



# HELEN SUZMAN FOUNDATION

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# Profiles




## Xolela Mangcu

Dr Xolela Mangcu is a Visiting Fellow at the Public Intellectual Life Project and a Resident Equity Scholar at the University of the Witwatersrand. He is Visiting WEB Du Bois Fellow at Harvard University and writes a regular weekly column for Business Day.

Dr Mangcu was most recently Distinguished Research Fellow and Executive Director for Society, Culture and Identity at the Human Sciences Research Council. Prior to that he served as the Executive Director of the Steve Biko Foundation; Associate Editor and columnist for the Sunday Independent, and a Senior Analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.

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His publications include the Meaning of Mandela (a collection of public lectures by Wole Soyinka, Henry Louis Gates Jr and Cornel West), and Emerging Johannesburg (with Richard Tomlinson, Robert Beaugard and Lindsay Bremner).



## Aubrey Matshiqi

Aubrey Mongameli Matshiqi was born in November 1962, in Orlando West, Soweto.

He is a former mathematics, science and English teacher. Towards the end of his teaching career he obtained a degree in English literature and history. He started his Masters in politics with the University of Port Elizabeth in 2000 but could not complete it.

He is a former government spokesperson and a member of the Strategy Unit in the Premier's Office in Gauteng.

He was, until recently, an independent political analyst and is now a Senior Associate Political Analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies.

His services as an analyst are used by local and international media, government, political parties, policy institutes, academic institutions, foreign embassies and the corporate sector.

He writes regularly for various publications (including a column in the Business Day) and often addresses seminars and conferences.

He was previously involved in leadership and other capacities in the UDF, the ANC, Umkhonto weSizwe, the student movement (AZASO), the civic movement, the union movement and the South African Communist Party.



Steven Friedman

Steven Friedman is a research associate, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) and Visiting Professor of Politics and International Relations at Rhodes University. Prior to that he was senior research fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies, an independent, non-profit, policy research centre. He is a former consultant on urban politics to the Urbanisation Unit of the Urban Foundation and to the Development Bank of Southern Africa. He was national head of the Information Analysis Department of the Independent Electoral Commission and a member of the Commission on Provincial Government think-tank which explored constitutional options relevant to provincial government. He is a member of the international research council, International Forum for Democratic Studies, Washington DC, and is an editorial board member of the Journal of Democracy. Friedman publishes widely.



Zwelethu Jolobe

Zwelethu Jolobe holds a masters degree in international relations from the University of Cape Town (UCT) and is currently doing a PhD at UCT. His doctoral research topic involves refining theory on constitutional engineering and constitutional negotiations looking in particular at cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe. He is a lecturer in Comparative Politics at UCT's Department of Political Studies. Zwelethu is a regular commentator and political analyst on Western Cape and Cape Town electoral politics, local and provincial government and national political and policy trends.

# Profiles



## Bantu Holomisa

Major General (Retired) H Bantubonke (Bantu) Holomisa co-founded the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in 1997 and currently serves as its President. He was chosen by the ANC Election Committee to campaign alongside Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and other alliance leaders during the democratic election in 1994. He received the most votes in the 1994 ANC National Congress and served as the Deputy Minister of Environment and Tourism of South Africa in the Government of National Unity. Mr. Holomisa was expelled from the ANC in 1996 after testifying at the TRC about Transkei issues and refused to retract his testimony. Mr. Holomisa is a respected Member of Parliament and party leader and has addressed various international forums, mediated conflicts and acted as a key election monitor in the June 2007 elections in East Timor.



## Raenette Taljaard

Raenette Taljaard is the director of The Helen Suzman Foundation. Taljaard, a former DA MP, served as Shadow Minister of Finance from 2002 and was a member of the Portfolio Committee on Finance. She also served on numerous other parliamentary committees, including the Standing Committee on Public Accounts during the arms deal investigation.

Taljaard lectures part-time at the University of the Witwatersrand's School of Public and Development Management and locally and abroad on the regulation of private military and security companies.

Taljaard is a Yale World Fellow, a Fellow of the Emerging Leaders Programme of the Centre for Leadership and Public Values (UCT's Graduate School of Business and Duke University) and a Young Global Leader of the World Economic Forum.

Taljaard holds a BA in Law, RAU (University of Johannesburg), a BA (Hons) in Political Science, cum laude, RAU (University of Johannesburg), an MA in Political Science, cum laude, RAU (University of Johannesburg) and an MSc in Public Administration and Public Policy, cum laude, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Taljaard publishes widely.



# HELEN SUZMAN FOUNDATION

*Refinement or fundamental redesign?  
The future of the provinces*

Friedrich Naumann  
STIFTUNG **FÜR DIE FREIHEIT**





# Introduction

**I**t is a great honour for us to host the last of the Helen Suzman Foundation's Quarterly Roundtable Series for 2007. We're doing it at a rather opportune time, a few days before the kick-off, no pun intended, of the Polokwane Conference.

We've asked some of the best and brightest analytical minds in our contemporary political environment to join us in a discussion on "The Final Stretch". We literally are in the final stretch, and there are very interesting events emerging. We have Winnie Madikizela Mandela trying to broker agreements between the Mbeki and Zuma camps. We have various interesting issues emerging in the Free State with respect to delegates who may or may not be voting, and that may stretch to other provinces. We have equally fascinating developments with reference to the ANC Women's League, and the possibility of the parity principle being adopted in Polokwane. All these factors could have a bearing on the events that will unfold in the next few days. As a nation we're obviously in rapt attention to see what the outcome of this process will be. This decision will have an impact on all of our lives.

# Introduction

“As a nation we're obviously in rapt attention to see what the outcome of this process will be. This decision will have an impact on all of our lives.”

I'd like to welcome everybody on our panel here today, starting with a former parliamentary colleague, and friend in that regard, and certainly an analytical mind in Parliament I greatly respect: General Bantu Holomisa, who needs very little introduction. He is the leader of the UDM [United Democratic Movement] in Parliament and also a former member of the ANC, and therefore has some interesting insights to offer us in that regard. Zwelethu Jolobe is a lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Cape Town, and many of you will have noticed Zwelethu in the commentary and political analysis leading into Polokwane. Prof Steven Friedman is a visiting research associate at IDASA [Institute for Democracy in South Africa] and also at Rhodes University, and he is certainly, again, one of the most respected analysts on this topic. In particular, he has written extensively about the issues relating to the democratic principles that are being established en route to Polokwane, and not only about the popularity contest in terms of who may emerge as the leader. Aubrey Matshiqi has had various incarnations and roles both within both party structures and government, and civil society. He was a strategy consultant in the Cabinet unit of the Premier in Gauteng, and is now an analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies. Xolela Mangcu started the Platform for Public Deliberation at Wits University, which has played a very important role in catalysing issues of discussion around succession this year, and we're very pleased that Xolela could join us.

Without any further ado, I'll hand over to my panellists.

*Raenette Taljaard*



“I'm concerned by the scaremongering, the playing of the politics of fear around Jacob Zuma. It's got some interesting parallels, of course, in history.”

## Xolela Mangcu

Well, here we are on the eve of one of the more important and defining moments of our collective life, and of course most of us are spectators as a group of 4 000 people decide our fate, to some degree, one way or another.

At a panel discussion for the Sunday Times at the beginning of the year, I entered into a wager with Frene Ginwala. I said that this process was out of control, and it was not going to happen that senior leaders or elders would emerge to bring it back under control. And Frene said, in typical ANC-people talk, “You don't know the ANC.” It seems to me that she might have to eat her shoes in public, except that I wouldn't do that to her.

What I said was that the person who would be the beneficiary of what I then called a leadership tailspin would be Jacob Zuma. Of course, if there were to be some kind of arranged deal, then somebody else would emerge, maybe Tokyo or Cyril or Pallo, whoever, but the idea that more rational heads would prevail was Frene's position.

And it turns out, of course, that I was right. The process really got into a tailspin, and Jacob Zuma became the ultimate beneficiary of that. And they say it's never over until the fat lady sings, but it seems to me that

Jacob Zuma is a shoo-in for this thing. That's the first point I'd like to make.

The second is that I'm concerned by the scaremongering, the playing of the politics of fear around Jacob Zuma. It's got some interesting parallels, of course, in history. It is, in many ways, the nature of politics that you make people fear your opponent for all kinds of reasons, good and, sometimes, dubious; it's part of political campaigning.

I'm saying the fear is overdone, and the reason I'm saying that is precisely because of what's happening now with respect to Thabo Mbeki, which in many ways demonstrates that the people of this country will not let any one individual just run roughshod over them. There is no way that Jacob Zuma is going to be beyond the recall of a range of institutions in this society. The media will be picking up everything he says or does. Parliament should get its act together and act more like a Parliament, and I cannot imagine the NEC [National Executive Committee] of the ANC just sitting by while Zuma is taking the country down. So I am concerned by the obsession with the idea that one individual is going to do as he pleases over this country. I think not, actually.

A question that I'd like to put on the table, that's just philosophically interesting, is the





whether there is an automatic extrapolation from somebody's private morality to their public leadership. In other words, does the fact that Jacob Zuma may have 18 wives or whatever number of children translate into his being a bad president for a country? Is there an automatic translation of one into the other? I have a little bit of a nuance in answering that, because you always have to be careful with these things just in case you're misquoted by the newspapers.

It goes something like this: while private morality may hobble an individual's capacity to lead, public leadership cannot be reduced to private morality. And what do I mean by that? For the first part, one example that I like is from the 19th century in the United States, when Martin van Buren was Vice-President and then, ultimately, President, was known to be

“So I am concerned by the obsession with the idea that one individual is going to do as he pleases over this country. I think not, actually.”

absent from work for weeks and weeks because he was drunk. That's a case where somebody's private behaviour basically incapacitates them, and I'm sure there were a whole range of other leaders who were hobbled by that.

The second part of my formulation, however, is that public leadership cannot be reduced to an individual's private morality. So we need to problematise this relationship, and I think in South Africa we don't, we



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just jump from one to the other. If you look at historical examples, at [Franklin D] Roosevelt, for example, who had a mistress, or John F Kennedy, who had many, and Bill Clinton, and Francois Mitterrand in France, you cannot really say that it took away from their public achievements, can you? They've gone down in history as people who basically changed the face of the 20th century in many ways – for good, actually, if you talk about FDR, and Francois Mitterrand literally remade France.

