.

Yet the strange thing is that the rulers of China know that powerful people should fear too much power, just as pigs may fear growing fat. The anxiety about unrestrained power and the fear of power-sharing, power-chastening democracy explain why China is better described as a 'phantom democracy' – where the fear of democracy forces a style of political management that in many ways mirrors and mimics electoral democracies, where the fear of elections puts leaders in constant campaign mode.

The leadership knows by instinct that full rice bowls, skyscrapers, shopping malls and holidays abroad aren't enough. And that is why, for some time, it has been trumpeting China as a "people's democracy" (*ren min min zhu*) that conducts experiments with a wide range of locally crafted democratic tools designed to win public support, to deal productively with what the leadership labels mass incidents (an estimated 100,000 annually) and, primarily, to avoid the fate of its Soviet counterpart by becoming what some Chinese scholars call a 'learning party'.

But what exactly are these locally made, so-named democratic tools? The examples are numerous. Most obvious are the election of village committees by villagers themselves, and (less obvious) the spread of a culture of elections into social media, city administration and experiments of business houses with 'consultative democracy' among their staff. Democracy made in China also includes efforts to apply the rule of law selectively, in the shape of contract law, integrity and compliance units (within the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance), and local mobile courts. Nearly a million mediation committees assisted by 'people's mediators' now handle most conflicts (perhaps 90 per cent) inside and outside courts, at no cost to the litigants, in such areas as economic and labour disputes, divorce and minor criminal matters and civil disputes at the township level.

There are public forums, neighbourhood assemblies, democratic hearings and participatory budgeting experiments. Accountability and competition mechanisms are built into state bureaucracy. Chinese democracy makes room for independent public opinion leaders (*yu lun ling xiu*), figures such as the online satirist Papi Jiang and former Chinese army officer turned transgender dance star and choreographer Jin Xing, known affectionately as 'poison tongue' (*du she*), who use Sina Weibo and WeChat as public amplifiers to say things that grate on official ears. Democracy made in China thrives on the clever utilisation of public opinion polls and democratic campaign styles by party officials, and the use of digitally networked media as early warning devices and as sophisticated tools of public opinion formation and policymaking.

The anxiety about unrestrained power and the fear of power-sharing, power-chastening democracy explain why China is better described as a 'phantom democracy' – where the fear of democracy forces a style of political management that in many ways mirrors and mimics electoral democracies, where the fear of elections puts leaders in constant campaign mode.

Media Storms

These and other locally-made democracy experiments are typically ignored by those who beat the drum against the Chinese empire. That is unfortunate, if only because the conflict-producing and loyalty-inducing effects of these experiments are not to be underestimated, even if they fall far short of the standards of power-sharing democracy. Take the recent public scandal surrounding bogus vaccines supplied by Changsheng Biotechnology Company, a great rumpus that was initially stifled by the local and national drug administrations.

State media and local authorities sprang into action when all hell broke loose on social media. The *People's Daily* called on local regulators to 'rapidly take action, do a complete investigation and announce authoritative information in a timely manner to pacify public anxiety'. Premier Li Keqiang chimed in with talk of 'illegal and criminal acts that endanger the safety of people's lives'. Xi interrupted his state visit to Rwanda to order severe punishments 'to safeguard the public interest and social security'.

Media storms like these are chronic in China. They are allegories of the skittishness of the powerful. They also reveal the Achilles' heel of the whole system: its failure to deal with the systematic misuse of power through independent, sharp-tooth monitory mechanisms. But this weakness equally helps explain why talk of democracy in China is not oxymoronic. Locally made forms of democracy enjoy a measure of public acceptance. Despite their phantom qualities, they have real effects on the ground. They reinforce the sense that those who rule are less powerful than they might suppose. Hence, whereas governing China used to be like hammering nails into wood, it now much more closely resembles the art of balancing on slippery eggs.

Democratic Style

China's rulers have drawn anew the conclusion that shepherding the people means winning their hearts and minds through the use of democratic style. Supposing the existence of an unwritten contract (*mo xu*) between themselves and the people, party leaders have come for the first time to mount the public catwalk, and to pay meticulous attention to body-language, diction and decor, manners and charm. In the name of serving the people, as if they were up for election, they embrace the aesthetics of the permanent campaign. They step out from behind closed doors and go walking among the people. Seemingly unscripted, they appear in unusual locales. There they pause to breathe the local atmosphere, to establish themselves as the guardians of the political order, to measure the loyalty of their supporters, to charm cynics or win over those who fear they are being devoured by the jaws of power. In the hallowed name of the

people, the party showboats. It practises the common touch, as when Xi springs a well-crafted 'surprise' appearance and presses the flesh in a Beijing bun shop, rides on a bicycle with his daughter, embarks on a poverty tour in western China, and kicks a Gaelic football during an official visit to Ireland; or when his partner, the former singer and opera star Peng Liyuan, the first-ever First Lady, brings high heels and proto-democratic style for the first time into the field of high-level diplomacy and foreign policy.

None of this may seem new. For centuries, popular and elite discourse on the arts of government in China has rested on the understanding that rulers ought to be the expression of the will of the people. In many classic texts, rulers are seen as the sons of heaven and fathers of the people, upon whom heaven has bestowed the right to rule. In effect, the will of heaven is equivalent to the will of the people. The implication is that rulers shouldn't indulge their own interests at the expense of the needs of the people. If they do, for example by failing to govern benevolently and stirring up disorder, poverty and war, then they lose their "mandate of heaven" (*tian ming*).

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The new anxiety-fuelled efforts of the current rulers to experiment with democratic mechanisms may be thought to be mere extensions of these old ways of thinking. In fact, they are truly without historical precedent. The official embrace of organised market research and opinion polling techniques is an example. Since the early 1980s, the regime has built a giant information gathering apparatus. The contraption has many parts, comprising different types of information gathering, including hundreds of registered polling firms.

Some of them are classified as unofficial (private, for-profit, not directly part of state structures). Others are semi-official (for-profit, operating at some distance from state ministries); still others are controlled directly by the state, as happens at the People's Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Centre, which uses data-harvesting algorithms to send summaries of internet chatter trends in real time to officials, often with advice about which language to use and avoid in handling hot topics. Some polling agencies

are joint ventures with foreign firms and agencies such as A.C. Nielsen, Gallup, Tailor Nelsen and Pew Research Centre.

Practically every institution of higher education hosts a public opinion research unit, chartered to analyse trends and hotspots with the help of social scientists who have swapped their former 'redness' for the mantle of 'expert' functionaries in a booming public opinion polling and survey research industry. Elsewhere in the polity, the data harvesting machine includes local party branches, which function as listening posts, as do the party schools where up-and-coming cadres are sent periodically for 'study'.

The information harvesting machine extends far beyond the territorial borders of China. China's surging foreign press corps is an example: stationed around the world, its journalists are more than reporters filing stories from abroad; they double as providers of regular intelligence to a state that is increasingly reliant on, yet resistant to, open flows of information.

Higher up within the imperial polity, the network of People's Political Consultative Congresses and other consultative organs are all designed to win the support and collect the opinions of businesspeople, intellectuals and various party and non-party people. The information harvesting machine extends far beyond the territorial borders of China. China's surging foreign press corps is an example: stationed around the world, its journalists are more than reporters filing stories from abroad; they double as providers of regular intelligence to a state that is increasingly reliant on, yet resistant to, open flows of information.

Data gathering techniques and opinion polling machinery function as early warning detectors, protecting governing structures from political resistance and social disorder. Polls are also cleverly used to calibrate proposed policy changes considered potentially controversial, such as measures to increase public transport fares. A case in point is the role played by the Canton Public Opinion Research Centre (C-por), the largest independent public opinion research agency in China, in dampening and managing the public rumpus triggered in early 2014 by local government plans to reduce traffic congestion by increasing parking fees in Guangzhou.

It all sounds familiar, yet the Changsheng Biotechnology Company vaccine scandal shows that the really remarkable thing is that those who govern China simultaneously honour and do everything to crush the formation of publics with independent views about matters of public concern. The authorities know the old rule that every form of government rests upon opinion (*min yi*). But when they say that the survival or extinction of the regime depends on 'winning or losing public support' (Xi Jinping) they give the old rule a new twist: if opinion is the foundation of stable government, the government itself must create stable opinion. It follows that the imperative is to watch, to keep an ear to the ground, so that the goal of harmoniously 'guiding public opinion' becomes a reality. The party-state must work constantly to stay closely in touch with the people, to ensure that 'separation from the masses' (*tuo li qun zhong*) never grows dangerously wide. The rulers thus acknowledge that power doesn't flow ultimately from the barrels of guns, or from Xinjiang-style arrests and internments. They understand that very little props up the political order except people's belief in it.

The Changsheng scandal also shows that much the same proto-democratic dynamic is operative in the world of online media. Everybody knows the authorities firewall, censor and crack down on subversive messaging and 'inappropriate discussions'. Early-morning swoops by plain-clothes police, disappearances, illegal detentions and violent beatings by unidentified thugs happen. Total cyber-surveillance of citizens is slowly becoming a reality. Equally striking but less obvious is the way the authorities use digital media as a listening post, as a medium through which internet users are

urged to chat and vent their grievances, to move closer to the state authorities, even to fight against the abuse of power. Hence the recent calls by officials, for instance in Shandong province, for journalists to do their job of in-depth investigation; the proliferation of sophisticated digital strategies such as the Blue Map App designed to inform citizens in real-time about water quality, local sources of pollution, and to scrutinise emissions from polluting companies; e-consultations and online Q&A sessions; virtual petition sites and online webcasts of public forums that come packaged in official assurances about the need to encourage transparency.

