What is New about the European Migrant Crisis?

TOVE VAN LENNEP is a political and economic analyst and Researcher at the Helen Suzman Foundation. She holds a Masters cum laude in International Relations from Leiden University, the Netherlands and a BA Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) with Honours in International Relations from the University of Cape Town. Her research interests include Global Southern politics, cooperation and development, global order, human rights and refugee protection.

This study starts from three premises.

- **Migration is inevitable.** It is propelled by market forces, and shaped by patterns of development and the aftermath of colonialism. During the age of empire, Europeans risked everything for resources and a better life beyond their borders. There is no reason why 21st century migrants will not continue to do the same.
- **Migration has a long history.** Since the emergence of the first rudimentary states over 6 000 years ago, human migrations have crossed, extended and reshaped political borders. Between 1815 and 1932, over 60 million Europeans emigrated outwards from Europe, so that by the eve of WWI, 38% of the world's population is thought to have been of European ancestry.[1] UN data demonstrate that since 1965, migration has grown at almost the same rate as the global population.
- **The politicisation of migration is not new.** In the last century and a half, there have been British campaigns against Jewish immigrants in the 1880s, the US Nativist movement in the 1920s, the White Australia policy in the 1960s, and Europe's anti-immigration discourse since decolonisation.

The European Migrant Crisis refers to the period since 2013, when foreigners arrived in the European Union (EU) from across the Mediterranean Sea or overland through Southeast Europe. Some of these people were refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War and other conflicts. Others were low-skilled economic migrants from Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the former having been afforded passage by the 2004 EU enlargement.

How are we to understand the European Migrant Crisis? Is it simply the recycling of old themes with added vigour and media attention, or is something new at work? This study will argue that Europe's crisis is primarily a social and political one: a crisis of insecurity, which has heightened concerns about identity, and is coloured by some hangovers from the imperial period.

But first, some definitions.

Europe

'Europe' as a collection of countries can be defined in a number of ways. The United Nations World Population Prospects defines Europe as a set of 48 territories. The list includes the Russian Federation and excludes Cyprus (regarded as part of the Middle East). Ten of these territories have populations of less than a million.

The European Union, on the other hand, has 28 members. There are 26 Schengen countries and 19 former communist countries, excluding the Russian Federation and East Germany. Five EU countries had longstanding colonies in the past: the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. More than one concept will be used in this study. The Appendix indicates country membership in each concept category.

Migrants and refugees

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its subsequent Protocol[2] define a refugee as a person without a nationality who has 'fled their country of former habitual residence owing to a well-founded fear of persecution'.[3]

People fleeing dire poverty are not considered refugees, even if remaining in their home country amounts to sacrificing their survival. These people are called "economic refugees" in some humanitarian circles and "economic migrants" in international law and popular discourse.

A migrant is 'any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is'.[4] Refugees are one category of migrant, among others.

People fleeing dire poverty are not considered refugees, even if remaining in their home country amounts to sacrificing their survival. These people are called "economic refugees" in some humanitarian circles and "economic migrants" in international law and popular discourse. Many studies have pointed to the "category slippage" between refugees and economic migrants in the recent decade, particularly evident in the European media and public debate.[5]

In this study, I shall distinguish between migrants and refugees where possible, whilst recognising that European *anti-refugee* and *anti-immigrant sentiment* are routinely conflated within a general attitude against an undesirable other. They therefore cannot always naturally be separated.

Measuring migration

Migration data is recorded in either stocks or flows. Immigrant stock is the number of immigrants living in a country or region at a given point in time. In many cases, the immigrant stock is regarded as consisting of all people born outside the country under consideration. Immigrant flows are the number of immigrants entering a region during a specified time period (e.g. over a year).

To determine the actual level of the migrant "crisis", it is useful to consider both types of data. Whereas flows give a sense of short-term challenges and the perception of the crisis (a picture of pressure at borders, over-stretched administration, boat arrivals, cost of returns), stock gives a sense of the longer-term reality: how immigrants affect demographics, social integration and the economy. Immigration intensity measures the immigrant stock as a percentage of the local population at a point in time.