The point I want to make is that it seems to me that the question Jacob Zuma poses more than anything else is none of these fears – there are concerns, of course, we should always have concerns – but what I call the more political questions. And these are whether this person is a democrat or not, whether this person is incorrigibly corrupt or not, whether this person is intolerant or not. Those are the questions that I'd like to engage with, rather than the fact that he said something about taking a shower. Because, really, while that is a seriously stupid statement, why do we hang on it for so long instead of asking these broader political questions?

“The point I want to make is that it seems to me that the question Jacob Zuma poses more than anything else is none of these fears – there are concerns, of course, we should always have concerns – but what I call the more political questions. And these are whether this person is a democrat or not, whether this person is incorrigibly corrupt or not, whether this person is intolerant or not.”





Xolela Mangcu





## Aubrey Matshiqi

I will start with the results of the ANC nomination process. Personally, I read them by, firstly, going back to June to the ANC National Policy Conference, which, as you know, passed a resolution saying that preferably the person who is elected President of the party in Polokwane should be the party's nominee for Head of State in 2009. The language was quite diplomatic, and I think was diplomatic for a reason, but the subtext of the resolution, for me, represents a very strong current in opposition to the idea of separating the two centres of power; the presidency of the party and the presidency of the country. It also represents a very strong current in opposition to the re-election of Thabo Mbeki as President of the ANC. And what the nomination process did was to give us a clearer sense of the balance of support in the succession battle.

Now, of course, you cannot rule out the possibility that you will have a different outcome in Polokwane because of the lobbying that is certainly going on, and will continue in Polokwane. It is always possible that Mbeki will reverse the result of the nomination process, but my view is that it is highly unlikely. The reason I say it is possible is that, a few weeks ago, when the ANC here in Gauteng had its own conference, the MEC for Education, it

“What the nomination process did was to give us a clearer sense of the balance of support in the succession battle.”

was thought, would be elected Chair of the ANC in this province. It was a foregone conclusion that she would beat the MEC for Finance, Paul Mashatile. So much so, that as far as I know, she hosted a party the night before the election to celebrate her impending victory. And the lesson is that when it comes to ANC conferences, the balance of support can shift decisively in a matter of hours prior to an election. It's possible, yes. Likely? I do not think so.

But what is also interesting about the outcome of the nomination process is the fact that in provinces where Mbeki did well, Zuma did almost equally well, but in provinces where Zuma did very well, Mbeki did quite poorly. So this current of opposition to the re-election of Mbeki as party President seems to have been reflected in that.

I don't want us to spend too much time on the Women's League, because I think there are only two things to be said about that. The first is that there are people who have come out in protest against the way in which the Women's League voted simply because they are committed to gender equality. Secondly, there are people who came out similarly in protest against the nomination of Zuma by the Women's League because theirs was a proxy argument in opposition to Zuma's



presidential ambitions. In other words, what we have in that case is a situation where people are disguising their opposition to Zuma as a commitment to gender equality. I wrote a column in which I explained further what I think happened there.

The Eastern Cape result is interesting. Prior to the conference there was an assumption that the ethnic factor may come to the fore, and I think the fact that Zuma did as well as he did in the Eastern Cape kills the ethnic argument. The question is whether it kills the intra-ethnic argument. If you look at the branches that voted for Zuma, which branches are those in terms of the intra-ethnic dynamic? So the result kills the ethnic argument, but I don't think it kills the intra-ethnic argument as far as the dynamics among the Xhosas in the Eastern Cape are concerned. The OR Tambo Region, specifically, and other branches that mainly voted for him, in terms of the internal Xhosa dynamics, are people who are not regarded

as pure Xhosa – the Bhaca, the Mpondo, and so on. In fact, during the campaign in the Eastern Cape, there were those said, “vote for Mbeki because he is one of us”, meaning he's a Xhosa. And some would say well, no, actually, his ancestors came from KwaZulu-Natal. So there are interesting intra-ethnic dynamics about what happened in the Eastern Cape.

Then you wake up and read in the Financial Mail: “Be afraid.” Here I concur with Xolela. There has been an emerging class consensus about Zuma since 2005, and it has become a desperate state of panic because of the results of the nomination process. My view, as far as the fears of international investors go, is that Zuma will have very little room to tilt ANC policy in any decisive way towards the left, because the left lacks the qualitative and quantitative presence it requires in the structures of the ANC in order to effect such a shift in policy.



# Aubrey Matshiqi



Secondly, he himself is a philosophical conservative, who is unlikely to shift ANC policy in any decisive way towards the left. In his own words, he has said that he supports Mbeki's policies, especially Mbeki's economic policies, and therefore the support that he has received from the left has no ideological basis whatsoever. It represents what we have been talking about as the anti-establishment impulse.

I'm beginning to think that the tension in the party is not a tension between the establishment and those who represent an anti-establishment impulse. I think both candidates represent the establishment, and therefore what we have is a tension within the establishment. And therefore if we are looking for an anti-establishment option, we are not going to find it in Zuma. We will have to wait for him to finish his term, if he's elected, of course, for such an impulse to emerge genuinely within the ANC.

But while I am not concerned about shifts in the policy content of the ANC, I have certain worries, which arise from my view that it matters less who the personality is, who will win the battle, and matters more what the margin of victory will be. Anyone who wins by a wide margin or a very wide margin will then have the capacity to impose his political agenda on the party, on the tripartite alliance, and possibly even on the state, even while Mbeki is still head of state.

A narrow margin means the victors must negotiate that agenda with the losers, which of course portends conditions of both stability and instability. Let's say it turns out that we analysts are nothing but fountains of error as far as this issue is concerned, and Mbeki wins. Are Zuma supporters going to accept the outcome, especially if Mbeki wins by a narrow margin? I doubt that. And it is quite possible that if Mbeki wins by a wide



margin, given rumours that are being spread by some in the Zuma camp that he can only win that election by rigging it, I think it will be difficult for Zuma supporters to accept such an outcome.

I also worry about what may happen in KwaZulu-Natal. Is it inconceivable that in parts of KwaZulu-Natal there may be instability in response to an Mbeki victory? I assume, I think rather safely, that our security establishment is on high alert in that province as far as this matter is concerned.

Will the conference finish? That's another question for me. This conference is not going to be primarily about the small matter of a better life for all. This conference is going to be primarily about Zuma/Mbeki. I think you are familiar with the Cell C advert, "Hummer Hummer Cell C". In the same way delegates will either be going "Zuma, Zuma", "Mbeki, Mbeki" or whatever. I have an image of a food vendor receiving an order from a conference delegate who goes "Mbeki, Mbeki". So it's

quite possible that beyond the presidential election it will be difficult or impossible for the conference to continue.

Now, the question is what kind of future, then, lies beyond this conference? For me, the first challenge that will face whoever wins is to preside over a process of healing; firstly, within the ANC, secondly, within the alliance, and to some extent within the state, because some governance paralysis has begun to set in, especially in provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal. I am not convinced that Zuma and Mbeki will be able to preside effectively over a process of healing if either of them is elected. And therefore we may be looking at 18 months of some kind of instability, with possibly Zuma heading Luthuli House and Mbeki still in control of the Union Buildings.

The question, therefore, is whether, if Zuma wins by a wide margin, what we saw on the front page of the Sunday Times will eventuate, that Zuma's supporters will put pressure on Mbeki to call for an early election. Of course, Mbeki's unlikely to




accede to that. So will the matter be taken to the ANC's parliamentary majority? And, of course, I don't see the UDM and others supporting a vote of no confidence in the President.

Within the ANC itself you need that two-thirds majority. You'll be dealing with a divided caucus. For me, that does not matter that much. What matters is a situation where people even think of doing it, and actually do it. Whether they lose or succeed is immaterial, the effect is the same: a very unstable ANC and a very negative image of the country outside. Somehow I think that scenario is not going to eventuate, not because the ANC has a self-correcting mechanism that will pull it from the brink, as ANC members believe, but for some other reasons that we can go into during the Q&A.

Finally, I am convinced that for ordinary members of the ANC, and maybe even for some ordinary South Africans who are not members of the ANC, the choice between Zuma and Mbeki is a choice between hope and despair. Do yourselves a favour. Watch a documentary that was produced by the

team that did the unauthorised Thabo Mbeki documentary. They did fascinating interviews with members of the ANC in the OR Region, and you can clearly see that for the rank and file, at least in the OR Region of the ANC, the choice is between hope and despair. For those who support Zuma, Zuma represents hope and Mbeki despair, and for those of course who support Mbeki, Zuma represents a slide or a decline into a period in which political morality is going to be compromised.

In my view, those of us who are looking for hope beyond Limpopo must look elsewhere. I think we must approach the time, and do so quickly, when we rely less on political parties for our future.



“In my view, those of us who are looking for hope beyond Limpopo must look elsewhere. I think we must approach the time, and do so quickly, when we rely less on political parties for our future.”



# Aubrey Matshiqi



“There's an interesting paradox about what's happening in the ANC at the moment, and it seems to me unavoidable to argue that, at least for the moment, the ANC is changing quite fundamentally.”

## Steven Friedman

**B**efore I discuss what I want to discuss, I have to declare an interest, in that I have become increasingly distraught by the mounting likelihood that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will not be elected ANC President.

This has nothing at all to do with political preferences and everything to do with the fact that I've been on panels with Aubrey several times in which he's promised to eat various parts of his wardrobe if she gets elected. I'm very distressed that it looks pretty likely that Aubrey will keep his wardrobe intact and will eat what the rest of us eat.

I also want to say, over the question of whether this is done and dusted or not, I would tend to lean more to Aubrey's side of the argument. I certainly think that a Zuma victory is far more likely than an Mbeki victory, but just bear in mind not only that there has been intensive lobbying over the last couple of weeks, which may turn out to be significant or may not, but the votes which were counted at the Provincial General Councils [PGCs] don't overlap exactly with the votes at Polokwane. In other words, some Youth League votes, for example, were counted which will count less at Polokwane. So I don't think we can say it's all over yet, although obviously the

evidence we have in front of us says that a Zuma victory is more likely.

But that's not fundamentally what I wanted to talk about. As the Chair has said, my interest in this issue is not who wins – and I really don't care who wins – it's what all this means for the future, what all this means for democracy in South Africa. And in the short time available to me I want to do two things. I want to say something about what I think is happening to the ANC, a sort of rehash of a column I wrote for Business Day this week, some of which actually made it into the newspaper. And, secondly, I want to look beyond that, and talk a little bit about what this means for the country.