Among the biggest possible surprises is that the powerful rulers of the People's Republic of China, driven by skittishness, succeed in harnessing locally made democratic mechanisms to win the loyalty of their subjects and, thus, legitimate and strengthen their one-party rule in support of their global imperial ambitions.

China's Future

The idea of China as a phantom democracy, rather than a straightforward case of authoritarianism, naturally prompts basic questions about the efficacy and durability of all these practices, and where they are steering the imperial political order. The short answer is, nobody knows. In politics, as in life, surprise is the most powerful player in defining what comes next. Among the biggest possible surprises is that the powerful rulers of the People's Republic of China, driven by skittishness, succeed in harnessing locally made democratic mechanisms to win the loyalty of their subjects and, thus, legitimate and strengthen their one-party rule in support of their global imperial ambitions.

Suppose the present political order, with the help of political wisdom, calculated cunning and good luck, managed to display great resilience. Then imagine that the rich and powerful men who run this polity mastered the art of paying homage to their subjects, to better rule them, at home and abroad, on the basis of a surprising degree of self-scrutiny and experimentation. Let's further imagine that the convergence of such trends as steady economic growth, improved social policy provision, cyber-surveillance and political repression served to stabilise the homelands of the polity, helped along by a loyal middle class hooked on dreams of restoring China to greatness, and by the imperial foolishness of those who currently govern America in the name of making it great again. If all this came to pass, in defiance of political science handbooks, wouldn't China celebrate its return to the global stage armed with a strange new soft power weapon? A distinctively 21st-century one-party polity grounded in the voluntary servitude of its people, an ultra-modern despotism with a strangely democratic feel? Not a 'thoroughgoing return to totalitarian politics' as Chinese legal scholar Xu Zhangrun warned last year in a widely circulated essay (and for which he has since been sacked), but a tremendous phantom-democratic political order triumphantly beating a path towards a future world well beyond power-sharing constitutional democracy? A new global empire that slowly but surely brings to an end democracy as it was known, practised and enjoyed by millions of people on our planet during times that now seem rapidly to be fading into the distant past?

NOTE

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The challenge to the Normative by New Norms

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South Africa was the site of an immense struggle for a new normative dispensation – echoing what had been fought for throughout Africa and, indeed, throughout Asia and other locations in the 20th century – and that was the liberality of norms to do with racial equality, with access to international institutions based on the equality of states, and with equal access for all citizens and all states to national and international justice.

All over the world in the 21st century, those norms are being challenged – not on the basis that there should be no norms, but that the bodies of thought underlying a hitherto hegemonic normative regime need to be re-examined from their foundations, and that those who formulated that normative regime in the first place might be hoist on their own and on a reformulated petard. From the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall demonstrations of the intellectual youth of South Africa, with their echoes in the decolonisation-of-thought movement spreading across the Western universities; to the alternative models of governance and government that have made China a superpower; to the insurrectionary challenge of Islam via its militant and militarised Jihadist wings, based on intellectual doctrine that is against liberal doctrine – all is under challenge and it seems that the liberal centre cannot hold. To these contestations come more self-serving protestations of African states against the International Criminal Court, suggesting a 'counter-norm' of impunity; and, indeed, the self-serving Trumpian American refusals to follow international due processes or observe international refugee law – refuting the Christian norm of mercy.

In this short essay, I wish to problematise certain aspects of what I have noted above. I wish firstly to beg the questions: 'Towards what do we decolonise? Is there an antecedent body of norms which should be revitalised? Do they have to be recreated, or even created – and on what basis does this creation proceed?' Secondly, I wish to raise the underlying but overarching question to do with 'non-state actors' involved in fundamental challenges to norms, and that is 'Why can't they have a state?' Is it a question of preserving a Westphalian order as much as a question of norms within a new (or very old, or perhaps recreated) sort of state? Finally, even China has a system that is constitutionalised; 'To what extent can norms be constitutionalised?'

South Africa

Starting with the last question: The South African Constitution is the most normative constitution on earth with its range of equalities. Whether it has successfully made government more answerable or more transparent than elsewhere is another question. The South African government cannot be made more transparent without a major jump in electronic capacity. When contrasted with Estonia, the world's most transparent government – rendered so by clear electronic publication of every debate and decision – South Africa lags behind appallingly. It demonstrates huge incapacities in the electronic systems of its public administration and with many senior members of government, so it is rumoured, not fully able to use a computer.

Having said that, debate that appears on electronic platforms can be reduced to soundbites. I make this point now as I return to it later in the case of ISIS and militarised Jihad, and the point is a simple one: Debate is not a soundbite that is amplified and extended beyond its logical reach; the soundbite is a condensation of a complex debate involving logics and argued norms. In the case of South Africa, a profound dissatisfaction with the fruits of majority rule cannot lead to the creation of something new by extrapolating from a soundbite. The work of scholars like Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni,[1] nuanced more moderately but still forcefully by scholars like Adam Habib,[2] show that the argument is forming for a new intellectual departure, and with it a normative one. But the rendition of their work into a mere 'decolonisation' without an interrogation of what norms, governments, and economies looked like in a pre-colonial age – *that was not globally enmeshed and technologically complex in the production, accumulation and circulation of capital and learning; and how they could be made so* – is a challenge to problematise anything that is reductionist. What is sought is in fact a complex post-colonialism – although that term too has often become a mere soundbite. My point is that the search for new thought, new norms, and new anchors for society is urgent but not simple, and certainly not simplistic.

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I am reminded of New Zealand, a country that took my refugee family in during World War II. At the time, the indigenous Maori people had only begun to emerge from an epoch of great loss of morale after failing to win their liberation war against land-hungry white settlers. The Maori cultural renaissance and political resurgence of the late 1960s and 1970s began, curiously enough, with an objection to the All Blacks playing rugby against an apartheid Springbok team. This led to a critique of apartheid as a national system based on selective and vindictive norms, and leading to much debate as to which Maori norms could be suitable, even if refurbished, for modern times. Times in which students were also challenging governments in the streets of Paris and Prague in the name of justice. Andrew Sharp's book *Justice and the Maori*[3] established a set of noble norms that were not primitive or unable to be problematised – a norm is not a divine command, unlike a soundbite injunction, but is capable of being immersed in debate. The whole text of communal kindness that resulted, and which saw, for example, the haka redefined as not just a challenge but a mark of respect, is not unlike the emergence of Ubuntu in South Africa – except that Ubuntu really has remained a background norm that has not been amplified in student protests and has certainly not been informative of government policies. In New Zealand, the practice of solidarity has become something writ large, as was seen in the response to the March massacres at the mosques in Christchurch. Then, everyone was at pains to express sentiments in both Maori and broken Arabic – but Xhosa was better spoken in *Black Panther* than in many of the polite suburbs of Johannesburg.[4]

The worrying thing about the decolonial project in South Africa is that it shares with the very government it protests against a key attribute – a sense of black majority rule, but extrapolated into a sense of blackness, extrapolated further into a sense of pan-African blackness, extrapolated still further into a universal black solidarity and oneness. But, from the days of apartheid onwards, South Africa has been continentally notorious for assuming that all of Africa must look like South Africa. The ignorance of

the continent is profound. It is a continent of 55 African Union-recognised states. It contains 2000 languages. Its key marker is one of difference and plurality. It is black only in contradistinction to being white. Is this enough upon which to build a new normative structure that is meaningful to all black people? Even Thabo Mbeki, with all his essays on Caribbean poetry and praise for Ngugi wa Thiongo's *Decolonising the Mind*,[5] was startled when out-manoeuvred by Tony Blair at the 2003 Commonwealth summit in Abuja convened to discuss Zimbabwe. Mbeki thought he could count upon the support of all African member states. In the end he could not and Blair, for good measure, captured the black Caribbean states.[6]

The Chinese response to having been denigrated was to become better and, essentially, to crush the West with technology, industry, economic growth and movement, and global outreach. The Chinese remain Marxists in name, but do not base their sense of autochthony on a Marxist credo or on not being white. What empowers China is simply success.

The legacy of apartheid is an entire generation of leadership anxious to be seen as as good as the white man on the white man's terms, but without seeking to surpass the white man in technology. It is as if time stopped still at liberation and no new development of electricity, computer networks and electronic industry was needed. And, insofar as the credo of blackness was amplified by the doctrine of redistribution – a Marxist norm as opposed to an economic strategy – the developing ideology is to do with the sequestration and distribution of capital, and not its generation, circulation and strategic investment. The comparison has to be with China after what it calls its 'century of humiliation' at imperial hands.[7] The Chinese response to having been denigrated was to become better and, essentially, to crush the West with technology, industry, economic growth and movement, and global outreach. The Chinese remain Marxists in name, but do not base their sense of autochthony on a Marxist credo or on not being white. What empowers China is simply success.