Likewise, refugee stock is the number of people with refugee status residing in a given region at a given time. Refugee flows are defined as first-time asylum claims – the number of people who enter a region and claim asylum irrespective of whether they are granted refugee status. Refugee intensity is the percentage of the local population constituted by refugees.



Note: EU+ means the EU plus Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Source: Eurostat

The flow data in Graph 1 indicate the extent of the European migrant crisis. Immigration flows are composed of asylum-seekers, intra-EU immigrants (through the Schengen Area) and immigrants from beyond the Union and continent. In 2017, almost 50% of immigration flows came from within the EU.[6]

In 2019, contrary to the media and political discourse, Europe is experiencing its lowest number of asylum claims since 2013.

The graph shows that while EU states did see a significant increase in asylum-seekers between 2014 and 2017, the flow has since subsided. In 2019, contrary to the media and political discourse, Europe is experiencing its lowest number of asylum claims since 2013.[7]

Immigration intensity

Eighteen EU countries had immigration intensities of over 6% at the end of 2017. In eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Slovenia) over 50% of immigrants had come from Europe. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden over 10% of the immigrant stock had come from both the Middle East and Asia. In the UK, Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands, many immigrants had come from former colonies in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In Estonia and Latvia, more than 50% of the immigrant stock had come from Russia.[8]

The following graphs indicate trends.







Sources: UN World Population Prospects, UN Population Division: International Migration

The stock data in Graph 2A shows that immigrant stock in the EU in 2017 was about 20% of the global stock. Since 1990, the EU's immigrant stock has doubled, compared with a 70% increase in the global stock. The EU immigration stock has increased more slowly in the recent decade than it did between 2000 and 2010.

Graph 2B shows that global immigrant stock has grown slightly faster than the global population since 1990. Immigrants have gone from constituting 2.9% to 3.4% of the global population. Immigration intensity in the EU has been consistently higher than in the world as a whole, and it has increased faster – from 5.6% to 10.8%. In part, this is because the EU population has grown slowly from 476 million in 1990 to 507 million in 2017. The EU's low total fertility rate, which stood at 1.57 (well below replacement) in 2017, and its ageing population create a demand for immigrants.[9]

Graph 3 shows that whereas 55% of non-EU states experience an immigration intensity of below 3%, only 13% of EU countries do. European states experience a range of intensities with a median of 9 – 12%. The graph gives a sense of the vastly different experiences of states in the EU, with countries like Austria (19%), Sweden (17.6%), Ireland (16.9%) and Germany (14.8%) absorbing high proportions of immigrants.

To put the stock data in context, in 2017, the EU was host to 13% of the world's migrants, 7% of its population and contributed 22% of global GDP. Immigrants are, by and large, handpicked by the markets and facilitate economic growth. The EU's GDP per capita has increased steadily over the years, except for lulls in 2009 and 2012. In 2017, GDP per capita in Europe was higher than ever before and over 30% higher than it was in 1990.[10] In contrast, GDP per capita in Africa has been in decline since 2010, sitting today at around 10% of European levels.[11]

Looked at as stock with respect to the EU's population and GDP, immigrant volumes do not seem to indicate a migrant crisis, or the UK Daily Mail's suggested "biblical exodus". However, as intensities, seen against Europe's declining fertility rate and ageing population, immigrants can be construed as a demographic threat – one that has been building incrementally over the decades and which is especially palpable in some EU states.

Refugee intensity





Source: UN Population Prospects, UNHCR, UNHCR Historical Refugee Data

The EU's high rejection rate of asylum-seekers is shown by the stock curve in Graph 4A as opposed to Graph 1. Only 2.3 million refugees resided in the EU at the end of 2017, with many confined to camps.

Graph 4A shows that since 2013, admitted refugees have increased by 89% worldwide but by only 65% in the EU. With respect to population, however, the EU's "crisis" is greater.



Source: UN Population Prospects, UNHCR, UNHCR Historical Refugee Data

The historical data in Graph 5 reveals 3 refugee stock crises in Europe since WWII, defined here as where refugees make up more than 0.35% of the population (3.5 refugees per 1000 people).