There's an interesting paradox about what's happening in the ANC at the moment, and it seems to me unavoidable to argue that, at least for the moment, the ANC is changing quite fundamentally. And, whatever the merits or demerits or the candidates, we have seen open campaigning for the Presidency of the ANC – which we haven't seen for 58 years, and didn't really see in 1949 either, because Dr Moroko was sort of produced out of a hat at the last moment. We've had a far more vigorous democratic process within the ANC over the last few weeks, I think, despite all the hype, than at any time in the movement's history. I suspect that this might be a fundamental shift.

I've had some interesting conversations with ANC activists and supporters, and the general conclusion one can draw from them is that if the ANC is on the verge of a major democratic breakthrough, which would be entailed by electing a President in an open contest rather than in a backroom deal between leaders, this prospect is not exciting the membership and the support base of the ANC. In fact, quite the opposite.

I don't know whether the people I've been speaking to are vaguely representative, but this is supposed to be impressionistic, after all. There have been three themes. The first is that I find many, many people who really would rather they had somebody to choose other than Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki. Obviously there are the zealots on both sides, but people aren't going into this process excited. I think very many people are going into this saying, if this is the candidate that an open election produces, perhaps another method would be more desirable.

Secondly, I encounter a quite widespread perception that what is going on at the moment is not a great battle between ideas and different approaches to the future of the ANC, but a rather grubby battle for power and position. People are saying repeatedly, "This is not what we used to do in the ANC, this is not an ANC tradition, these people are only in it for themselves."

People are a bit vague about whether they're saying that because they just find the idea of a competitive election in which people, in effect, put themselves forward distasteful, or whether they feel it must be said, with a fair amount of evidential backing on their side, that people are not fighting over real issues, they are fighting over power or position.

And, thirdly, and Aubrey has taken us through some quite stark scenarios based on this perception, there is a fairly obvious fear, and a concern, that the ANC will come

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out of this process deeply divided, that people who lose will be deeply alienated, and that will eat away at the ANC in all sorts of ways.

The obvious logical conclusion to draw from these kinds of perceptions is that this particular exercise in political pluralism, in allowing the delegates, rather than the elites, to choose who the next President of the ANC will be, is a momentary phenomenon; that people will, once the dust settles if the ANC gets through this successfully, put their heads together and try to find ways of preventing the mistake ever being made in the future, because people will find it distasteful and distressing.

That's a possibility, it could happen. I don't think it will happen. I think that the process of trying to govern a diverse society with a fairly developed market economy is rather too complicated simply to be left to the whims of political high-ups.

I think, incidentally, perhaps the most important lesson of the Mbeki era is that you can have extremely sophisticated policies, whether you like them or not, put together by very smart people with lots of degrees, and if you can't actually take your constituency with you, and you can't get the sort of social co-operation from the society that you need – which is all about politics, and all about the relationships you form with people, and all about democracy – if you can't do those things, then people





# Steven Friedman

will not regard the policies as credible, and they will try to get rid of you at the first available opportunity. And that's a lesson that people in any walk of life in South Africa could take.

One of the consequences of that argument is that – and I'm not just saying this because of my normative preferences – the business of trying to run South Africa with very small groups of elites is rather more difficult than it was to run an exile movement with small groups of elites.

**“The business of trying to run South Africa with very small groups of elites is rather more difficult than it was to run an exile movement with small groups of elites.”**

I suspect that the Winnie Mandela proposal, which fortunately is not going to get anywhere, is on one level not a serious political proposal. But it's quite revealing in the sense that that, although she tends to take this to extremes, I think she's speaking for a section of ANC history and an ANC tradition which says, “Look, this stuff about elections, etc, is all very well in theory, but

what we need is a bunch of high-ups to come in and sort the whole thing out.” And that that's good for the movement and good for the country, because, of course, what is good for the movement is good for the country, and what is good for the elites is good for the movement. I think that that [attitude has] been there for a long time. and she is in a sense expressing it, but the sort of derision to which the proposal has been subjected, the fact that it doesn't look like a political flyer, perhaps indicates to us that the past has really gone, that the past is indeed another country.

It's very important to stress – and I think we very often misunderstand this – that breakthroughs for democracy are not usually achieved anywhere in the world because noble, saintly people decide that democracy is what the country needs. It is usually decided because extremely grubby people who are involved in extremely grubby conflicts decide that the only way out of the conflicts is democracy, and I think that that's what we're viewing at the moment.

So I don't think that we should assume that because ANC members are reluctant about this process, because people are not entirely sure that it's what they want, that it is reversible. I think that there's a fair amount of evidence to suggest that it may well not be reversible – that, as I say in the article, in five or ten years' time the people who are



now saying this was absolutely dreadful are going to be accepting competitive elections within the ANC as a natural process.

This depends on one important factor, the way in which the post-Polokwane process is managed. Quite obviously, if some of those more nightmarish scenarios that Aubrey is talking about come to pass, if people don't accept results, if there's conflict over the nature of the results, if people don't try and resolve this politically ... I don't think there's anything particularly alarming about a political battle about who's going to head the ANC list in 2009, but I think there would be alarming prospects if people start saying we've been cheated.

If the ANC can get through this process with the losers accepting the results – and accepting doesn't mean you have to like the results, it means that you have grudgingly to learn to live with them – then I think we may well be entering a situation in which contested elections will become part of the way in which the ANC conducts its affairs.

Now, what does this mean for the rest of the country? You can make an argument, as some people have, that, in fact, if you are a democrat, and believe in multi-partyism and in free and open elections, that it would actually be a setback for the country. The argument that this is based on is that if the ANC entrenches democracy in its own ranks, it becomes better able to handle its own conflicts, there's less prospect of a split in the party, and there's more prospect that the ANC will remain such a dominant factor in our political life that a vigorous democracy will not be possible.

I don't buy that argument for a number of reasons which I don't have time to talk to now, but the most important point is about India. The society whose post-democracy political development has possibly been most analogous to ours is India. And what happened there, in a nutshell, is very similar to what's happening here. In the Indian National Congress, the Congress Party, a particular group tried to impose a very top-down elitist approach, which created all sorts of problems, much as we are seeing at the moment. And the

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result was that Nehru, who'd given up the Congress presidency in order to become Prime Minister of India, and had wanted to separate the two positions, said it was not working, and made himself available for President of Congress. He became President of Congress, and then said, “This is pluralist organisation, a democratic organisation, and if you want to differ with the leadership, and do it publicly, that's okay.” In his view that was the only way you could keep Congress together.

The results of this were twofold. First of all, people took him at his word, and you had a lot of maverick politicians within Congress who said all sorts of things in public which the party lines said they weren't supposed to say. But more importantly, over time India evolved into a far more competitive system, in which alternatives to the Congress Party emerged and in fact won elections.

I'm not saying that what happens in India has necessarily to happen anywhere in the world, but I think there is a lesson from that experience, which is born out in other situations I've studied in which one party dominates for many, many years, Japan and Italy being very obvious examples. The more you have intra-party democracy, the more you have the principle established within parties that leaders must be elected democratically and that the rule of law must maintain media freedom; the more democracy tends to become part of the way in which people do things in the society.

In other words, I think that the Indian experience and a great deal of other analysis tells us that over time a more democratic, more pluralist, more competitive ANC is not only good for the ANC, it's good for democracy in South Africa.



## Zwelethu Jolobe

My great interest in this really emerged from the outcomes of the PGC votes. Initially I was surprised, not by the fact that Jacob Zuma was in the lead, but more importantly by the margins in key provinces such as the Eastern Cape and the Free State, and the fact that Mr Mbeki got nine votes in KwaZulu-Natal. This led me to begin to investigate what the underlying reasons were. The basis of the points that I would like to make is to look at some of the main reasons, and what they could mean for the post-Polokwane era.

The first thing that I've come to realise is that Mbeki as an individual doesn't seem to be the only problem here – especially the fact that he doesn't run the country alone, he runs it with a Cabinet. So we should move away from the notion that individual leaders can either cripple a country or cripple an organisation, or that they are great indispensable messiahs who can single-handedly solve the country's problems.

The problem I have identified has to do with the Mbeki presidency, in the sense that the manner in which it has evolved as an institution, in its relationship to Parliament, to the judiciary, to the alliance

“The problem I have identified has to do with the Mbeki presidency, in the sense that the manner in which it has evolved as an institution, in its relationship to Parliament, to the judiciary, to the alliance structures, and to the society at large, has really isolated and detached the Cabinet from the people.”

structures, and to the society at large, has really isolated and detached the Cabinet from the people. And the implication of this has been a weakening of the influence of these various political or societal formations, and the consequent reduction in the accountability of this presidency as an institution to the alliance structures, to Parliament and to the ANC membership. And I think a number of events this year have played crucial roles in terms of how these results unfolded.

Firstly, the dismissal of Billy Masetlha after the National General Council, after Project Avani; the protection of the Health Minister against the Deputy Health Minister; and, most importantly, the desire to seek a third term at the helm of the ANC, have led to a rise of discontentment within the organisation and within the alliance.

What opened up the space as a consequence of this was the fact that the President's term limit began to draw to a close, and this new coalition found an outlet in Jacob Zuma, or in the new alliance around Mr Zuma – meaning that the issue here is not so much about the fact of Mr Zuma as an individual, but the fact that we are witnessing more of a broad-based coalition of trade union and business

interests, which is indicative of a power shift within the ANC, as one group is making a bid for the alternation of power. This, I feel, has had a major impact in terms of the state of the ANC.

Most importantly, that the ANC has become responsive to Mr Zuma is testimony that the organisation is opting, not so much for the individual, but more particularly for the alternation of power for the sake of democracy. And the fact that the ANC has been responsive to a Jacob Zuma campaign, which in many ways he has publicised and so made the contest for the party leadership more transparent and more primary-like, in many ways shows that the ANC is moving gradually more towards being a democratic organisation.

The issue, however, is what these underlying structural reasons for Mr Mbeki's initial defeat at the nomination rounds, in particular with reference to the manner in which his office has evolved, tells us about what could happen after Polokwane. There are a number of questions that I feel are important in this regard.

The first is whether or not the NPA [National Prosecuting Authority] will charge Jacob Zuma. And if so, what the

implication will be for the coalition around Mr Zuma, and for the perceptions that the organisation will have of Mr Mbeki, given the fact that there are perceptions that Mr Mbeki himself is behind the prosecutions (and the fact that his Minister of Justice wants to involve herself in matters of prosecution, hasn't helped this issue). Secondly, if Mr Mbeki or Mr Zuma wins, who will be in this new NEC, and how will it respond to or relate to the State Presidency? Thirdly, what influence will the unions or the NEC have in issues like Cabinet selection? And, fourthly, how will this new team manage or deal with this strong inherited presidency?