China

Much has been made of whether the Chinese wish to export their political system. In fact, the system is based both on a norm and, precisely, economic success. The norm is *guanxi* – the most approximate translation being 'reciprocation'.[8] Whereas democracy is a horizontal system of equalities, guanxi is a system of vertical hierarchies that emulate Heaven and Earth. Thus the emperor is above the subject, the husband above the wife, the older brother above the younger siblings, etc. However, the dynamic that lubricates the system is that, while respect is owed upwards, benefaction *must* flow downwards – otherwise the system becomes dysfunctional – just as equalities become dysfunctional if there are unequal votes in what is meant to be a democracy.

The Confucian overlordism of the Chinese Communist Party is functional only because of prosperity. Without prosperity and its sharing up and down the chain of relationships, the system starts to grind towards a standstill. The system is thus dependent on the discharge of a norm. That norm demands constant economic growth. Growth demands constant innovation and, in the modern world, technological command. It becomes the most competitively based norm in the world. In this sense, President Trump is tactically correct to challenge the Chinese economy through means of trade wars – except that China has now amassed such reserves that it can, if push comes to shove, lubricate its system for quite some years to come. The Chinese messaging to its citizens is precisely one of providing and maintaining prosperity and, for now, it is a more powerful messaging than that to do with democracy.

Messaging has to be telic – purposeful. It can't forever be just about maintaining something. That thing must keep going forward. The promise of the message is

something better, something even better. Here, however, there can be a loop involved. It can mean going backwards to a text that is projected into an adjusted modernity by modern means. In its most sinister but sophisticated form, this has been the achievement of ISIS.

ISIS

What I have tried to do in my latest work,[9] building on the general observations of Gray[10] and Devji,[11] is to construct a detailed picture of the infrastructure of the ISIS messaging. Gray and Devji, among others, observed that, far from a medieval project, ISIS had captured modernity from 'moderate' Muslims. Its Caliphate was a 'pure' land, achieved atrociously to be sure, but also by the most modern of means. By that I mean not only in terms of military prowess and economic transactions, and not only in terms of electronic and broadcast messaging, but in terms of a vision of a state with all modern benefits as well as norms of righteousness – depicted in the first instance as righteous because others were unrighteous, but then in sophisticated disquisitions of the reasonings of learned men on the scriptures.

Given that the early ambition of ISIS was to establish a Caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq, I wonder what the world would have looked like if it had survived and then tried to function like a normal state in terms of trade and travel links. But, because its model was a direct attack upon the Westphalian state system, achieved after decades of religious war in Europe, the secular Westphalian system could not have accommodated an out-and-out religious state.

I unpacked how media command allowed a theology to be propounded – the facile Facebook posts being only an entry point that led, step by step, to an internet universe of clickthroughs, worm holes, and the encryptions of the dark web. At each stage, the polish of media production of the highest order was married to a further stage of theological discourse that led from dissatisfaction with the world order, to a revival of older virtues, to a conversion that was firstly personal, then communal, and finally heroic to the point of deontological. Each stage was blessed with norms and justifications that bore the patina of actual justice. The more I studied it, the more I understood how significantly the West had under-estimated it, and how significantly moderate Islam had under-estimated its radical and Jihadist counterpart.

When UK Prime Minister Theresa May vowed to wipe ISIS off the internet, she had no idea about how the internet actually works. Nothing can be completely wiped from it, and variations cannot be prevented from reappearing. It is not only South African politicians who do not understand the electronic communications age. But I was at pains to ensure that my book was not just a geek's guide to electronic darkness. The theological discourse is led step by step towards an expansiveness – and to conclusions with which I thoroughly disagree – but it is learned and when it is not, it appears learned. Its methodology is one of learning or apparent learning. Someone not previously and deeply versed in Islamic thought would be beguiled and then convinced. Vast production studios of the sort owned by ISIS before its geographical defeat ensured that the methodology of ideas was shaped and disseminated by the methodology of the most modern media.

Given that the early ambition of ISIS was to establish a Caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq, I wonder what the world would have looked like if it had survived and then tried to function like a normal state in terms of trade and travel links. But, because its model was a direct attack upon the Westphalian state system, achieved after decades of religious war in Europe, the secular Westphalian system could not have accommodated an out-and-out religious state. It would have been regarded forever as a non-state entity, although 'irregular' transactions would of course have been

conducted with it – just as they were with white-ruled Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa and warlord militias controlling oil fields in Libya today. Norms, finally, are not in themselves retarding agents against wickedness.

Concluding remarks

So, in a world with, at the least, agitated norms, challenged norms, a resistance against hegemonic norms – not always because of the norms themselves but because of the nature of hegemony – what does this mean for a project we might loosely call 'international morality'?

The old Realist sages of the discipline of International Relations would say there never was an international morality. Everything was a policy, product or perpetuation of power on behalf of national interests. In moments of conflict, negotiations would involve a bartering of interests. Normative International Relations arose from continental critical theory and vouchsafed itself by claims to speaking the truth as well as speaking morally. One universal truth meant one universal morality. In the face of global developments, critical theory is the least able to answer the calls for dialogue and negotiation – because it means a bartering of aspects of what one side or the other calls moral, calls normative. The accusation that this becomes a cultural relativism merely perpetuates the sense that a morality is finally a hegemonic project. It was white against black. apartheid had its own 'norms' too. It was democracy against Communism. It was China against the satirical image of being Chinese – even though that image had its own moments of beauty in a stereotyping of Chinoiserie. Dialogue between and across moralities at least relieves the debate of hegemony and the more moralities in the frame, the less the debate will be binary, crudely dyadic.

When, finally, norms are debated in terms of their unique foundational values there may be a step towards a normative equivalence, a normative balance, a normative equilibrium. Maybe, as a staging post, a normative equality? In the very messy world of the 21st century, this might not be a bad staging point for something better.

NOTE

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Best of "Global South" Values still Offer Alternatives in Times of Global Uncertainty

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The South East Asian developmental states used positive aspects of their ancient traditions more effectively to promote sustainable nationhood, inclusive growth and development than their African counterparts. Thus, the "Asian Tigers" more successfully used aspects of their traditional cultures to combat corruption, make company corporate cultures more inclusive and foster common national identity. Confucianism is a humanistic ethical philosophy, with origins nearly 2000 years ago in China, whose influence on social behaviour has remained intact in many Asian societies. It is widely practiced in East Asian Tigers such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.

Consequently, these societies have used positive aspects of Confucianism to lift millions equitably out of poverty and establish globally competitive companies and peaceful societies over relatively short periods.[1] "Does the way the East Asian Tigers used positive aspects of Confucianism offer an alternative model for development, to tackle corruption and install ethical moral values; to a South Africa and African countries which are in deep-seated poverty, corruption and violence?"

Does it offer us the opportunity to examine positive aspects of traditional African values which could be leveraged similarly to promote caring, equal and honest societies?

Confucian morality and ethics

Confucian approaches are not homogenous. Confucianism is contested, like all traditions, with a range of interpretations of key principles. Nevertheless, there are some core aspects on which there is reasonable agreement.[2]

Confucianism emphasises the right to human equality, worth and dignity.[3] Confucian philosophy argues that individuals, in their relations with others, must engage ethically, morally and fairly. It is expressed in the terms *ren* (benevolence), *li* (propriety)[4] and *shu* (reciprocity)[5]. Morality includes the virtues of benevolence (*ren*), which is sensitivity 'to the needs and feelings of others'[6]; consistently behaving in a principled fashion (*Li*); and 'treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself' (*shu*)[7] .

Combining the virtues of *ren*, *li* and *shu* leads to social harmony.[8] In Confucianism, a state should be concerned about inequality (*bujun*) in wealth between people.[9] But *bujun* goes beyond wealth to include political equality.[10] The Confucianism ideal is for the "virtuous" (*junzi*), the honest, the knowledgeable and the talented to work in government.[11] A person who sets a moral example in behavior is classified as *junzi*.[12]

Harmony is crucial in Confucianism. 'This may include harmony between societies, harmony within a society with different ethnic groups (or political parties), harmony within the same ethnic group with different kin, and harmony among the same kin'.[13]

The Confucius scholar, Chenyang Li, argues that "harmony" does not mean "sameness".[14] Harmony, in fact, 'presupposes differences and has to be achieved through differences'. Li makes an argument for "cooperative opposition", where opposing parties can be brought 'into harmony without harming one another'.[15] Furthermore, to move from tension, strife and opposition to harmony 'requires coordination or cooperation among the involved parties, either consciously or unconsciously'.[16]

However, the paternalistic aspects of Confucianism, which emphasise loyalty to family, group and clan, could translate into cronyism, corruption and waste; with jobs, contracts and largesse given to members of the favoured group. The partnerships between government, business and trade unions could easily become patronage-based, encouraging cronyism, corruption and pork-barrelling.

Confucianism values consensus over conflict, preferring to accommodate 'different views and seeking compromises for the sake of the common good'.[17] In Japan and South Korea, consensus is strongly emphasised in politics, business and family relations.[18] Consensus between government, business and civil society to pursue growth in the post-Second World War, with each social partner agreeing to compromises, is at the heart of the East Asian Tigers' economic miracles.