The first crisis occurred in the wake of WWII when close to 1 million Western Europeans spilled across the region.[12] This led to the establishment of the UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The second and most prolonged crisis arose in the late 1980s and lasted more than a decade. People from Afghanistan, Iraq, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, Angola, Eritrea and Croatia sought asylum in Europe. This surge was the outcome of ethnic conflict after decolonisation and the international armed conflict after the

breakup of Yugoslavia. At its peak, around 1.8 million refugees were hosted in Western Europe, a large proportion of which were European (Bosnian and Croatian).

The third crisis is the recent European Migrant Crisis. While Graph 4B shows that the EU experienced its peak in refugee intensity in the 1990s, Graph 5 shows that in Europe outside formerly communist and small territories, refugee intensity was highest in 2017. The refugees hosted in these countries today are predominantly darker skinned, Muslim and Middle Eastern or North African.

In 2017, at the peak of the refugee crisis, the EU hosted 12% of the world's refugees, compared with 7% of global population. Given that it also held 22% of global GDP, many critics have argued that the real humanitarian crisis is outside of the Global North.[13] In Africa, for example, 80% of migrants never leave the continent.[14] Five of the ten countries that host more than half of the world's refugees are in Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Chad, DRC), and the other five are in the Middle East and South Asia (Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran).[15]

Nationalism, is arguably a grand response to intergroup threat perception: 'a crisis of identity', 'the response to the irregularities of modernity' through the reinforcement of the essence and boundaries of the nation.

To summarise:

- This is the third refugee "crisis" experienced by the EU since 1945, and not the largest.
- The refugee aspect of the recent migrant "crisis" has declined to pre-crisis levels.
- Half of the EU's immigration flows come from other EU states, while the other half tend to come from former colonies, South and East Asia or special bilateral relations (e.g. Estonia and Russia).
- The number of immigrants residing in the EU has increased gradually over the decades. The ratio of immigrants to locals has increased more rapidly, given low natural population growth.
- High levels of GDP and GDP per capita mean that Europe has the resources to cope.

Ultimately, the "waves" of migrants referred to in the media are neither unprecedented nor unmanageable. The EU's challenge should simply be about process – creating and maintaining effective migration policy, housing asylum-seekers waiting for decisions, deporting illegal immigrants and integrating legal ones into the economy and host society. Instead, refugees on rubber dinghies have been transformed into a threat by one of the most powerful regions in the world.

Analysis

Continued immigration from outside Europe is inevitable for the following reasons.

1. State, nation and territory

Though the state is often treated as the container for all aspects of social being, humans have agency and imagination beyond state borders. Particularly when a nation has failed or its survival is at stake, the fragility of the nation-state system and the arbitrariness of its borders become apparent.

By entering the *territory* of the state without entering the *nation*, asylum-seekers and migrants draw attention to the fragility of the state-nation-territory trinity.[16] Resulting anxiety is combatted by politicians and society through anti-immigration discourse and immigration restrictions. These re-inscribe the state's importance in managing the border between national and other identities.[17]

In present-day Europe, realities of the nation-state system have combined with manifestations of globalisation – rapid flows of capital, the porousness of national borders and the increasing vulnerability of the state to external realities – to incite a reassertion of nationalism. Nationalism, is arguably a grand response to intergroup

threat perception: 'a crisis of identity', 'the response to the irregularities of modernity' through the reinforcement of the essence and boundaries of the nation.[18]

By this argument, it is the very fragility of the nation-state system that necessitates nationalism: Nation-states create migrants, migrants reinforce nationalism and nationalism bolsters nation-states. Populism is an intensification of this dynamic, in an age of globalisation and uncertainty.

2. Globalisation and development generate factors favouring mobility

Given that capital, commodities, ideas and values span the globe and shape societies, the movement of people is inevitable. Transnational communities have become a global norm, through which social and economic remittances unleash powerful processes of social transformation and migration.

Since 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty (defined as less than $2 a day) has declined by nearly two-thirds. More people have thus begun to meet the material threshold required to migrate, entering a new global "striver class".