Will they scale down its powers? What will happen to the cluster system or the various policy units within the President's office. In the end, whatever the outcome of Polokwane, could the new victors simply succeed in turning the world upside down, but then, in the end, actually fail to change it? In many ways I do not foresee any significant structural or policy changes after Polokwane. I think that what has certainly come out in both camps is that the issue is not necessarily about policy, neither is it about ideas. In the end we could potentially have more of the same, but with a more human face.





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## Bantu Holomisa

Let me take the meeting back to 1994, when President Mandela thought that the person who would be his Deputy President would be Cyril Ramaphosa. He was basing that argument on the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa was number two on the list to Parliament and, secondly, he was the Secretary-General of the party, and, thirdly, he played a meaningful role in the Constitution, in the negotiations and so on.

But what came out clearly was this so-called culture of the ANC of electing or anointing leaders, which even Mandela himself, and other members of the ANC, were not aware of. He was told at the last hour that look, we have our President, he has been groomed over the years by OR Tambo and his name is Thabo Mbeki.

But it looks as though some people did not rest after that, and they started, from 1994 up to this day, to change that culture. They want to participate in electing a new leader of the ANC. You hear diplomatic terms now like “we would prefer”, “preferable”.

But if you come closer to what is expected in Polokwane, the delegates, and in particular the country and the world, would expect Mbeki, when he takes the podium, to clarify this confusion about the third term. He would have to dispel the fears that his


re-election is a ruse to go for a third term as the President of the country, in that, if he is elected again, he might make sure that the list that goes to Parliament will be the people who would amend the Constitution for him to continue.

So he needs to clarify that, because when you listen to the campaigns on the ground, the people interpret the third term as Mbeki wanting to continue to be the President of the country.

Equally, Mr Zuma might have also to take the podium, or at least make a statement, to assure the people that his continuous refusal to co-operate, or open the cupboards for the Scorpions to search for whatever, in order to finalise the case ... he has to come out in the open and say, “I’m ready to co-operate.” And he needs to clarify this theory of the so-called conspiracy. Where does this theory come from, given the fact that the judiciary, especially at appeal level, has rejected that argument outright?

The other area which we need to look at is the role of the SACP [South African Communist Party] and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] in this whole campaign. It looks as though they have done a good job of promoting JZ, and they have succeeded in making sure that the people in their NEC list will represent their interests.





Now, the delegates, in particular the ANC members, might want to question the wisdom of wanting to make a Chairperson of the SACP Secretary-General of a ruling party, which means this alliance is still confusing to many people. There is still a need to clarify and educate people.

But suppose the ANC members vow that the SACP and Cosatu will not be allowed to advance their social agenda on the back of the ANC. Then we might witness, sooner rather than later, an emergence of two political formations representing these interest groups. You are aware that SACP has already registered with the IEC [Independent Electoral Commission]. One may argue that the majority of people who have nominated JZ for now also include the ANC [members]. I won't reject that, but I'm looking at the undercurrent Why?

The other person who, perhaps, might also have to answer a few questions in the Polokwane conference is the Secretary-General himself. He has managed to take advantage of the situation, and it would appear that he has positioned himself,

because he's in a stronger position now. Suppose JZ is elected as President and then in January the Scorpions visit him at Luthuli House and serve him with the indictment, obviously the SG will be in a better position, because he will be the Deputy if they win. With hindsight you could ask, was he honest to both Zuma and Mbeki?

Lastly, I've been asked to comment and write articles on this issue and also appeared on radio stations, and I still maintain that the ANC, and, in fact, the country, aren't ready for the change of guard within two years, as was suggested in the Sunday Times. Some ANC members of Parliament might, in big numbers, block that idea as well. And, of course, some tiny opposition parties together might also reinforce those who are against a vote of no confidence on Mbeki as President of the country.

My position is that we should maintain the status quo. This would give Mr Zuma another opportunity to co-operate with the Scorpions, and it would also place him in a better position if he continues as Deputy President. When the case is finalised, or he's



acquitted, then come 2009 he would be a strong contender.

So if I were in their boots, I would call one another, go to a room. Mbeki leaves his pipe outside the room, and then Mr Zuma leaves Zapiro outside, and they face one another and say, where do we take the party and the country? I don't think there is a need for them to challenge one another. My fellow panellists are talking about instability, ethnic cleansing and so on – is there a need for that? All they need is to agree on a policy of succession. That's my case.

“The other person who, perhaps, might also have to answer a few questions in the Polokwane conference is the Secretary-General himself. He has managed to take advantage of the situation, and it would appear that he has positioned himself, because he's in a stronger position now.”







# Discussion

**MR ROBERT WILSON:** The question of the role of National Treasury going forward hasn't been touched upon, but, particularly given the recent weekend letters by the Minister of Finance, and his role going forward, I think it's quite crucial – unless we are sanguine about this argument that it will be business as usual in terms of the economy, and that there won't be a fundamental ideological shift to the left. But the devil is in the detail in terms of policy implementation. To date the National Treasury has played an important role in tempering or fettering the exuberance or ideological zeal of other departments, particular the DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] and the DME [Department of Minerals and Energy]. What will the role of the National Treasury be? To what extent can Luthuli House influence National Treasury, and particularly its leadership? That really will have bearing on the way economic forces are played out.

**DR MANGCU:** I'd like to make a couple of points, and not necessarily respond to that, but I think that point somehow touches on what I want to say. For me it's not just about prediction. I'm not a non-partisan, objective, number-counting analyst, dispassionate and uninterested. I have an interest in a particular outcome, and that interest is that Thabo Mbeki must go. And I've said that as much as I can, and I can make the political argument for that.

But, really, I just want to make two points. One, which we did not, I think, highlight as much as we should have, is that the seismic shift in terms of the political culture in the coun-





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try and in the ANC is just amazing; that here's a man who had this country, or his party, in a tight fist only two years ago, and now almost like everybody in his party doesn't want him. So even if he wins there is no undoing; the genie's out of the bottle. There's a different mood out there, which I think is good for this country either way, whether Mbeki loses or not, and I think that's very, very important.

The second point is related to the Treasury issue. There is something that I'd like to think about some more when I'm driving home, which is, why is it that things that are normal in other countries get us into a tizz here? The matter of a President calling an early election – that's par for the course in a lot of democracies. It does happen, folks. Why is it that when it is suggested in South Africa somehow it's Armageddon? It's like the end of the world? That was just one thing.

The second is something like a political pardon for somebody who's been found guilty – let's say Jacob Zuma is found guilty and the next President offers him a pardon. I mean, George Bush just did it for Scooter Libby, they did it for Nixon in the early '70s. It happens. Tony Blair has just said that they were not going to investigate the Saudi Arabians over corruption around the arms deal. So why is it that something like a pardon, which happens, is again something that takes us into a tizz in this country? Why is it that there's this assumption, in almost all of our daily talk – and this relates to this Treasury issue – why is there this assumption that things must stay the same?

There's an assumption that if Zuma comes in, he's going to want to change economic policy. Well, that's what political parties do in other societies. In Britain, when the Social Demo-



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crats come in, or when the Labour Party comes in, and takes over from the Tories, the first thing they want to do is to change the economic policies. So why is it that in this country it's blasphemous to think that if Zuma becomes President he might want to change policy? Why is it that we say, if Zuma becomes President, then there's going to have to be payback to his supporters? It's par for the course in every country. You pay back those who've supported you. You appoint your own people, it happens all the time.

I have a suspicion that it has to do with something sociological about South Africa, and it's just a suspicion. I think that there's a schizophrenic aspect about us because of our history, that we're very conservative and that anything that might kind of derail us from the trauma of the past is something that we should be guarded about. However, it's that very same schizophrenia, I think, that in fact may suggest that even if Zuma wins, actually we'll wake up the following day and everything will be just fine, and nobody will be fighting with nobody, precisely because of this schizophrenia, so schizophrenia can work in both directions.

And so my last point, really, is that perhaps because of that schizophrenia, the victory of Jacob Zuma will not bring this country to some kind of Armageddon-like situation. We'll live our lives and we'll fight with him, we'll have all kinds of battles with him. And we'll have policy contestation. I think a lot of the economic policies that we've had with Thabo Mbeki are horrendous. I think the unemployment levels, the poverty, the inequality are as a result of Mbeki's policies, so why should we stay with them? But the problem is once you raise that, which is a legitimate policy question, it's then recast as a Zuma question. And it's not a Zuma question, it's a legitimate policy question.

**MR MATSHIQI:** Well, Xolela, that is happening in part because a lot of class prejudice has come disguised as analysis when it comes to the possibility of a Zuma presidency. I have argued in the past that National Treasury, not only in this country, tends to operate like a state within a state. I mean, our National Treasury is no exception, even from the time I was in government myself. And I've had some run-ins, as a representative of one government department, with Provincial Treasury, which operated in the same way – as a state within a state. So some of the tensions within the alliance stem from the way





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in which National Treasury operates. But also because of how National Treasury operates, the budget has tended to be the tail that wags the policy dog. What happens is that National Treasury comes to you as head of department, and says they've got R10, design your policies around the fact that they can only give you R10. That, basically, is what has been happening. Whether things are going to change depends on whether you think the function and role of the post-apartheid state will change if there's a change in the presidency of the ANC, and possibly that of the country.

My view is that the post-apartheid state will remain a pluralist state, whose function is to manage class contradiction, and it will not have a bias, as demanded by the left, towards the working class. And it does not matter whether the President of the ANC is Zuma or Mbeki or somebody else, the role of the post-apartheid state will remain largely what it is today. And therefore the role of National Treasury will remain largely what it is today.

I would like to touch on Kgalema [Motlanthe] and the NPA. If charges of corruption are reinstated against Zuma there is a possibility that he may have to withdraw from the race for Head of State. So we have a scenario, possibly, in which Zuma has been elected President of the ANC in Polokwane and is charged thereafter, and in the period leading to the 2009 election he is facing corruption charges, or there is even a trial. People tend to think that political damage will occur at the end of the trial, especially if he's convicted, or that his political problems will be solved if he is acquitted.

As we've learnt from the rape trial, political damage can happen during the trial, long before the conclusion of the trial. Evidence may be adduced of such a nature that he is forced, long before the conclusion of the trial, to withdraw. In which case Kgalema Motlanthe may have to step up if the strategy of the Zuma camp succeeds.

My reading of the strategy of the Zuma camp is that it has two pillars. The first pillar is about preventing Thabo Mbeki from being elected, and the second is about preventing anyone created in his image from being elected Deputy President of the ANC. If you look at the Zuma lists, at the top you have Zuma for President, second is Kgalema Motlanthe for Deputy. It seems the idea is that in case Zuma has to withdraw from the race for Head of State, then the Deputy President of the party may have to step up and become the nominee for Head of



State for the ANC. If the Zuma campaign and ticket wins, then Kgalema Motlanthe may be that person. So actually we are looking at the possibility that the next Head of State of the country may actually be Kgalema Motlanthe.