Confucianism emphasises education. In South Korea such is the reverence for teachers that they are not called by their names by students, but rather by their function, *seongsaengim*, out of respect for their learning.[19] In 1984, the Singapore government introduced the teaching of Confucian ethics in schools.[20]

Many Southeast Asian scholars argue that Confucianism is compatible with democracy.[21] Japan, the oldest democracy in Asia, is a case in point.[22] In a study on the historical roots of the South Korean democratisation process, Kwon Tai-Hwab and Cho Hein remark that 'in the long run, the Confucian legacy may play an increasingly positive role in the democratisation of Korea'[23] through 'mutual adjustments in the interface between Confucian and Western ideals'[24].

Not all aspects of Confucianism are necessarily good

Confucianism makes a case for reciprocity (*shu*) in social relations and exchanges. Reciprocity in relations precipitates the 'exchanges of mutual benefits or favours'.[25] This practice is called *guanxi*. However, in many cases this practice of *guanxi* has been abused and has resulted in bribery, corruption and pork-barreling.[26]

Among the emphasis of Confucianism is *zhong*, interpreted as loyalty to elders and superiors, and *xiao*, filial piety, which translates into respect towards your elders.[27] In companies such as Toyota in Japan and Samsung in South Korea, employees are regarded as part of a "family".[28] The CEO of the company is seen as the 'the head of the family who appreciate[s] contact with workers (family members), leading to formulations such as the 'Samsung family', the 'Toyota family', the 'Hyundai family' and so on'.[29]

Confucianism also makes it easier for social partners, government, business and civil society to coordinate and create growth coalitions. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had partnerships between government, business and trade unions in which each one made compromises to raise the productivity of the economy. However, the paternalistic aspects of Confucianism, which emphasise loyalty to family, group and clan, could translate into cronyism, corruption and waste; with jobs, contracts and largesse given to members of the favoured group. The partnerships between government, business and trade unions could easily become patronage-based, encouraging cronyism, corruption and pork-barrelling.

This is not to say that some opportunistic East Asian leaders and governments do not manipulate culture for self-interest, to hide corruption or to suppress critics. In fact, on occasion, it is used to compel uncritical loyalty to the leader and the state.[30] 'The impression that Confucianism advocates the suppression of the self for the sake of societal interests may be due to the politicisation of Confucianism'[31], and the 'attempts by various groups to politicise Confucian ethical values for other non-ethical purposes'.[32]

This is not to say that some opportunistic East Asian leaders and governments do not manipulate culture for self-interest, to hide corruption or to suppress critics.

Khun-Eng Kuah writes that Confucianism can be an 'important ideological tool for social engineering', by potentially providing 'a set of moral and ethical values that legitimises the perpetuation of a highly centralised and authoritarian system of government'.[33] Tu Wei-Ming warns that often, Confucianism is politicised for reasons of self-interest, when leaders encourage submissiveness, 'passive acceptance of authority' and hierarchical power relationships between the elite and ordinary citizens.[34]

Submitting passively to traditional authority, political leaders or party results in 'self-depreciation without dignity, communal participation no longer means the extension and deepening of one's humanity'.[35]

Autocratic leaders have often abused this to demand loyalty to the leader from citizens.[36] Paternalistic aspects of Confucianism to promote hierarchy, loyalty to leader, elders and group and suppression of the individual will to that of the collective, have on occasion been abused by political leaders and governments to hold whole populations under the leash.[37]

Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, for example, censored the media, made homosexuality a crime and banned chewing gum.[38]

In Taiwan in 1948, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or "KMT") and its leader Chiang Kai-shek introduced martial law (only suspended in 1987), banning independent trade unions, civil society organisations and the media.[39] The KMT outlawed all opposition parties. It only allowed trade unions, business associations and civil society groups that deferred to the leader and government unquestioningly.

The Indian Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has long ago debunked the wrong-headed notion that democracy is Western or foreign to Asian or African cultures, arguing convincingly that democracy is "universal" and that there are both democratic and undemocratic elements in all cultures.

Many South East Asian leaders, like Singapore's former leader Lee Kuan Yew, have often abused aspects of Confucianism that emphasised the collective, to argue that democracy, individual rights and interests are "Western values" and therefore "undesirable" and undermine moral values. Yew said: 'Traditional Asian ideas of morality, duty and society which have sustained and guided us in the past are giving way to a more Westernised, individualistic and self-centred outlook on life'.[40]

Those who, like Yew, argue that Confucianism is intrinsically authoritarian, have been convincingly rebutted. Charlene Tran wrote 'all individuals possess and exercise rights that are intrinsic in and supported by Confucian philosophy'.[41]

The Indian Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has long ago debunked the wrong-headed notion that democracy is Western or foreign to Asian or African cultures, arguing convincingly that democracy is "universal" and that there are both democratic and undemocratic elements in all cultures.[42]

Indeed, as some argue, Confucianism emphasises the 'right to rebellion if the state does not fulfil its role; whenever a dynasty comes to an end, it has always been justified on the grounds that the state was not performing its functions, whether economic or political'.[43] Furthermore, aspects of Confucianism also encourage the right to criticise 'when there is a violation of propriety and justice'.[44]

South Korea's New Village Movement

South Korea's President Park Chung-Hee, who led the country from 1961 to 1979, launched the "Saemaul Undoing" or New Village Movement on 22 April 1970. The movement used the Confucianism principle of community to encourage local community-led development.[45] Each village was given 335 bags of cement, half a ton of iron rods and a four-step local community development plan.

Every village member had to join the development.[46] The villagers had to select their leaders. Village committees were elected. Decisions were made at traditional village assemblies. The community had to pledge small amounts of money. Communities had to build new homes or upgrade their homes collectively. Communities had to establish cooperative companies producing local products.

Together, the communities built amenities, infrastructure and policing mechanisms. Villages partnered their development efforts with neighbouring communities. The villagers modernised roads, bridges and irrigation systems. Women played crucial roles in the organisation of the reconstruction; which spawned a village women's movement, with organisations such as the Mother's Club raising to prominence. Women's involvement in the New Village Movement countered and changed age-old patriarchal views of women's abilities.[47]

Within a decade, the village movement had decreased poverty significantly. It transformed the dilapidated thatched rural houses called *choga-jip* houses, into new, sturdy tiled housing. The leading role of women in the movement strengthened their power in rural society.[48]

Japanese employee participation in business decision-making

Many Asian Tigers used the principles of Confucianism to argue that the role of business is not solely to pursue profitmaking at all costs; but that it has obligations to its employees, local communities and society. This has manifested in firms putting "doing right" over profit.

The organisational culture of such firms is inclusively managed both internally and externally. Employees are included in decision-making, provided with skills' training and benefits; and customers are not short-changed for short-term profit. Some scholars have dubbed business leaders based on the ethical foundations of Confucianism as "ethnocracy".

Japan's firms make decisions through consensus involving all employees and by spreading the benefits of profit to all employees.[49] Japanese firms have a number of avenues for employee participation.[50] These include quality control circles formed from employees from different units, which meet regularly to make suggestions on increasing the efficiency and quality of products. Their proposals are then passed on to management.

Japanese companies provide long-term employment, welfare and employee participation in return for labour market peace, increased productivity and employee loyalty to the firm.

Companies have management-labour joint structures to share company information, strategy and direction. Trade unions in Japan are based at the enterprise, rather than the sector type of unions we see in South Africa and other countries. There is a cooperative partnership at the firm level between management and unions – and their interests are often aligned. Japanese companies provide extensive corporate welfare in the form training, housing benefits and community development.

Japanese companies provide long-term employment, welfare and employee participation in return for labour market peace, increased productivity and employee loyalty to the firm.[51] Surveys have shown that, in the long run, there 'is a clear link between ethics and strategic management: honesty, trustworthiness, etc. may increase corporate returns, for example, through signalling effects that allow suppliers, potential employees, and present employees to infer that the firm will not be unethical in its behaviour toward them'.[52]

Singapore building national identity on shared values

Singapore became a standalone independent country in 1965. The country used the communitarian aspects of Confucianism to mould together a common identity for one of the most diverse countries on earth.[53]

Singapore has an ethnically diverse society, with the Chinese community making up 77%, Malays 14%, Indians 7.7% and mixed groups around 1.3% of the population. These different communities are diverse within themselves. Different ethnic groups have different religious beliefs, and within individual ethnic groups, there are also different religious beliefs.

Under colonialism, the different communities lived separately. Before and after colonialism, however, the different ethnic groups have clashed violently. After the Second World War, communities in Malaya 'were mobilised in discrete racial silos, and inter-ethnic bargaining among communal leaders on behalf of their communities was institutionalised as the dominant model of multiracial political rule'.[54]

In 1957, the Singapore People's Action Party (PAP) took power following the end of colonialism. The PAP argued for the forging of a new national identity, based on racial equality among the different groups, and the creation of a 'national culture based on enlarging the overlapping areas of cultural beliefs and practices shared by the Malay, Chinese and Indian cultures'.[55]

The government introduced a Confucianism-based programme called "Our Shared Values", in which shared common values from all ethnic communities were moulded into a new set for the country. These would be the basis of a new common national identity.