While the positive relationship between *globalisation* and migration is widely agreed upon, the correlation between *development* and migration is contested. Particularly during the decolonisation era, dependency theory literature focused on migration as a North-South exodus driven by poverty and income gaps. Development was prescribed as a "solution" to the immigration "problem".

Since the 1970s, however, transnational theories have begun to link mobility to processes of development and economic integration. Migration transition theory postulates that economic development and social transformation initially coincide with increasing levels and a greater geographical reach of emigration.[19] This is because development expands access to infrastructure and transport, as well as material resources, social networks, media and knowledge. Once industrialisation has taken hold, population and labour supply decline and wage levels increase. Emigration falls and labour immigration begins to occur.[20]

In a study of Africa in 1960, 1980 and 2000, authors found that countries with a high proportion of extra-continental emigration intensity were those with comparatively higher levels of economic development.[21] Intra-continental migration, on the other hand, is typical to poorer, landlocked countries. This contradicts outdated interpretations of migration to Europe as being driven by poverty and underdevelopment.

Since 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty (defined as less than $2 a day) has declined by nearly two-thirds.[22] More people have thus begun to meet the material threshold required to migrate, entering a new global "striver class". Their migration patterns resemble industrialisation migration of the 1800s – 1950s, whereby Europeans with enough money and hardship sought greener pastures in the colonies.

Of course, if Global Southern states are unable to develop (restricted by national circumstances or unfavourable features of the international order), the "striver class" will remain and emigration to the Global North can be expected to continue.

3. Europe may not want low-skilled migrant labourers, but it needs them

European immigration has increased gradually over the past 3 decades.[23] There is no question that Europe knows enough and is powerful enough to prevent irregular migration and deport illegal migrants. Immigration intensity has increased in Europe simply because *Europe has allowed it to*.

Given its low fertility and economic growth, Europe relies on immigrant labourers.[24] According to UN World Population Prospects estimates, EU states had a median fertility rate of 1.57 in the 2015 – 2020 period – well below the natural rate of replacement (±2.1). The median crude birth and death rates of EU states inform a rate of natural increase of -0.6.[25] Immigration is thus a vital source of population, human capital and economic growth.

Low-skilled immigrants tend to be expensive to taxpayers because they are more likely to be poor and stay poor. At the same time though, in the UK, if immigration had frozen in 1990, the economy would be at least 9% smaller than it is now. That is equivalent to a real loss in GDP of more than £175bn over 15 years. In Germany, the net economic loss would be 6%, or €155bn.[26]

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In response, many immigration policies are arguably "designed to fail". Their purpose may be to persuade the electorate that their concerns – for example the protection of jobs for nationals – are being taken seriously. For example, successive British prime ministers have placated public hostility by declaring "British jobs for British workers", while creating complex and differentiated entry systems to satisfy the markets and stimulate economic growth.[27]

In some instances, restrictive policies met with employer demand push immigrants into illegality. This can lead to high levels of risk and exploitation and push up 'illegal immigration' statistics. The result is public hostility and even more restrictive policies. Like counter-terrorism, detaining and policing immigrants has become a major and self-sustaining industry in Europe.

4. Colonial echoes and the North-South divide

It is myopic not to recognise colonial legacies in the flows and politics of migration.

Violent conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East (significantly responsible for both European refugee "crises" since 1990) have been directly linked to 1) colonial domination and arbitrarily imposed borders, 2) hurried and violent colonial withdrawal, 3) devastating Cold War proxy wars, 4) ill-conceived Western interventions in the region, and 5) sustained economic domination and exploitation.

The norms and policies that treat migrants as a safety valve for European economies (providing low-skilled labour in times of expansion and disappearing in times of recession) can be viewed as a continuation of colonial practices, which mobilised African and Middle Eastern labour (see African slave trade and European "guest worker"[28] policies) to meet the demands of emerging capitalist production, whilst preventing long-term settlement.[29]

The EU's Neighbourhood Policy, the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal and bilateral agreements with Libya, Morocco and Tunisia have been applied to "contain" migrants in the Global South. Each has had severe consequences. The Italy-Libya deal, amongst other things, allowed Libya to import European weapons in exchange for curbing migration to Europe. European weapons and funding have fuelled civil conflict and an abhorrent migrant slave trade in Libya.