I also want to go back to the question of ethnicity. I think we should not be too sanguine about the fact that Zuma performed as well as he did in the Eastern Cape, and therefore this means the ethnic factor has been destroyed. The Zuma camp smells the Presidency; some, I think, can feel it in their hands. In this climate, what's the point of raising the ethnic issue when the assumption is that Zuma is going to win in Polokwane?

So there is no need for Zuma supporters to raise the ethnic issue, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, where some have been arguing that this presidential race is about preventing a Zulu from becoming Head of State in 2009. That argument does not have to arise if it seems a foregone conclusion that Zuma is going to win. But should he lose, I have very little doubt that the ethnic issue will come back, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. To what effect, I don't know.

**PROF FRIEDMAN:** Yes, ethnicity remains an issue in this society. I don't think that's a problem. I'm always amused by the ethnicity issue. You know, you go to international conferences and somebody – usually, interestingly, somebody upper middle class from Africa – stands up and wrings their hands and says, “Our politics is still dominated by ethnicity.” Well, actually, you look around Europe, and there are the Scottish National Parties and Bavarian People's Parties and Flemish Parties, etc. If it works, if it's okay there, why isn't it okay here?

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The real answer is that it's not a problem about having ethnic identities in any democracy, the problem is how you deal with it. If people were able to express it in a way in which they feel part of the democratic system, it's not a problem. I think that's one of the challenges we have going forward.

I wouldn't quite agree with Aubrey, if I'm understanding him correctly, about the anti-Zuma prejudices. Some reservations about Zuma are legitimate – I think some of the things he said at his rape trial were, to put it mildly, rather unfortunate, and I'm not a great machine gun buff myself – but I think that a lot of the concerns are more a sort of cultural prejudice than an economic prejudice. I think the idea of black men in traditional dress doesn't actually turn most people in the suburbs on, and I think that that's part of what's going on.

And I think the lesson from that, as I've said from this platform before, is that it's very important that democrats in this society – liberal democrats, if that's how you describe yourself – look beyond culture to substance. The issue is not what people wear, the issue is not what language people speak, the issue is whether there are core democratic processes and values there.

Finally, this question about the Treasury. I do a blog, and I wrote precisely on this, saying economic policy isn't going to change radically. And people write in and say, "You're just doing this to make us feel better" – to which the answer is that I never said anywhere that this is a good thing, that economic policy isn't going to change. I made an analytical observation, and the analytical observation is based on the following, in a nutshell:

When I say that policy is not going to change, I'm not saying that details of policy are not going to change, because details of policy change everywhere all the time in democratic systems. And bear in mind, for those people who are freaking out about all Zuma's policy changes, that there is clearly a different economic approach in the Mbeki camp at the moment. It doesn't involve regulating business, but there is very clearly a sense in the Mbeki camp that there needs to be more public investment, there needs to be a greater public role in the economy. And I think that that's now an ANC consensus, whoever gets into power.

So those of us who say that there's not going to be a major shift are saying that the politics of the ANC, as it's currently constituted, do not allow for that radical shift to the left that Cosatu and the SACP are calling for.

And I'll give you three reasons for that. In March this year Zwelinzima Vavi gave an interview to the Mail and Guardian and said three things, one of which, obviously, was: "We're going to change the ANC from a social democratic movement into a radical left movement." He then said how they were going to do it.

Point one, they were going to flood the ANC with Cosatu members. If you look at the latest audit, all the gains in membership are in rural areas, so they haven't flooded the ANC.



Secondly, he said, we are going to make sure that working-class people and poor people dominate the list. If you look at the top six they've endorsed, if, as seems likely, is de facto the case now, the nominee for Chair is Sexwale. You've got two prominent business people, a trade unionist who's got so many BEE deals that he's forgotten where he came from, and Gwede Mantashu, who's sort of the token member of the working class, but he's in semi-retirement from the working class. So he didn't deliver on that.

The third point, about the radical left thing, is that if, as I have done recently, you speak to Cosatu strategists about this, the conversation's very interesting. You say to them, well, where is the great radical left shift? And they say it's already happened. And you say, oh that's very interesting, how did it happen? Oh well, there's a resolution for Polokwane which says that we should have a National Health Insurance System. So I say, well, all of Western Europe has a National Health Insurance System, that's not radical left. And then they say, if we say we want radical left then we might get moderate left. If we say we want moderate left, we get nothing at all.

All of this is based on the core political reality that Vavi knows that as the ANC is currently constituted, under the card-carrying membership of the ANC, there is no majority for the kind of policies he wants.

I was doing an interesting exercise before I came here this morning, going through the NEC nominations and making sure that I boned up on who all the folks were who had been nominated. It's a bit like a McGregor's Who's Who exercise. You look these people up and it's basically a listing of their shareholdings and interests in various things, and that doesn't sound like a socialist majority to me.

**MR JOLOBE:** On the question that was asked, I think that we have to make a difference between brinkmanship, on the one hand, on the eve of political competition, which happens everywhere in the world, and what is possible. If one looks at the ANC, not only in the post-apartheid era but even before that, it's always been a site of contestation, and I think that various ideas – be they socialist, be they non-socialist – have always competed for hegemony, for dominance.

I think that we need to understand it within that context first, in that on the eve of the changing of the guard, different tendencies are always going to push through or articulate their broad ideas. And the many ideas about socialism in the ANC are not new, neither are

ideas about creating perhaps more progressive, or more radical, spending regimes. So I think that we need to be clear about that, and not see this particular era as anything different from that.


The second issue is that all changes in leadership produce policy changes, and the question is the extent of the change. If we were to look at the groupings around Jacob Zuma, I think that there is nothing that suggests that they are going to radically change things at all. If the National Conference, for instance, ratifies the recommendations of the Policy Conference, and if one actually looks at what was discussed at the Policy Conference, it is quite clear that there will be no fundamental shift. And I don't think that the groupings around Mr Zuma will promote such radical change.

**MR HOLOMISA:** Well, as a former dictator let me have the last word on this issue ...

On a serious note, the Mbeki government has been under pressure since the time of the GEAR policy. So they came up with that concept of a developmental state and all that jargon, ASGISA [Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa] and so on. But the bottom line is that it looks like they were just trying to appease the left without moving an inch.

As a result, there is a legitimate expectation, especially from disadvantaged communities, that the developmental state means more state intervention on a number of areas, which they have done. But if you look at how Tito Mboweni runs his affairs across the street from Trevor Manuel, then you begin to ask questions as to whether these people know exactly what agenda are they pushing.

In Parliament we are pushing for legislation for the members of Parliament to have a say in the budget, as opposed to relying on some technocrats who tell us this is what the budget is all about – and then we are expected to sing the praises of Trevor Manuel after that. There's a push in Parliament for legislation that would empower parliamentarians to say, "We are not happy with this. Why are you not developing area A? It's your priority to do A ahead of that area." So it's not going to be radical. People here are not careless, as Prof. Friedman has already said. You can call them communists, you can call them socialists, and so on. Judge them by where they live, what they drive, what they eat.





# Media coverage

BUSINESS DAY, 14 DECEMBER 2007

## Motlanthe 'fanning rift' for own gain

Wilson Johwa

*Political Correspondent*


UNITED Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa has accused African National Congress (ANC) secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe of causing divisions within the ANC, in a bid to set himself up for national president.

Holomisa said Motlanthe was fanning the rift between President Thabo Mbeki and ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma in the aftermath of the arms deal, which he described as a "cancerous tumour" eating into the ANC.

"His public utterances seem to reflect that he was the main mobiliser for one camp against the other, and as if he wasn't loyal to his president," said the former ANC cabinet member in a paper released at a roundtable discussion organised by the Helen Suzman Foundation.

ANC spokesman Tiyane Rikhotso declined to comment.

Holomisa said Motlanthe "has already shown that he has a vested



interest" in the outcome of the succession battle.

Motlanthe, who is seen as a possible compromise candidate, was nominated by the Zuma camp for the position of party deputy president. Competing for the same position will be Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who is

seen as an Mbeki ally. The winning candidate for the deputy president's post could be well placed to become ANC president because Mbeki may not stand for a third term as SA's president and Zuma's campaign could be scuttled by pending corruption charges.

"To an outside observer it would look as if it would be to his advantage if both Mr Zuma and Mr Mbeki fell by the wayside," said Holomisa, suggesting that Motlanthe would face a grilling at the ANC national conference which starts on Sunday.

Continuing with the surprise attack, he said some of the "sudden leaders who are lionising Mr Zuma are vultures hovering above him waiting for the Scorpions to pounce, and then they will be the first to suggest that he step down".

Holomisa suggested that Motlanthe had been restrained in quelling divisions and getting errant party structures to answer for their actions.

"The secretary-general will be asked about his role in calling to

order the alliance partners and youth structures in terms of attacking one another, including the ANC president, in public and in the media, as well as the destruction of party material," said Holomisa.

In his address, Holomisa's suggestion of how to resolve the potential leadership impasse echoed a proposal by his former party ally Winnie Madikizela-Mandela for the ANC to "maintain the status quo" by allowing both Mbeki and Zuma to retain their positions until clear succession policies were worked out and charges against Zuma finalised.

"After all there is no difference in their policies except personal gripes," he said.

Speaking at the same event, political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi said of major concern was that a small margin of victory by either candidate could cause instability. An Mbeki win could result in violence, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. "I assume our security establishment is on high alert with regard to this," he said.



BUSINESS DAY, 14 DECEMBER 2007

BUSINESS DAY, 20 DECEMBER 2007

## Words wear masks on road to Polokwane

**T**WO weeks ago I participated in a debate about whether the national conference of the African National Congress (ANC) would amount to "business as usual" or an "opportunity for renewal". The debate organisers played a snippet from a documentary based on interviews that were conducted with ANC members in the OR Tambo region of the ruling party. Since this clip was shown before the panel could take the stage, the audience was saved from my usual in-the-clouds sophistry because the voices of the documentary had a devastatingly humbling effect on me.

Is there a point to this meandering? For me, the documentary makes it clear that ordinary members of the party seem to think that the choice between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma is one between hope and despair. Some think that a vote for Zuma is a vote for a better life while others seem convinced they will vote for him only as a result in a decline in political morality. The latter view is popular with the middle class and certain sections of the media, who, in their commitment to the public interest, have been warning the country to be afraid of Zuma — the ogre of the succession battle.