The PAP introduced a policy of "multi-racialism", which had pillars of multi-lingualism, multiculturalism and respect for different religions. It emphasised an overarching national Singaporean identity, rather than ethic identities. The PAP government was careful not to have the Chinese community dominate, and refrained from pushing the assimilation of the different communities into the largest Chinese community. The PAP government emphasised the universal idea of "Singaporean", rather than a specific ethnic identity.

The government introduced a Confucianism-based programme called "Our Shared Values",[56] in which shared common values from all ethnic communities were moulded into a new set for the country. These would be the basis of a new common national identity. 'The values [were] intended to promote certain common beliefs and attitudes that capture the essence of being Singaporean… In this way, in time, all communities [would] gradually develop more common, distinctively Singaporean characteristics'.[57]

Five overarching shared values were identified as: nation before community and society before self; family as the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus not conflict; and racial and religious harmony.[58]

The PAP, dominated by Chinese, brought all ethnic groups into its party leaders and membership structures. It also opened appointments to Cabinet, government and state agencies to all ethnic groups. It introduced meritocracy into its party promotion policies and for appointments to the public service, securing of government contracts and business licenses. It introduced what is called Group Representation Constituencies, which guarantee representation of minorities in elected councils.

South Korea: Using Confucianism to tackle corruption

In South Korea, immediately after independence the Confucian principle of *guanxi* (one's "networks" or "connections") were often misused to provide opportunities, contracts and jobs exclusively on the basis of clan, family and school ties.[59]

Major-General Park Chung Hee took power in South Korea in 1961 and launched the Third Republic of Korea, which lasted from 1961 to 1971. Park himself labelled corruption as "evil", and pushed for severe punishment for those found to be corrupt and generous rewards for those found to be performing their public duties diligently, honestly and efficiently.

Park called for both economic and "spiritual" modernisation of the society, using aspects of Confucianism to tackle corruption. He argued that economic transformation could not happen unless it is preceded by a transformation of moral values. "Spiritual" modernisation was meant to be a change of moral values in the public service and broader society to emphasise honesty, hard work and efficiency. When he launched his anti-corruption drive, he initially focused on high-ranking public servants to send the message that the government was serious about combatting corruption. During his leadership, two Cabinet ministers were imprisoned for corruption.[60]

The subsequent government in March 1975 launched a nation-wide anti-corruption movement called *Suhjongshoeshin* Movement (Government's Purification Campaign). It aimed to achieve

"National Restoration", through tackling corruption, increasing public sector efficiency, and restoring moral values. In the public sector, the project introduced training and rewards for efficiency and honesty: It introduced improvements in administrative regulations, reporting practices and budget management. It focused on cleaning the environment.

The targets for remedial action within the government include unjust, uncaring or corrupt behaviour. Behaviour which undermined discipline and administrative efficiency was policed. There was monitoring of officials perceived to have extravagant private lives, which were deemed to exceed "proper" living standards of government officials. Outside employment activities, which conflicted with employees' public service jobs, were also policed.

During the year of its introduction, around 22 000 civil servants were punished. The movement was launched by dismissing 331 public officials in February 1975, among them 46 were high ranking officials, including two Deputy Ministers Ministers[61]. To tackle corrupt behaviour in broader society, attempts were made to inculcate what the government called healthy mind-sets. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), sports, professional and community organisations were required to rid themselves of corrupt practices and leaders. Members of the public who attempted to solicit favours or request illegal actions of public officials, such as buying information, were severely punished. Officials who accepted bribes were also punished and publicly shamed.

> Immediately after independence South Korea had patronage cultural systems called guanxi, whereby opportunities, contracts and jobs were given on the basis of clan, family and school ties.

South Korea established a meritocratic bureaucracy which also reduced corruption across society. Meritocratic public administration was put in place, which included examination-based recruitment to the civil service and the public service. Promotions were also based on merit.

Conclusion: Lessons for South Africa and Africa

The question is often asked whether African culture and traditions are obstacles to development and democracy.

During African colonialism and apartheid, colonial powers often chose to highlight aspects or distorted elements of African culture and traditions which would reinforce the oppression of the colonised African people. The aspects of African culture and traditions which colonial and apartheid governments highlighted were often the more autocratic, subservient or anti-developmental ones.

Many colonial and apartheid governments ruled African populations through a different set of laws, called "customary law", which were ostensibly African 'traditional' and 'cultural' laws, conventions and institutions. The African scholar Mahmood Mamdani called this phenomenon 'indirect rule' of colonial governments.[62] Colonial governments confirmed 'traditional leaders', chiefs and kings or installed their own, and set new 'traditional' rules, laws and institutions to make people subservient to both the colonial government and the colonial government-endorsed 'traditional' leaders, chiefs, kings and institutions.

In the post-independence period, most African governments and leaders retained the colonially appointed traditional chiefs, kings and structures – and their powers over their 'subjects', on condition that these former colonial appendages ensured their 'subjects' loyally support or vote for the African governments and leaders. In the post-independence period, many African leaders and governments have highlighted or emphasised only the more autocratic, subservient and anti-developmental aspects of African culture and tradition. They have done so in many cases to reinforce their own control over their populations.

Some African countries and leaders have either, for self-interested reasons, emphasised the

undemocratic elements of African culture or, for ideological reasons, rejected democracy building as "foreign". Other African leaders and governments opportunistically argue that democracy is unAfrican, "Western" or against African culture because it shields them from democracy scrutiny so that they can continue to enrich themselves at the expense of overwhelmingly poor Africans.

Many political, traditional and cultural "leaders" have increasingly been using supposedly "African" "culture" and "traditions" to excuse their personal wrongdoing: South African former President Jacob Zuma said that corruption is a "Western paradigm".[63]

Many political, traditional and cultural "leaders" have increasingly been using supposedly "African" "culture" and "traditions" to excuse their personal wrongdoing: South African former President Jacob Zuma said that corruption is a "Western paradigm".

Thus, some African governments and leaders have invented new African "traditions" and "cultures" – claiming these to be authentic.[64] Such new "traditions" and "cultures" are put forward by self-serving leaders and governments to either cover-up misdeeds, shield criticisms or to shore their political support base – and so their ability to secure patronage – among poor, uneducated and uninformed communities.[65]

African culture and traditions have both democratic and autocratic aspects, and both developmental and anti-developmental aspects. The African countries that have dedicatedly pushed for democracy since the end of colonialism – such as Botswana and Mauritius - have been richer and more peaceful.

Botswana has, since independence, emphasised aspects of African traditional culture, such as the concept of *lekgotla*, which involves popular participation in decision-making; consensus-seeking; governing in the interest of the widest number of the population; and leadership accountability. Botswana has outshone all of those that labelled democracy as unAfrican or introduced aspects of democracy which favoured only them.

The African concept of *Ubuntu*[66] is important here. Archbishop Desmond Tutu described *Ubuntu* as: 'My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in what is yours'[67]. Former South African President Nelson Mandela based his leadership on moral integrity. Mandela exercised "Ubuntu-style management": 'Its emphasis not on differences, but on accommodating these'[68].

Rwanda, between January and December 1994, saw one of the world's most terrifying ethnic genocides. In 2005, the Rwandan government re-established the traditional community court system called "Gacaca". In the *Gacaca* system, communities at the local level elect judges to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes except planning of genocide. The courts give lower sentences if the person is repentant and seeks reconciliation with the community.

Since 2005, more than 12 000 community-based courts have tried 1.2 million cases throughout the country. The *Gacaca* trials provide victims with the truth. They give perpetrators the opportunity to confess their crimes, show remorse and ask for forgiveness in front of their community. The *Gacaca* courts were closed on 4 May 2012.

It is crucial for Africans to push determinedly the aspects of African culture and traditions which will enhance democracy and development. African cultural practices which undermine individual human dignity, value and rights must either be abolished immediately or reformed.

The great challenge of this generation in Africa and, indeed, South Africa is how to emphasise democratic elements in African culture and tradition and cut out the

autocratic elements; and similarly, how to elevate the developmental aspects. For this African and South African generation to fail to grasp the nettle of this challenge is to perpetuate another generation of failed African states, with poverty-stricken, broken and unstable societies.

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The Economic Outlook for Emerging Markets

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Asia, Asia, Asia!
Old and wondrous land…
Ravel: Shéhérazade, 1903

The term 'emerging market economies' to describe a group of countries has been around for nearly forty years. It is vague and unsatisfactory in some respects, but it has endured for lack of a better description. This study offers criteria by which to delimit the group, and discusses their growth prospects over the medium term. In doing so, it addresses issues of convergence of emerging market and advanced economies and among emerging market economies themselves, the distribution of fundamental characteristics and the risk they face.

Definition

As good a place as any to start the analysis is the *Wikipedia* entry for emerging markets.[1] Thirty-seven countries are identified by their inclusion in at least one of nine lists of emerging markets. To qualify for inclusion here, economies must satisfy three criteria:

- They must be included in at least six lists.
- They must have an estimated GDP per capita income in 2019 of between $ 6 000 and $ 30 000 in 2011 purchasing parity power prices.
- They must be one of the 25 largest economies on the *Wikipedia* list in 2019, valued at market exchange rates in current US dollars.