Meanwhile, freedom of migration exists for virtually all middle-class citizens of the Global North, and has for over a century. It is through some combination of hypocrisy and collective amnesia that Europeans discount their migration history – a history that involved not only diluting but exterminating and enslaving host populations across the

Global South.[30] This migration was so immense that by the eve of WWI, 38% of the world's population was of European ancestry.

Migration expert Professor Stephan Castles argues that international migration is an integral part of relationships between societies and that there is currently a "crisis" in North-South relationships as a result of deepening global inequality. Until resources are better distributed, encumbered development, sectarian conflict and economic insecurity will continue to drive both forced and voluntary migration. Accordingly, North-South migration is an inevitable aspect of the North-South divide – one that no policy, however draconian, will be able to prevent.[31]

What has changed?

This final section unravels the factors responsible for the apocalyptic response to the European Migrant Crisis, compared with former crises of the 1950s and 1990s.

1. The colour and composition of migrants



Sources: UN Population Prospects, UN Population Division: International Migration

Europe's increased immigration intensity since 1990 can be attributed both to the expansion of the EU in 2004 (intra-EU immigration has risen from 1.64% to 3.17% – see Graph 6) and the growth of non-European immigration following decolonisation (which has risen from 2% to 4% of the total European population). This is owing largely to the greater mobility of formerly colonised people, family reunification claims (with origins in European "guest worker" policies of the 1950s and 1960s) and Europe's labour demands and facilitating policies.

It is important to realise that the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, including the right to asylum, were rights not intended to apply to all human beings. Non-European bodies of the Global South were not recognised under the first international legal framework of humanity. The 1967 Protocol removed the temporal (events associated with WWII) and geographic (Europe) restrictions to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and in the decades between then and the 1990s, Europe was relatively open to refugees. This served Europe's interest during the Cold War in reinforcing a liberal, democratic identity and providing refuge to escapers of communism.[32]

However, beginning in the 1990s, escalating European legislation collectively established what is known today as the European non-entrée regime. This coincided with the fact that, for the first time in history, 'the majority of asylum-seekers making

applications for refuge come from outside Europe. They are, in fact, by and large people who originate from countries which until thirty to sixty years ago were under [...] colonial rule.'[33]

Although asylum-seekers always existed in great numbers in the Global South, they did not have the mobility to reach Europe until the liberalisation and globalisation of the late 20th century. In light of this, the idea that Europe's current "crisis" response is a result of a global "upsurge" in refugees could be interpreted better as a result of the *nature* of those refugees, coupled with their ability to reach Europe.

A similar argument can be made for economic migration to Europe. In a historical account of British national identity, Cesarani tracks the development of British immigration policy from the 1905 Aliens Act to the 1981 Nationality Act. He evidences the increasingly exclusive nature of British national identity and citizenship,[34] developing in opposition to the non-white Commonwealth subject while simultaneously preventing such subjects from accessing Britain as their mobility increased.[35] He concludes that the same stereotypes that legitimised imperial domination were used to justify the regulation of migration, and served as an antithesis for British national identity as a fragile mixture of 'superiority', 'civilisation' and 'modernity'.

It is important to note, however, that Europe's association between Muslim people and violence far predates September 11th. It has roots going back for centuries.

This argument – of the Global Southern (and therefore "other" and threatening) nature of contemporary migrants – explains the heightened panic surrounding the second and third crises, as opposed to the first. It does not, however, explain the particular response to the 2013 crisis. One might argue that in the 1990s, a significant proportion of refugees and migrants were European and therefore acceptable. Or that still-fresh colonial guilt and political correctness restrained anti-immigration sentiment. But in the decade between the two crises, other important factors have entered the fray: one concerning the religion of migrants, and the other concerning the identity of Europeans.

2. Islam, terrorism and the perceived failure of multiculturalism

The string of terror attacks since September 11th 2001 has changed the game for migration policy and discourse. Until terrorism, European anti-immigration sentiment could usually be boiled down to old-style racism or ethnic nationalism. Now, Islamophobia can claim to be about a security threat.