First, we must not delude ourselves into thinking that the small matter of "a better life for all" will be uppermost in the minds of ANC delegates. In the same way that people in a certain advertising campaign have become zombies who can only chant "Hummer, Hummer", the mantra of Zuma supporters will be "Zuma, Zuma" and food vendors will be astonished when some delegates place orders for "Mbeki, Mbeki".

Second, some of the "Be Afraid" newspaper articles forced me to do a bit of light reading. In the process I stumbled on the book *Plato's Republic: A Biography*, by Simon Blackburn. In it I found two warnings about the written word. The author borrows from Robert Louis Stevenson who argued that "written words remain fixed, become idols even to the wisest, and breed dogmatism, and preserve flies of obvious error in the amber of the truth". He also refers to Plato who, in similar vein, said that "the written word is easily turned into an object of recitation, the foodstuff of unintelligent fundamentalisms". Clearly, "dogmatism" and "fundamentalisms" have become a critical feature of the succession debate. Because I am not as eloquent as Plato or Stevenson, all that is left to argue on this point is the fact that the succession debate has, to some extent, become an "echo chamber" of middle-class opinion. This does not mean we should not be afraid. We do have reason to be afraid that the succession battle may spiral out of control if the national conference becomes an arena of fierce combat between the Zuma and Mbeki camps.

Will Zuma supporters be able to restrain themselves when Mbeki steps up to deliver the opening speech or are they going to boo and chant songs with unsavoury references to the outgoing leader of the ANC? Did I say "outgoing leader"? Well, this faux pas brings me to another question. If Mbeki wins, will Zuma supporters accept such an outcome? We cannot rule out the possibility that the ANC conference may not be able to proceed beyond the presidential election since it is not inconceivable that the losers will simply go home or worse will happen when the result is announced. Already, there are suggestions that Mbeki can only win the battle of Polokwane if he resorts to means nefarious. Personally, I worry about the possibility of unrest in parts of KwaZulu-Natal if the desired outcome does not eventuate. On the other hand, mine may be the fulminations of one who is nothing but a "fountain of error".

Alternatively, you should blame Plato for my state of mind. He asks a very disturbing question: "If one type of character outweighs the rest, so to speak, then don't you think it draws all the other types with it?" For me the "type of character" is not necessarily an individual or group of individuals. It refers to dominant forms of political behaviour that may or may not have been imposed by the personality of a leader or group of leaders. The ugliness and viciousness of the succession battle reflects a malaise that must have set in long before the leadership contest started dominating headlines. If this ugliness continues to the ANC conference floor, one hopes that former president Nelson Mandela will break his silence for the sake of us all.

■ *Matshiqi is a senior associate political analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies.*

**ZUMA VICTORY/Steven Friedman**

## Trials ahead, but ANC vote may be a beacon of hope

**J**UST after his candidate's victory, the young Jacob Zuma delegate volunteered: "This is not Zimbabwe. If they had done this years ago, they would not be in the mess that they are."

That, surely, is the key implication of Zuma's victory — it has shown that our democracy will not follow the path which is meant to be inevitable when liberation movements lead countries to majority rule. But, if it has shown us where we are not headed, much still needs to happen before we know our destination.

In no post-independence African country has a sitting president been peacefully and democratically defeated by his own party. While some have seen democratic processes which have rejected sitting presidents, none has happened so soon after majority rule. And it may well be that no liberation movement anywhere has seen such a swift assertion by its members of their right to decide who should lead them.

This is crucial because, in many people's minds, there is an inevitability about countries, particularly those in Africa, which are led to majority rule by liberation movements: the new leadership becomes immune to removal by the electorate or its own members, prompting decades of decay. Zimbabwe is the most immediate and topical example, but hardly the only one.

The African National Congress (ANC) vote signalled that we are on a different path in which leaders can be ejected by those they lead and in which, therefore, high office is always a conditional gift — you keep it only as long as those who gave it to you allow it.

Important as this is, we are not necessarily riding off into a new sunrise. We may be headed for a more vigorous democracy and, therefore, a more successful country. But many trials lie on the way before we can be confident of this.

First, for many South Africans, including many who work in or vote for the ANC, the benefits of an election for ANC president are outweighed by the costs of the result: many have deep misgivings about Zuma. More than a few, for



example, wish that Thabo Mbeki had withdrawn months ago to give Cyril Ramaphosa a clear shot at the presidency.

This raises the possibility that the gap between the political leadership and the country which has so hampered progress over the past decade has not been bridged, that all we have seen is a shift from one elite figure to another in a process from which the people will continue to be excluded. And so, if we are to progress, Zuma and his supporters need to know both that this vote was far more a rebellion against Mbeki than an embrace of Zuma and that the more than 9-million people who vote ANC but don't belong to it did not choose him.

That means that he cannot assume the support of either the ANC or the country — he must work to achieve it: only if he does are we likely to see a government more in touch with the society it governs.

Second, we do not know yet whether the Zuma supporters here at Polokwane were making a lasting statement that they want an ANC in which leaders account to the led or were merely switching their allegiance from one leader to another.

Are those who challenged Mbeki camp decisions going to hold to

challenge the legal process? Will they maintain that he is innocent until proved guilty and so insist on him leading the ANC into the 2009 election even if he has not been acquitted? Or will he graciously withdraw, leaving his new deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe, to become our next president? At stake may be whether we enjoy a smooth transition to the next state president — and even perhaps whether we establish the principle that all, including victorious ANC presidents, are subject to the law.

Finally, how will the tensions between the ANC and the ANC in government be managed now that the "two centres of power" which this election was meant to prevent are immediately among us? On Tuesday night, a senior civil servant suggested that Zuma and Mbeki need to talk "right now" if the smooth running of government between now and 2009 is to be secured. They probably did not talk then but they certainly need to now.

If government over the next 15 months is to be hobbled by constant conflict with the ruling party, again the gains of the past few days will be undermined by a further decline in government performance. Vigorous democracy is meant to produce strong and effective government — there is no point in people choosing if their choices cannot be translated into reality. And it is probably this danger, rather than the false alarms that have been raised these past few days, which should be the uppermost concern of every South African, whatever our view on the ANC.

Further along, the demand that the government become more responsive to the ANC makes it more in tune with the voters — but, if the one in three people who vote for other parties are excluded, then a government more responsive to Polokwane's majority will still not be able to serve all the people.

It is too soon to say how the new ANC will respond to these realities. How it does may well determine whether Polokwane's democratic dawn brings more enduring light to the entire country.

■ *Friedman is a research associate at Idasa and visiting professor of politics at Rhodes University.*

# Relevant articles

BUSINESS DAY, 20 DECEMBER 2007

## Fears of big shift under the trade unions' candidate dismissed, but members say the politics of the party will change New-look ANC gives 'developmental state' a boost

**Mathabo le Roux**

*Trade and Industry Correspondent*

**G**REATER emphasis on the developmental state and "industrial intervention" to increase employment were among the proposals supported during policy discussions yesterday at the African National Congress's (ANC's) Polokwane conference.

This comes as no surprise as the proposals are a consolidation of policy was embarked on at the party's policy conference in June.

Fears of a radical shift to the left with the trade unions' candidate Jacob Zuma taking the reins of the ANC have generally been dismissed by political analysts as alarmist.

While the new party leader is yet to formally address the media, prominent party members close to Zuma quashed notions of sharp policy shifts as unfounded.

Even from the South African Communist Party (SACP), the response to concerns about sweeping policy shifts was a resounding "no" — mainly because the battle for a shift to the left had already been won.

SACP deputy general secretary Jeremy Cronin says the leftward shift is already under way, with the battle against privatisation "fundamentally won" and with the focus now on a strong developmental state that would largely be driven by state-owned enterprises and job creation.

"What we are seeing now is a deepening and consolidation of these perspectives," Cronin said.

On macroeconomic policies the stance is softer than usual,

with Cronin calling for such matters to be debated.

"It has been part of our frustration that in the past these issues have been 'cast in stone'," he said.

"We have to discuss (matters such as) inflation targeting. We don't claim to have a monopoly on wisdom; what we are seeing at this conference is a reclaiming of the democratic debate.

"We want a chance to share perspectives," Cronin said.

Economic policy discussions at the Polokwane conference have also confirmed that changes in the party would be political, while policy direction is largely locked in.

Unsurprisingly then, few new policy issues emerged during policy discussions.

Instead, the emphasis was on the consolidation of current policies.

The only new resolutions adopted at the economic transformation commission were on climate change, rural development, and land and agrarian reform.

But even the latter resolution is in line with current strategies, encapsulated in the national industrial policy framework.

The only controversial issue to be put forward is a proposal by delegates from the SACP to have steel producer Arcelor Mittal SA nationalised.

Demands for the nationalisation of strategic assets are sporadically raised by the left, but even at yesterday's discussion there was general scepticism about the likelihood of such a move, with some delegates



The newly elected top six office-bearers of the ANC are (from left) Thandi Modise, Gwede Mantashe, Baleka Mbete, Jacob Zuma, Kgalema Motlanthe and Mathews Phosa  
REUTERS/Siphwe Sibeko

privately dismissing the issue as minor and likely to fall off the agenda.

"It is as we've said all along: there will be no changes in policy but a fundamental change in

politics," said one party official who declined to be named.

"What will be seen will be a matter of prioritisation. Mbeki may have to a larger extent supported global integration and the African agenda.

"It may be that under Zuma there is a greater focus on health and crime.

"We have been in a process of shifting policies in any case.

"In the past there may have been a view that economic policy had been a constraint on social development, but now the social issues have come to

the fore," the official said.

The view is shared by political analyst Adam Habib.

Habib argued this week that while the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) might claim greater emphasis on pro-poor policies as a victory, in fact talk of a developmental state, state intervention and an end to privatisation had begun three years ago.

Neither Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi nor SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande gloated about the increased influence of the left on the top structures of the ANC.

They have both played down the role individuals could play in

changing course, emphasising the organisational strength of the ANC.

"There has been a lot of speculation — largely negative and part of a strategy to represent Jacob Zuma as this 'gogga' who has so much debt to pay to the lefties, as we're called (but) Jacob Zuma is not an organisation. The ANC is the only organisation," said Vavi.

"It is not true that there is one person who decides policy."

Taking a swipe at former party leader Mbeki, Vavi said the hope is rather that Zuma "would better engage with us".

"Openness and respect — that is all we are asking for."