Application of these criteria produces a list of fifteen countries: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. Together they account for 53% of the world's population and 31% of the world's output value at market exchange rates in 2019. This compares with the 40% of global output produced by the United States and the European Union combined. By 2024, the fifteen countries are projected to contain 52% of the world's population and to produce 34% of global output.

Projected growth performance, 2019 - 2024

The International Monetary Fund's projected growth performances of the fifteen countries are highly dispersed, as indicated in Figure 1. India's projected growth rate is more than four and a half times greater than that of Russia.

'Economic convergence' means a tendency for per capita income in poorer countries to grow faster than in richer countries, leading to greater equality in per capita income across all countries.

Given advanced countries' projected per capita growth rate of 1.3%, there is divergence between South Africa, Turkey and Mexico, and advanced countries, and very slow convergence between Russia, Brazil and Chile, and advanced countries. There is some

convergence between emerging market economies themselves, but it is not strong. Growth prospects in South Africa and Turkey are well below what would be expected on the basis of their GDP per capita at market rates, while China, Malaysia and Poland demonstrate better growth prospects than expected.

Graph 1: Gross Immigration Flows and Asylum-seekers in the EU+



Economic structure

The economic characteristics of the countries are diverse, as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1

Country	Projected per capita GDP growth at least 250% of advanced countries	Investmentas a share of GDP of at least 24%, 2019	Net oil exporter, 2017, most recent estimate	Share of manufacturing in GDP at least 18%, most recent estimate	Imports plus exports more than 50% of GDP, 2019	Human capital index at least 0.60, most recent estimate
Brazil			X			
Chile					X	X
China	X	X		X		X
Colombia			X			
Egypt	X		X			
India	X	X				
Indonesia	X	X		X		
Malaysia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mexico			X		X	X
Philippines	X	X		X	X	
Poland				X	X	X
Russia		X	X			X
South Africa					X	
Thailand	X		X	X	X	X
Turkey				X	X	X

Sources: Investment: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019
Net oil exports: United States, Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2018
Share of manufacturing in GDP : World Bank, World Development Indicators
Imports and exports: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019
Human capital index: World Bank, Human Capital Index and Components, 2018

Among the countries with highest rates of growth, Malaysia makes it on all five indicators; Thailand on net oil exports, manufacturing, openness and human capital; Philippines on a high investment rate, manufacturing and openness; China and Indonesia on a high investment rate and manufacturing; and Egypt on net oil exports alone.

On the other hand, being an oil exporter does not guarantee high growth, as Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Russia show. Nor does a high share of manufacturing, openness and a high HCI, as in Poland and Turkey, or openness alone, as in South Africa.

Country risk

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of sovereign risk is of considerable interest to domestic and foreign direct and portfolio investors. Many studies are available only through subscription, but there are seven publicly available quantitative indicators which are considered here. They are:

- Five-year credit default swap rates. A credit default swap insures investors against sovereign defaults and a high rate indicates a high risk of default. A basic rate of below 100 is here regarded as an indicator of low risk.
- Sovereign ratings from the three main ratings agencies – Standard and Poor, Moody's and Fitch. One point is scored for each investment grade rating, and a score of three is an indicator of low risk.
- Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index – a score of above 60 (highest scores are least corrupt) indicates low risk.
- The Euromoney Country Risk score – a score of above 40 (highest scores are least risky) indicates low risk.
- Six World Bank Governance Indicators: Voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law – four or more scores above the 15-country median indicate low risk.
- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's country categorisation for purposes of export credits – categories 2 and 3 indicate low risk.
- Freedom House's aggregate democracy score – a score of 60 indicates a relatively high degree of political freedom and civil liberties.

Appendix Table A1 sets out the information in detail, and calculates the number of indicators reflecting low risk (higher scores indicate lower risk). Countries with a score of at least four are regarded as low risk.

Table 2 cross tabulates prospective growth rates with country risk.

Table 2

Projected growth	Risk	
	High	Low
Low	Brazil Colombia Mexico Russia South Africa Turkey	Chile Poland
High	Egypt Philippines	China India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand

Eleven of the countries are on the main diagonal, with six relatively high risk and low



The International Monetary Fund carries out Article IV consultations with each country every year. The publicly available information contains detailed IMF staff analysis, including a risk assessment matrix, which considers the probability and impact of deviations from the assumptions behind the IMF growth projections

growth countries, and five relatively low risk and high growth countries, all in Asia. The four off-diagonal countries contain two with low GDP per capita growing fast with high risk, and two of the highest GDP per capital countries, both of which are low risk, but have started to approach the slower growth of advanced industrial countries.

Medium term risks to economic growth

The International Monetary Fund carries out Article IV consultations with each country every year. The publicly available information contains detailed IMF staff analysis, including a risk assessment matrix, which considers the probability and impact of deviations from the assumptions behind the IMF growth projections. The risks considered fall into three main categories:

- **Global economy risks**. These include tighter global financial conditions, economic slowdowns in advanced economies, economic slowdowns in the Chinese economy, adverse movements in geopolitical conditions and adverse movements in global risk appetite.
- **Policy risks.** These include policy uncertainty, reform failure, retreat from cross- border openness, weak rule of law, and an inappropriately heavy footprint of the state in the economy.
- **Macroeconomic risks.** These include unsustainable and uncoordinated macroeconomic developments, poor fiscal policy and threats to the financial system.

Both probabilities and impacts are assigned to one of five categories as shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Grade	Points
Low	1.0
Low/medium	1.5
Medium	2.0
Medium high	2.5
High	3.0

For each indicator and country, a risk score is calculated by multiplying the probability points by the impact points and the scores are aggregated for the three groupings. The score is positive when the risk is downside and negative when the risk is upside, so the aggregated scores represent net downside risk. Appendix Table A2 sets out the details.

Table 4 summarises the scores by group.

Table 4 - Risk scores

Country	Global risk	Policy risk	Macroeconomic Risk	All risks
Brazil	9	10	9	28
Chile	16.5	5	3	24.5
China	4	4	6	14
Colombia	22	14	0	36
Egypt	17	4	4	25
India	10	8	10	28
Indonesia	14	3	4	21
Malaysia	15	6	13.5	34.5
Mexico	15	11	10.5	36.5
Philippines	7.5	6	0	13.5
Poland	9	11	0	20
Russia	19.5	8	4	31.5
South Africa	17.3	7.5	12	36.8
Thailand	16.5	18	12	46.5
Turkey	20.3	4	6	30.3

The greatest downside risks are found in Thailand, South Africa, Mexico, Malaysia, Colombia, Russia and Turkey. Growth prospects are more fragile in Thailand and Malaysia than in India, Indonesia and China. They are slightly less severe in Brazil than in South Africa, Mexico, Colombia, Russia and Turkey. They are low in Egypt, Chile, Poland and Philippines.

Conclusion

The results of the analysis are clear. The Asian countries are going to pull away from the rest, with some downside risk in Thailand and Malaysia. The Latin American countries will grow at a moderate rate, with high downside risk in Mexico and Colombia. Egypt and Philippines are catching up, while Poland and Chile are making a slow transition to advanced country status. Russia, South Africa and Turkey face the worst headwinds.

NOTES

1 The lists have been compiled by the (1) International Monetary Fund, (2) the BRICS plus eleven countries chosen for their potential to become some of the largest economies in the world in the 20th century, (3) the Financial Times Stock Exchange classification of countries, (4) the Morgan Stanley Capital International classification, (5) the Standard and Poor's classification, (6) the J P Morgan bond market classification, (7) the Dow Jones classification, (8) the Russell Investments classification and (9) the Columbia University list of emerging market global players.

Appendix

Table A1 - Country Risk Analysis

Country	Five Year Cds Swap Rates Basis Points	Investment Grade	Corruption Perception Index	Euromoney Country Risk Score	World Bank Governance	Oecd Classification Export Credits	Freedom House Aggregate Score 2018	Score
BRAZIL	171.80	0	35	63.22	2	5	78	2
CHILE		3	67	73.61	6		94	5
CHINA	40.85	3	39	63.55	3	2	14	4
COLOMBIA	93.16	3	36	58.72	2	4	65	3
EGYPT	321.00	0	35	41.63	0	5	26	0
INDIA	77.32	2	41	58.60	4	3	77	6
INDONESIA	93.83	2	38	58.27	4	3	64	4
MALAYSIA		3	47	64.75	5	2	45	5
MEXICO	107.57	3	28	58.13	1	3	62	3
PHILIPPINES		2	36	54.46	2	3	62	2
POLAND	66.30	3	60	70.99	6		85	6
RUSSIA	121.18	2	28	56.83	0	4	20	0
SOUTH AFRICA	185.95	2	43	59.20	6	4	78	4
THAILAND		3	36	63.00	3	3	31	3
TURKEY	440.41	0	41	57.07	3	5	32	1

Source	World Government Bonds	Ratings agencies	Transparency International 2018	Euromoney 30.4.2019	World Bank governance indicators Most recent	OECD Export Credit classification	Freedom House	
Date	30.4.2019	30.4.2019	2018	30.4.2019		2019	2018	