The reality, moreover, that many bombers have been "home grown" has drawn attention to groups of immigrants in European states who remain unintegrated into their host societies. This has led to ideals of multiculturalism[36] (advocated by European governments between the 1970s and 1990s) being discredited. Of course, spatial segregation of migrant communities is often dictated by realities of class and income, and the size of these communities is often exaggerated by the idea that '[w]hen natives have lots of children of their own, immigrants look like reinforcements. When natives have few children, immigrants look like replacements.'[37]

In any case, the social and cultural problems associated with immigrant Turks, Moroccans and Algerians, politicised in Europe during the 1990s, have become intertwined with the Syrian refugee question in the recent decade, under the umbrella of "Islam".

It is important to note, however, that Europe's association between Muslim people and violence far predates September 11th. It has roots going back for centuries.

The Runnymede Trust Report of 1997 constituted a list of 'modern social imaginaries' – 'a repertoire of beliefs, feelings and behavioural dispositions that could be readily mobilized to foster hostility towards Muslims living in Britain'.[38] The report found four groups of stereotypes associated with Muslims: Islam as separate and other; Islam as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities; Muslims as barbaric, irrational and primitive, united by tribal loyalties; Muslims as violent, aggressive, engaged in a 'clash of civilisations' and supportive of terrorism.[39]

Politicians present themselves as 'managers of unease', simultaneously attempting and appearing to protect the national group by adding salience to the threat of immigration.

Revealingly, many of these stereotypes are antitheses of Western Enlightenment values (arguably the basis of European identity). The Enlightenment advocated a set of values centred on reason as the primary source of authority and legitimacy, including individual liberty, tolerance, progress, civility, morality and separation of church and state.[40] The findings of the Report indicate that the Islamic other is defined in opposition to Enlightenment values and therefore "European-ness" – inferior and threatening through his intolerance, backwardness, irrationality, immorality and primitiveness.

Islamophobia in Europe, therefore, must be located within the historical context of imperialism and Orientalism[41]. The historical stereotypes of Islam are still applied in policies and discourse today.[42]

3. Inequality and identity leveraged by populism

In recent decades, European states have experienced a growing dualization of their labour markets. That is the creation, widening and deepening of insider-outsider divides between workers with tenured and well-paid jobs and those with poorly paid flexible or part time jobs.[43] This dualisation has occurred alongside the transition from traditional welfare states (rooted in industrialisation and based on collective social risks) to post-industrial service economies (with individualised risks and decreased solidarity). It is argued that this 'neoliberal restructuring' has accentuated the power of dominant classes, while reducing the power of subordinate classes.[44]

Personified by Reagan and Thatcher, the neoliberal turn began during the 1980s. It entailed the scaling back of the welfare state and coincided with the economic recession of the early 1990s. One might therefore argue that the political and economic conditions during the 1990s migrant crisis were ripe for anti-immigration sentiment and politics. But missing from the equation were right-wing populist parties which, in the current crisis, have successfully associated the erosion of the welfare state with immigrants – as financial burdens and competitors.

According to Corbett, the threat of immigration is amplified in the right-wing populist environment, which is a '"twofold vertical structure" that is antagonistic upward towards the intellectual, political and economic elites, and downward towards those at the bottom of society: criminals, foreigners, profiteers who threaten the purity of the people'.[45]

Politicians present themselves as 'managers of unease', simultaneously attempting and appearing to protect the national group by adding salience to the threat of immigration. While right-wing populists embed unease by articulating and reshaping popular grievances through the prism of identity, liberals tend to respond by securitisation. Liberal securitisation *policy creates politics* by problematising immigration and institutionalising intergroup anxieties. The public response inspires further securitisation policy in a 'ratcheting effect', or upward spiral.[46]

As Fukuyama has pointed out, identity fuels much of politics today. This is often put down to the individualism of modern liberal society, which has led people to feel isolated and unhappy. Many find themselves nostalgic for the community and structured life they think they have lost, or that their ancestors are assumed to have possessed.