AFTER MBEKI/Xolela Mangcu

# Zuma's choices and our own

THE most puzzling thing about Thabo Mbeki is how someone purported to be an intellectual could be so oblivious to the one historical principle that has proven true over and over again. I used to go around reciting it as a little boy in Ginsberg, having read it in one of Steve Biko's essays: "The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress."

Mbeki was not yet an oppressive tyrant, but with the passage of time he could easily have transmogrified into one. The signs were there for all to see. But I would not be surprised if Mbeki still insists that African National Congress (ANC) members suffer from false consciousness. I can see that this is all a machination of racists, liberals and coconut intellectuals. The man's ability to deny is unparalleled. He is truly tiresome in that way.

Enough about Mbeki. He is a man of the past. Our gaze must turn to Jacob Zuma. In my forthcoming book, *To The Brink: The State of Democracy in South Africa*, I argue that Zuma is likely to be a transitional figure in at least three ways.

The first scenario would not be so much of a scenario were it not for its social consequences. I have always argued that we should have

found a political solution to this matter. Mbeki took us to the brink with Zuma and was ultimately left with egg on his face. He might be tempted to retaliate through the legal process but that would simply heighten the tension.

We may look to our most recent history for precedent. The state could do what it did with Adriaan Vlok — who received a suspended sentence for apartheid atrocities. Zuma could also be pardoned by an incoming president — the way Gerald Ford did with Richard Nixon during Watergate. The quid pro quo would be that Zuma should exit gracefully into the sunset.

The second scenario would be one in which Zuma is acquitted. There is little a man can do about his age. Barring an early election, Zuma would be 71 at the end of his first term, and 76 at the end of the second term. The same goes for all the members of the so-called Class of 1942.

I cannot imagine the ANC electing another 70-something to lead it in 2012 or in 2017. Granted, Nelson Mandela was in his 70s when he was president and other countries have had old and successful presidents, such as Ronald Reagan. The difference is that many of our "old timers", Zuma included, come from

a culture of exile, secrecy, hierarchy and quaint notions of old-fashioned solidarity. And yet the world we live in demands openness, accountability and horizontal networks.

On a cautionary note, Zuma should avoid the triumphalism that goes with what the great American presidential scholar and adviser Richard Neustadt called "newness". "Everywhere there is a sense of a page turning, a new chapter in the country's history, a new chance too. And with it, irresistibly, there comes the sense, 'they' couldn't, wouldn't, didn't but 'we' will. We can because we won." This can be dangerous, particularly in the sensitive and closely watched areas of economic and foreign policy.

The third scenario is my most preferred. This would be for Zuma to give way to someone such as Kgalema Motlanthe or Tokyo Sexwale. I would prefer Sexwale over Motlanthe because the latter is more of an organisational leader and the former more of a public leader. Either one of them would give us a breather. We need it, desperately.


Zuma won on the strength of a deep and widely-held anti-Mbeki sentiment in the ANC, but now that he has won he will no longer have Mbeki as his foil and his anti-type. All eyes will now be on him. He

saved us from the brink of tyranny but will he have the presence of mind to save us from himself?

Surely he would also agree that there would be too much "stuff" around him and that would distract him from being an effective leader of his country. And yet, as party leader and elder statesman he could still play an active and influential role in guiding the ANC. The country would be forever grateful to him, and history would remember him well for such a statesmanlike act.

Whether Zuma chooses to go down in ignominy in a jail cell somewhere; or to bear the burden of the state presidency; or to be remembered as a party leader and statesman who pulled his country from the brink of tyranny, is entirely his gambit. The challenge for us and future generations is different. It goes beyond Mbeki and Zuma to what Neustadt said: "Choose your president carefully because at the end of the day no one can save him from himself (or herself as the case may be)."

■ *Mangcu is executive chairman of the Platform for Public Deliberation and author of the forthcoming book *To the Brink: The State of Democracy in South Africa* (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, January 2008)*



# Relevant articles

THE STAR, 21 DECEMBER 2007

## Who's who in the new NEC?

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1. Mandela, Winnie	2845	42. Mabudafhasi, Joyce	1698
2. Radebe, Jeff	2716	43. Zulu, Lindiwe	1682
3. Skweyiya, Zola	2700	44. Tobias, Thandi	1675
4. Jordan, Pallo	2645	45. Love, Janet	1670
5. Cronin, Jeremy	2519	46. Shope-Mafole, Lyndall	1642
6. Duarte, Jessie	2448	47. Dlodlo, Ayanda	1641
7. Sisulu, Lindiwe	2384	48. Mthethwa, Nathi	1629
8. Mthembu-Mahanyele, Sankie	2291	49. Brown, Lynne	1623
9. Mabandla, Brigitte	2235	50. Kondlo, Ncumisa	1619
10. Sexwale, Tokyo	2198	51. Mtintso, Thenjiwe	1616
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13. Gigaba, Malusi	2144	54. Van Der Merwe, Sue	1593
14. Magashule, Ace	2121	55. Tshabalala-Msimang, Manto	1591
15. Mbalula, Fikile	2116	56. Motsoaledi, Aaron	1591
16. Moosa, Valli	2110	57. Manuel, Trevor	1590
17. Potgieter-Gqubule, Febe	2091	58. Mthembu, Jackson	1590
18. Chabane, Collins	2043	59. Tolashe, Sisisi	1574
19. Sisulu, Max	2041	60. Mabuza, David	1572
20. Ramathodi, Ngoako	2034	61. Shiceka, Sicelo	1532
21. Yengeni, Tony	2032	62. Capa Langa, Zoleka	1506
22. Nyanda, Siphwe	2005	63. Mashamba, Joyce	1497
23. Hanekom, Derek	1996	64. Manana, Sibongile	1496
24. Mkhize, Zweli	1976	65. Jenkins, Hazel	1496
25. Ebrahim, Ebrahim	1964	66. Mufamadi, Thaba	1496
26. Cele, Bheki	1950	67. Lobe, Charlotte	1494
27. Mfeketo, Nomaindia	1943	68. Mapisa-Nqakula, Nosiviwe	1490
28. Masetlha, Billy	1937	69. Masualle, Phumulo	1484
29. Dlamini, Bathabile	1933	70. Moloi-Moropa, Joyce	1470
30. Ramaphosa, Cyril	1910	71. Morule, Playfair	1468
31. Yengeni, Lumka	1907	72. Duma, Ndleleni	1447
32. Motshekga, Angie	1906	73. Netshitenzhe, Joel	1437
33. Madlala-Routledge, Nozizwe	1905	74. Pandor, Naledi	1431
34. Godongwana, Enoch	1891	75. Ndebele, Sibusiso	1427
35. Dlamini Zuma, Nkosazana	1885	76. Magadzi, Dikeledi	1424
36. Shabangu, Susan	1775	77. Ntwanambi, Nosipho	1403
37. Mokonyane, Nomvula	1756	78. Joemat-Pettersson, Tina	1369
38. Pule, Dina	1730	79. Mayende-Sibiya, Noluthando	1345
39. Bhengu, Ruth	1729	80. Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite	1337
40. Phaahla, Joe	1726		
41. Booi, Nyami	1709		

## And then those who did not make the list ...

81. Strachan, Grant	96. Ngonyama, Smuts	110. Moloto, Sello (Premier)
82. Chikane, Frank (DG)	97. Dexter, Phillip	111. Makwetla, Thabang (Premier)
83. Motau, Mojo	98. Lekota, Mosiuoa (Cabinet)	112. Myakayaka-Manzini, Mavivi
84. Mufamadi, Sydney (Cabinet)	99. Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile (Deputy president)	113. September, Connie
85. Molekane, Ellen	100. Pahad, Essop (Cabinet)	114. Tshwete, Pam
86. Kasrils, Ronnie (Cabinet)	101. Hendricks, Lindiwe (Cabinet)	115. Xingwana, Lulu (Cabinet)
87. Didiza, Thoko (Cabinet)	102. Rasool, Ebrahim (Premier)	116. Molewa, Edna (Premier)
88. Erwin, Alec (Cabinet)	103. Ginwala, Frene	117. Maape, Bushy
89. Mkhathshwa, Smangaliso	104. Molefe, Popo	118. Mpahlwa, Mandisi (Cabinet)
90. Dipico, Mame	105. Balindlela, Nosimo (Premier)	119. Matosa, Pat
91. Fraser-Moleketi, Geraldine (Cabinet)	106. Macozoma, Saki	120. Masepe Casaburri, Ivy (Cabinet)
92. Pahad, Aziz (Deputy minister)	107. Sonjica, Buyelwa (Cabinet)	<i>Individuals on this list who are provincial chairs or secretaries will still serve on the NEC, only as ex-officio members.</i>
93. Peters, Dipuo (Premier)	108. Nqakula, Charles (Cabinet)	
94. Moleketi, Jabu (Deputy minister)	109. George, Mluleki (Deputy minister)	
95. Madisha, Willie		



# Authentic leadership is the key

## COMMENT

RAENETTE TALJAARD



We don't know how to lead, but we certainly know when it is present or lacking

Members of the Young Global Leaders of the World Economic Forum are currently attending a course at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, reflecting on leadership in the 21st Century. Irrespective of the issue with which one engages – ranging from climate change to strategic geopolitical factors, or the challenges and opportunities in biotechnology and genetic research – it is clear that the base-line of authenticity in leadership is critical.

While leadership is critical, it appears to be a concept that is elusive when it comes to comprehensive conceptual definition. We don't know how to define all its contours but we certainly know when it is present and realise even faster when it is lacking.

But what is authentic leadership? In the American case it increasingly seems to be narrowly defined and, in the eyes of the average jaded citizen, finds expression in those who vocally oppose the Washington insiders.

Those who have been in the political game for too long, on both sides of the political aisle, come in for extensive criticism as inherently lacking authenticity – a fate that appears to also have befallen South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki.

This is unfair. Leaders, who lead by finding their true north – to paraphrase US management guru Bill George – do not have to be complete outsiders to be credible and authentic. Those who lead with integrity can retain authenticity, irrespective of how long they serve in public office. But this is the key question that determines whether leadership remains authentic – the actual record of integrity in public office. This transcends fiscal integrity and is, again arguably, where some of the Mbeki presidency's difficulties appear to arise.


While some ANC thinkers – such as Deputy Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba – criticised comparisons between US-style campaigning and the grassroots democracy dynamic of the ANC's closed-door process, the most highly watched CNN event in history and the YouTube Republic debate marked an interesting counterpoint to such glib dismissals.

It showed clearly how leaders were required to not only directly engage their citizens without the intermediation of high-brow pre-prepared and packaged interviews but also to engage with one another to explore the strengths and limitations of one another's authenticity, expressed by their record in office, both on policy issues and on substantive behaviour in leadership.