Las Condes, Chile

Table A2

Risk Assessment Matrices	Tighter Global Financial	China Slow-Down	Us/ Advanced Slowdown	Higher or Lower Oil Price	Global Risk Appetite	Geo Political	Political Uncertainty	Policy Uncertainty	Reform Failure/ Success	Cross Border Retreat
BRAZIL										
Likelihood	H	L/M					H			M
Impact	M	M					M			M
CHILE										
Likelihood	H	L/M	M	M					M	H
Impact	M	H	M	L					M	H
CHINA										
Likelihood					M					M
Impact					M					M
COLOMBIA										
Likelihood	H	M	H	L			M	M		M
Impact	H	M	M	H			H	M		M
EGYPT										
Likelihood	H	M				M			M	
Impact	(H)	(M)				(M)				
INDIA										
Likelihood			H			M			M	M
Impact			M			M			M	M
INDONESIA										
Likelihood	H	M		L					M	
Impact	M	H		M					L/M	
MALAYSIA										
Likelihood	H	L/M	M	M						H
Impact	M	M	M	L						M
MEXICO										
Likelihood	H		M				L			H
Impact	H		H				M			H
PHILIPPINES										
Likelihood	H									H
Impact	M/H									M
POLAND										
Likelihood	M		M				M			H
Impact	M/H		M				M/H			M

Table A2

Risk Assessment Matrices	Tighter Global Financial	China Slow-Down	Us/ Advanced Slowdown	Higher or Lower Oil Price	Global Risk Appetite	Geo Political	Political Uncertainty	Policy Uncertainty	Reform Failure/ Success	Cross Border Retreat
RUSSIA										
Likelihood	H	L/M		L		H			M	M
Impact	L/M	H		H		M/H			M	M
SOUTH AFRICA										
Likelihood	H	L/M	H					M		
Impact	M/H	M/H	M					H/M		
THAILAND										
Likelihood	H	L/M	H				M	H		M
Impact	M	H	M				H	M		H
TURKEY										
Likelihood	H	L/M				H		M		M
Impact	H	L/M				H		L		L

Sukhumvit Road, Thailand

Risk Assessment Matrices	Unco-ordinated, Unsustainable Macro	Fiscal Policy	Domestic Financial
BRAZIL			
Likelihood		H	
Impact		H	
CHILE			
Likelihood			L
Impact			H
CHINA			
Likelihood	M		
Impact	H		
COLOMBIA			
Likelihood			
Impact			
EGYPT			
Likelihood		M	
Impact		(M)	
INDIA			
Likelihood		M	M
Impact		H	M
INDONESIA			
Likelihood		M	
Impact		M	
MALAYSIA			
Likelihood	M	M	L/M
Impact	L/M	M/H	M
MEXICO			
Likelihood	M	L/M	
Impact	H	H	
PHILIPPINES			
Likelihood		M	M
Impact		M/H	M
POLAND			
Likelihood			
Impact			
RUSSIA			
Likelihood			M
Impact			M
SOUTH AFRICA			
Likelihood		M	M
Impact		H	H
THAILAND			
Likelihood	M	M	M
Impact	M	M	M
TURKEY			
Likelihood	M		
Impact	H		

BOOK REVIEW

Francis Fukuyama: Identity

DANIEL DE KADT is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California Merced. He received his PhD in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and holds degrees from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Oxford University. He studies political behaviour in new democracies, with a focus on micro-level turnout and macro-level political inequality, and a secondary interest in vote choice and change. His regional interest is Southern Africa, where he promotes the use of quantitative data and credible research design in the study of politics.



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LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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ISBN-13: 978-0374129293

"Identity politics" is an increasingly popular term used to describe numerous modern political movements. From South Africa's student protests to the resurgence of white supremacism in the United States, from Black Lives Matter to Brexit, it appears to some that expressed identities have come to dominate how political action is coordinated and discussed. Francis Fukuyama's *Identity* is an attempt to trace the historical origins of this phenomenon.

Fukuyama is best known for majestic treatises on political economy in which he takes deep historical views on subjects such as the origins and prospects of the modern liberal democratic consensus (such as it is) or the origins of the modern state. In *Identity* he studies at once the intellectual history and the political history of a type of politics that has become seemingly pervasive in the modern world. The book is certainly worth reading: it is well written, accessible, and provides an insightful lens through which to understand the role that identity has played in human history. At the same time, I would urge readers to maintain a healthy skepticism about the central contextual, theoretical, and empirical claims that interweave to make up the book's central argumentative thread.

By way of intellectual context, *Identity* is the latest in a series of books written in the last three years that attempt to diagnose a current malaise in Western liberal democracies. Though Fukuyama's interests are geographically broader, he himself notes that the impetus for the book comes from Donald Trump's election in 2016. *Identity*, like these other books, begs the question of whether such a malaise exists in the first place. It strikes me that more work needs to be done by both Fukuyama and others to establish that the liberal democratic consensus truly faces a crisis, let alone that this crisis is intimately tied to a rise in the role of identity. To be sure, there are warning signs that should make us wary of present and coming challenges to liberal democracy. Yet human prosperity, on every metric available, is at an all time high for both the haves and the have-nots; democratic elections continue to happen peacefully and regularly across the world; and fundamental human freedoms are likely enjoyed by a larger share of people than at any point in human history.

Theoretically, Fukuyama offers us a satisfying definition of identity: The understanding of an "inner self" distinct from an "outer self-in-society." He extends this to a definition of identity politics: The belief that society is failing to recognise the inner self, and that this disjuncture between the inner and the outer self implies a lack of dignity that requires political remedy. This is the concept that Fukuyama returns to throughout *Identity*, and it is perhaps best labeled "dignity": whether a person perceives that they are treated as a full human being. What is somewhat missing here, of course, is a close reflection on the conditions under which this becomes truly political: the existence of enterprising leaders, means of coordination, and a political setting in which collective expression can occur. For people to desire dignity is not inherently political unless that belief is multiplied and transformed into the realm of political action.

It is in altering the satisfying definition of "identity" into a definition of "identity politics" that the argument loses its way somewhat. How can we meaningfully distinguish

"identity-as-dignity" from a range of other political processes that have no doubt shaped modern history: political representation, class status, economic satisfaction, or any number of other forces? Throughout the book it is taken as self-evident that it is "dignity" – the disjuncture between the inner and outer self – that has been a driving force in political change over time, yet almost every example leveraged by Fukuyama could be equally well explained with some nexus of the above – representation, class status, and economic satisfaction. Of course, identity or dignity may play its part, but conceptually, what is identity if it is not distinguishable from a range of other political phenomena? Identity is a political tool and operates in concert with these other forces, but it does not supplant or contradict them, as Fukuyama supposes.

Empirically, as is ever the case with Fukuyama, we are offered an impressive synthesis of intellectual and political history. The book traces the origins of identity-as-an-idea from Plato and Luther through the modern era, demonstrating a considerable and admirable breadth of knowledge. Yet this intellectual history is peculiar in that it is essentially the history of an idea, rather than a reckoning with human psychology. The idea that identity – this notion of the internal self and the outer self-in-society – did not truly exist prior to Europe's Reformation and Renaissance periods seems trivially untrue. Intellectual reflection on the concept may not have existed, but unless human psychology has changed very fundamentally in a very short space of time, identity was always there and in operation. What has changed, perhaps, is the ability for people to express those identities and coordinate around those identities, and for institutional systems that allow identities to become political.

One of my chief frustrations in reading *Identity* is the presence of factual generalisations and assertions. This is of course the nature of such a book, in which the author tends toward breadth rather than depth, but it bears dwelling on. For example, Fukuyama leads off in Chapter 1 by declaring that '[t]he left has focused less on broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of groups perceived as being marginalized – blacks, immigrants, Hispanics, the LGBT community […] the right, meanwhile, is redefining itself as patriots who seek to protect traditional national identity[.]' There certainly is some truth to this assay, and yet it sits deeply at odds with the policy politics of the last two decades. The single defining issue of American politics for nearly a decade (from 2008 through 2018) was healthcare policy. Fukuyama returns to this issue later in the book, suggesting that Obama's focus on social policy was an aberration. But this dismissal of the most important political moment of early 21st century US politics is deeply unsatisfying. Likewise, the major issue in British politics for the past 30 years has been welfare reform, yet for some reason Fukuyama glosses over this to declare that class and economic interests have been supplanted by identity. It seems to me that Fukuyama's brief summary of modern "identity politics" is more strongly reflective of a strategic pivot on the right.

In general, this is the core problem at the heart of Identity: can we meaningfully distinguish a politics focused on "marginalised groups" from a politics focused on "broad economic equality?" Inequality in the United States, South Africa, Latin America, and both Western and Eastern Europe is deeply rooted in ethno-racial cleavages. Fukuyama's analysis of the South African anti-apartheid movement drives this problem home. He sees the anti-apartheid movement as an example of a politics of dignity spurring the masses to action. Dignity and identity were no doubt central to the movement, but surely no more central than economic deprivation, the denial of political rights, or a slew of other things. It was the nexus of all these things – systematic organised oppression along racial lines manifested in terms of physical freedom, economic prosperity, and dignity – that gave grist to the movement. Indeed, a broad literature in political science and economics argues that it is economic prosperity (and equality) that is often the catalyst for political revolutions.

Fukuyama has written a useful book on an important topic, but in the end, it is a case of too much breadth and too little depth, and it leaves this reader wanting more.