> *'Rural people, who are the backbone of the populist movements […] often believe that their traditional values are under severe threat by cosmopolitan, city-based elites. They feel victimised by a secular culture that is careful not to criticise Islam or Judaism, yet regards their own Christianity as a mark of bigotry […] They can be seduced by leaders who tell them that they have been betrayed and disrespected by the existing power structures, and that they are important communities whose greatness will again be recognised'.*[47,48]

Hence the anti-immigration cornerstone of populist identity politics and the liberal securitisation response deflect societal insecurity and resentment onto the immigrant other. The response to the recent migrant crisis is thus a symptom of Europe's internal crisis – a crisis of inequality, alienation, the decline of class-based politics and the rise of populism.

Conclusion

More than 60 million Europeans emigrated between the beginning of the nineteenth century and 1932.[49] In 2017, the migrant stock in Europe of non-European origin was 43 million. The world population in 1870 was just over 800 million. In 2017, it was seven and a half billion.

Europe is not threatened by immigrants so much as by the political reactions that immigrants and cultural diversity create.[50] Politicians might be spending time countering those reactions instead of immigrants themselves, if it weren't that anti-immigration sentiment served political ends. But it is becoming alarmingly clear that fostering an inclusive national identity to which newcomers can be assimilated is critical to the survival of liberal democracy.

Stephan Walt promoted history as the 'best antidote against the self-serving narratives that governments and misguided patriots invoke to excuse their own conduct and justify suppressing others'.[51] To counter the politics of identity, entitlement and collective amnesia, a data-based and historicised perspective of migration is necessary.

NOTES

1 Bissell, C. 'Online Emigration', *The Linguist* (2017), 56(6), p24
2 The 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, sets out the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of nations for granting asylum. The UNHCR is the global 'guardian' of the legislation (UNHCR, 2017).
3 UNHCR. *The 1951 Refugee Convention* (2017)
4 IOM. *IOM Definition of "Migrant"* (2019)
5 Buchanan & Grillo 2002, Lewis 2006, Mulvey 2010
6 Eurostat
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8 See Appendix
9 UN World Population Prospects (2017)
10 Trading Economics. *European Union GDP Per Capita* (2018)
11 World Bank. *GDP Per Capita* (2019)

12 BBC. *European Refugee Movements After World War Two* (2011)
13 The term "Global South" is used in this article to denote less developed regions, as a neutral alternative to non-West, developing or undeveloped (with no geographical aspirations). "Global North" denotes the developed world. In some instances, "west" and "non-west" are used for emphasis on the unequal power relations between the Global North and South, or in reference to a period or piece of literature in which they were applied.
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APPENDIX					
United Nations WPP	**EU**	**Schengen**	**Former communist**	**Former imperial**	**Small**
EUROPE					
Eastern Europe					
Belarus			x		
Bulgaria	x		x		
Czechia	x	x	x		
Hungary	x	x	x		
Poland	x	x	x		
Republic of Moldova			x		
Romania	x		x		
Russian Federation			x		
Slovakia	x	x	x		
Ukraine			x		
NORTHERN EUROPE					
Channel Islands					x
Denmark	x	x			
Estonia	x	x	x		
Faeroe Islands					x
Finland	x	x			
Iceland		x			x
Ireland	x				
Isle of Man					x
Latvia	x	x	x		
Lithuania	x	x	x		
Norway		x			
Sweden	x	x			
United Kingdom	x			x	
SOUTHERN EUROPE					
Albania			x		
Andorra					x
Bosnia and Herzegovina			x		
Croatia	x		x		
Gibraltar					x
Greece	x	x			
Holy See					x
Italy	x	x			
Malta	x	x			x
Montenegro			x		x
Portugal	x	x		x	
San Marino					x
Serbia			x		
Slovenia	x	x	x		
Spain	x	x		x	
TFYR Macedonia			x		
WESTERN EUROPE					
Austria	x	x			
Belgium	x	x			
France	x	x		x	
Germany	x	x			
Liechtenstein		x			x
Luxembourg	x				x
Monaco					x
Netherlands	x	x		x	
Switzerland		x			
WESTERN ASIA					
Cyprus	x				