BOOK REVIEW

John Dugard: Confronting Apartheid

DENNIS DAVIS is a serving Judge of the High Court of South Africa. He was a member of the Commission of Enquiry into Tax Structure of South Africa (the Katz Commission) and Technical Advisor to the Constitutional Assembly where the negotiations for South Africa's interim and final constitutions were formulated and concluded. Since his appointment to the Bench in 1998, he has continued to teach constitutional law and tax law at the University of Cape Town, where he is an Honorary Professor of law.



JACANA MEDIA
SEPTEMBER 2018
ISBN-13: 978-1-4314-2735-2

John Dugard is a legal hero to many, myself included. Back in the day when most academics and anyone else in the legal community was cowered into submission and silence by the repressive apartheid regime, it was Dugard as well as Barend Van Niekerk, before his untimely death, and Tony Matthews, who stood up to be counted. But for sheer consistency and doggedness, Dugard was exceptional. Apart from the many speeches and lectures he gave in defense of democracy and the rule of law over almost 30 years before the end of apartheid, he wrote the most luminous and eloquent account of the abuse of law by the apartheid regime in 1978, *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order* – still the finest work of its kind.

He has now written a new book entitled *Confronting Apartheid*, in which he looks back without anger but with great perspicacity at a career which extends over some 50 years. Dugard, South Africa's most eminent international law scholar (for which reason alone, although there were many other compelling ones, he should have been appointed to the first Constitutional Court) began his academic career by writing on the South West Africa (SWA) problem in the 1960's. In this book, he reflects on a 1966 article in which he took the World Court to task for its split decision in favour of South Africa, when it found that the applicants who had argued that South Africa's claim to SWA had no basis in law and did not have standing to bring the case. Dugard sought to publish his article in the *South African Law Journal*, then edited by Prof Bobby Hahlo of Wits Law School. Hahlo demanded that Dugard rewrite the article and praise the World Court. Although a junior academic at WITS at that time, Dugard refused to be intimidated by Hahlo, saying that he would publish in a foreign journal with an explanation as to why it had been refused in South Africa. Hahlo caved in, although Dugard generously writes that Hahlo and his deputy editor at the time, Ellison Kahn, were men of integrity who were finally dictated to by their consciences (27).

The book moves on to Dugard's speaking out against the apartheid regime. He writes about his famous 1971 inaugural lecture, in which he contended that South African judges had to come to terms with their unconscious bias and cure their deference to the government by employing basic natural law principles which were immanent in the Roman Dutch common law. By effectively criticising the judiciary's almost blind acceptance of the most constrained version of legal positivism, Dugard had thrown down a serious jurisprudential challenge to the judiciary. In his book, Dugard records how the then Chief Justice, Lukas Steyn, at a farewell occasion, took the opportunity to lambast an 'unnamed academic' for suggesting that judges were guided by inarticulate premises which favoured the executive. Steyn said that the judges had considered laying charges against this academic but that he (Dugard) had been very smart in not suggesting that the judges had deliberately favoured the executive in security-related cases (53).

Two implications struck me when I read this section of the book: It is truly sad that there is not one legal academic today who is prepared to show even 10% of the courage that Dugard exhibited in far more dangerous times (Pierre de Vos in his columns may be the one exception). It is regrettable that the legacy of speaking truth to power, which Dugard developed, has now been ignored by the academy. The second implication is

that the theory of adjudication developed by Dugard in his 1971 lecture took place at around the time that Ronald Dworkin at Oxford had begun to write in a similar vein, about judges seeking to be guided by legal principles found at the root of the legal system. Dworkin is widely regarded as one of the most influential legal theorists of the 20th century; hence the added praise that should be given to Dugard's lecture.

The book documents the creation of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) in the late 1970's. Dugard says that the initial idea was that there would be a collaborative partnership between the LRC and CALS, but that the organised legal profession was prepared to waive rules of practice relating to access to clients, attorneys and advocates working together in respect of the LRC but not for CALS. As the founding director of CALS, Dugard initially created a center which undertook serious research into legal issues of public interest as well as public education. But, as the book documents, as the years rolled on, CALS was heavily involved in hugely significant litigation in favour of labour rights in support of the new labour movement which eventually became COSATU. CALS exposed detention and torture, particularly through the so called "Wendy Orr case", land removals and litigating against censorship. To his great credit, Dugard recruited some of the most outstanding lawyers produced in this country, all of whom became very prominent in the legal community – Halton Cheadle, Edwin Cameron, Nicholas (Fink) Haysom, Clive Thompson, Gilbert Marcus and Paul Benjamin.

These lawyers were the critical litigators in the many cases brought by CALS. Although each is mentioned very positively by Dugard, I felt it a pity that he did not pen a whole chapter on what they – at the time young lawyers – achieved. While the work of the LRC under the leadership of Arthur Chaskalson has been justly heralded for its monumental contribution to ensuring that millions of people obtained some rights, less has been said about the record of CALS. Dugard should be very proud of his achievement in giving these talented lawyers the support and space to use the law as both a shield and sword against the apartheid regime. Hence, I would have preferred if he had devoted more space in his book to the legal struggles waged by this exceptional group, as well as the legal victories of their clients.

The section of the book dealing with the Israel-Palestine conflict is arguably the most compelling section. In less than 100 pages, Dugard provides a sustained analysis of a most complex political problem. He writes from the vantage point of having been the Special Rapporteur on human rights in occupied Palestine, a position to which he was appointed in 2001.

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Turning to the occupied territories, Dugard refers to the definition of apartheid in international law, particularly the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International

Court of Justice. In terms thereof, apartheid, which Dugard cautions is a label that should not be used lightly without compelling justification, requires that three conditions be met: 1) the presence of different racial groups; 2) the commission of certain inhuman acts; and 3) these acts must have been committed for the purpose of establishing domination by one racial group over another and systematically oppressing that group. As he notes, it is conditions 2 and 3 which are hotly contested. The book contains separate chapters dealing with these two conditions.

Dugard justifies the conclusion that the second condition has been met, in that there is clear and sustained evidence, in his view, of extrajudicial execution of protestors and militants not participating in hostilities; indiscriminate killing of civilians in the bombing of civilian neighborhoods; the imprisonment of some 6000 Palestinians each year by military courts that fail to comply with international fair trial standards; arbitrary detentions of thousands of so-called administrative detainees held for long periods without trial; and denial of freedom of movement by way of checkpoints, the wall and separate roads (212-216). In addition, there is widespread practice of house demolitions 'which leave innocent children, the elderly men and women on the streets ruined and shamed' (217).

Turning to the third condition, he writes 'the primary function of the Israeli civil and military authorities in the OPT (occupied territories) is to insulate and privilege Jewish settlors and to ensure that Palestinians intrude as little as possible on the lives of the settlors' (230). In support of the empirical evidence, Dugard cites the brave Israeli human rights lawyer, Michael Sfard, as follows: 'Israel has created not only occupation that has persisted for generations but also a regime where one group oppresses and discriminates against the other for the sole purpose of preserving its control and supremacy' (231). Tellingly, Dugard notes that, unlike Israel in the OPT, even the South African regime during its apartheid rule established schools, universities, hospitals and social services as well as some industrial development in the Bantustans.

The critics of this line of argument generally raise two defenses: 1) why pick on Israel for its policies in the OPT when there are so many more oppressive regimes, especially in the Middle East?; and 2) related thereto, those who argue, like Dugard, are anti-Semites, and if they are Jews, then they must be self-hating Jews. Regarding the first point, the response which is contained in this book is that 'unlike South Africa, which had refused to sign any human rights treaty and denied that it was bound by human rights law, Israel is a party to all major human rights and humanitarian law treaties and professes to be an adherent of international human rights law' (207). In short, having claimed to adhere to these standards unlike repressive dictatorships, Israel stands to be judged by these same standards. That is not to give repressive regimes a free pass – ironically the policy of the Trump administration, which is the most uncritical supporter of the current Israeli government. It is to hold Israel to the standard that it has chosen.

But can it be argued, because Dugard has concentrated on this area, even in the light that he was Special Rapporteur, that he is fueled by malice? That, as he documents, is the kind of treatment that he and others like him have received. Correctly, he notes that this label is painful, however hugely unfair it is. This kind of criticism arises when no rational response to the kind of careful case made out by Dugard can be developed. However, as he notes, it has the effect of silencing many who are not as tenacious and brave as is Dugard. In this connection, he refers to the retraction, in an op-ed by Judge Richard Goldstone, of significant parts of the Goldstone Report on the Gaza Conflict. In this connection he writes '[W]hy Richard wrote the op-ed remains a mystery. We can only speculate as to what caused him to take such an unprecedented step. However as one who himself was subjected to vilification by the pro-Israeli lobby. I suspect that intense pressure was brought on him to recant' (254).

Dugard ends his book by pointing out that, for those like him who steadfastly opposed apartheid, the dawn of South African democracy was a miracle. He then writes that as the contested land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River is the land of miracles, a similar miracle will happen and a settlement that does justice to all the competing parties will be found.

The entire book repays careful reading, as it records so much of interest about the struggle history in Namibia and South Africa. But the last section on Palestine/ Israel is the one which should be read by all concerned about this area of the world and hopefully debated with the care and rationality exhibited by the author.

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