It is instructive to reflect on this hard-to-definitively-define concept of authentic



Jacob Zuma



Thabo Mbeki

leadership as a core ingredient of what voters – especially the growing "militant middle" (in the words of some US campaign strategists) populated by independent minded sentiments and swing voters – identify as authentic leadership and how they judge their leaders accordingly.

While this is of significant consequence in the US system, it may even rear its head in Polokwane – even if some commentators believe the comparison between the two systems is an unfair one.

While the analogy of the "militant middle" may have unfortunate connotations in the SA context given our complex history, there can be little doubt that there are a few "militant middle" undecided voters who will be arriving in Polokwane looking for authentic leadership. These potential swing voters still have to decide whether to back Jacob Zuma or Thabo Mbeki or another candidate who can muster 25% of the votes to get on the ballot.

It is this undecided independent-minded (yes, this is possible in the ANC) Polokwane voter who could generate a few surprises if the intense lobbying that is to be expected follows its natural course.

The Zuma-Mbeki stalemate, which remains a stalemate despite the significant margins of victory in certain provinces in the light of Mbeki's clear insistence on remaining available, must confront the question of the country's, and party itself, needing authentic leadership.

The ANC cannot simply allow this matter to become a popularity contest free of value-driven questions – irrespective of how quintessentially democratic such "popularity contests" are. Some commentators might argue that the Zuma victory demon-

strates a party railing against the absence of authentic leadership in current ANC President Thabo Mbeki. This is certainly a train of analysis that does not lack a basis. But it is not the only aspect of the discourse that requires closer inspection.

We seem to have lost sight completely of the values we want in leadership and the key matter of authenticity. This will remain highly relevant due to two separate yet umbilically-related crucial developments this week. Jacob Zuma's legal team's Constitutional Court action, and the pending NDPP decisions on proceeding with possible cases against Jacob Zuma and police chief Jackie Selebi, are both critical developments for our country and its ability to produce credible leaders.

While ANCYL president Fikile Mbalula may link the mere prospect of Jacob Zuma's being charged again with corruption to the Nationalist government's "swart gevaar" tactics, and while Cosatu has already warned that the NPA must not be used to bring down Jacob Zuma, it is important to keep an eye on ethics in search of authentic leadership.

The Zuma litigation before the Constitutional Court is crucial for Zuma as an individual, but also for the NPA and the country. In Zuma's case, the concept of authentic leadership will remain elusive, irrespective of his clear popularity, until the cloud of suspicion that continues to hover is decisively dealt with.

For the NPA, the divided Supreme Court of Appeals decision on raids and the search and seizure operations of key documents pertinent to any possible future charges is potentially problematic and a Constitutional Court outcome that decisively backs

the SCA ruling would be a welcome development from the prosecution's perspective.

Conversely, a Constitutional Court ruling that finds with the SCA minority opinion would, equally, be a minority development in setting clear benchmarks for future NPA operations of a sensitive and highly complex nature.

For the country, the Constitutional Court case is important with reference to the ongoing saga of the ANC succession. Through a rigorous process, the court will clearly play a key role in highlighting the presence or absence of authentic leadership, but will also definitively generate clear case law on one's right to a fair and expeditious trial in accordance with the Bill of Rights.

While these events are all marked by high drama, they are crucial to helping our country probe our leaders' authenticity. This seems to be contradictory – surely leaders who are authentic do not require all these complex institutional hoops? But this appears to be the nature of the peculiarly complex hurdle we, as South Africans and particularly members of the ANC, have set for ourselves by failing to clear the decks on the Strategic Defence Procurement Package with a full and unhindered probe, despite the joint investigating team's compromised efforts.

The deeply regrettable aspect of this, for a fledgling democracy, is the fact that we are burdening our fragile new institutions with a near unbearable weight in the process of "authenticating" our leaders' authenticity – a weight that would make centuries-old institutions in established democracies feel immensely pressurised.

Authentic leadership resonates with voters and party supporters – not for vacuous populist reasons but because it is a near intangible that is present only when credibility is present at the same time. It is with respect to credibility that the Zuma-Mbeki race has failed to fully confront the crucible of authentic leadership. It now appears likely that the next chapter in South Africa's search for authentic leaders will take a number of stressful twists and turns.

As the ANC prepares to fill the vacancy that will arise in the Union Buildings in 2009 and make decisions that affect us all as citizens, and as the US prepares to fill a vacancy in the White House in 2008 that will be crucial to the evolution of a more multi-lateral approach to global problems, we can all hope a thought will be spared for authenticity of leadership and its necessity to credible governance and visionary change, both on the global and local stage.

■ Raenette Taljaard is the director of the Helen Suzman Foundation.





# Relevant articles

CAPE ARGUS, 8 JANUARY 2008

## Zuma takes over NWC



CONVICTED FRAUDSTER: Tony Yengeni



YOUTH LEAGUE LEADER: Fikile Mbalula



FORMER CITY MAYOR: Nomaindia Mfeketo



SACP LEADER: Blade Nzimande

### Top lieutenants rule key body – as party backs him for Presidency

By DEON DE LANGE, MOSHOESHOE MONARE AND SAPA  
Political Bureau

The authority of embattled ANC president Jacob Zuma has been reasserted, with his key allies elected to the party's influential operational structure – as the ANC gave him its full support as its candidate for South Africa's presidency in 2009.

And after the crucial meeting of the new National Executive Committee in Gauteng, ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe criticised the "Hollywood-style" conduct of the National Prosecuting Authority in its case against Zuma.

"The president of the ANC is going to fight this case with every sinew of his body," he said.

Former ANC chief whip and



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convicted fraudster Tony Yengeni, ANC Youth League president Fikile Mbalula, former Defence Force general Siphiso Nyanda and SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande and former Cape Town mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo were among those elected to the National Working Committee, the "engine room" of the party.

Yengeni spent months in jail after being convicted of fraud over an underhand car discount associated with the arms deal.

Nyanda's name also appeared,

together with more than 30 others, who are alleged to be recipients of a big car mark-downs from a German company linked to the deal.

Ironically, Zuma is facing criminal charges stemming from the multibillion-rand arms deal that has rattled the ANC leadership. His court case is due to start in August.

Other NWC members include current Cabinet ministers who differ with President Thabo Mbeki on partisan issues, including Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu and Transport Minister Jeff Radebe.

Radebe was so desperate to join the Zuma camp that he made himself available for the central committee of the SACP last year, but was rejected, along with other Mbeki ministers.

Arts and Culture Minister Pallo

Jordan, who made it known that he disapproved of both Mbeki's and Zuma's presidential candidacy, was also elected to the NWC.

The independent-minded Jordan once challenged the impact of Zuma's rape case on the reputation of the party, a taboo subject within the Zuma circle. Zuma was acquitted of rape.

Two senior leaders of the SACP – Nzimande and its chairman, Gwede Mantashe – are now serving on the ANC's powerful senior bodies.

Mantashe was elected the ruling party's secretary-general at its conference last month.

Nzimande fortified the SACP's support for Zuma in a fierce conflict with Mbeki.

Now the election of Zuma

supporters to the NWC, which used to be the terrain of the Mbeki Cabinet, is likely to create the feared two centres of power.

The voting took place at the NEC meeting yesterday and the names were released today.

Regarding the charges brought against Zuma by the NPA, the NEC reaffirmed its commitment to the independence of the judiciary.

But the NEC expressed its "concern and grave misgivings about the timing of these charges, and the general conduct of the NPA in this case, including inconsistency in the application of its mandate and leaking of information to the media".

In line with the resolution of the 2005 National General Council, the

#### The NWC Top 20

- Collin Chabane
- Bathabile Dlamini
- Inezitshane Dlamini
- Tina Joemat-Peterson
- Pallo Jordan
- Nomakhosi Kondo
- Fikile Mbalula
- Nomaindia Mfeketo
- Ange Mzobhega
- Nathi Mthethwa
- Mabhe Nkomo-Mashabane
- Siphiso Nyanda
- Blade Nzimande
- Dina Pule
- Jeff Radebe
- Susan Shabangu
- Lindiwe Sisulu
- Mkheliso Stofile
- Tony Yengeni

In addition, the NWC includes the top six NEC officials and one representative each from the ANC Women's League and ANC Youth League.

To page 3

# Call for cool heads in new year

## COMMENT

RAENETTE TALJAARD



What South Africa does not need is a paralysing "two centres of power" saga and dramatic policy changes

While South Africans will remember 2007 for the often denied and then memorably erupting succession battle and the road to Polokwane and its aftermath of uncertainties, it will also be remembered for ripples in the international economy that challenged conventional wisdoms, bringing their own set of uncertainties.

It is in the possible intersections of these two arenas of respective uncertainty where much of the challenge for us as an emerging market in the global economy will lie in 2008.

It will be our job to minimise and manage the uncertainties over which we exert a certain level of control.

The subprime mortgage crisis and associated credit crunch in the US have placed a question mark over the adage "safe as houses" and led to new and complex questions over the reach and appropriateness of the regulatory machinery with oversight over the international financial system – especially the role of central banks in an increasingly complex market where certain financial instruments do not fall under their control.

At the World Economic Forum's annual gathering in Davos last year, a panel of analysts forecast a "continuation of the goldilocks economy" with much of 2007 shaping up in that direction with emerging markets continuing to assist in maintaining the growth effort and talk of whether the growth dependency of emerging markets on the US economy had finally "decoupled" with these economies starting to contribute to the fuelling of growth in their own right.

But with the price of crude oil reaching \$100 (about R680) a barrel in early new year's trading and commentators worried about a possible recession in the US, and some even using the word "recession" blatantly, emerging markets will catch a cold if this big sneeze does happen. No doubt this year's Davos discussion will be different in tenor to last year's pre-subprime one.

It is against this backdrop of growing global stormclouds that we certainly do not have to make matters worse as an emerging market by adding uncertainty to the mix of factors investors have to weigh when looking at us as a possible destination choice again.

Much of the economic policy hubbub prior to the ANC's June policy conference and Polokwane has added question marks about our trajectory to an already heavy mix of factors.

In case we have forgotten, Joel Ntshenzhe's report to the ANC National Executive Committee shortly before the Polokwane conference formed a poignant



NEW BROOM: Jacob Zuma's election as ANC president last month had no major effect on the country's financial markets.

PICTURE: BONGWWE MGHUNU

reminder of the scale of challenges confronting our country, including growing inequality, HIV/Aids, crime and a host of others.

These factors are, however, albeit daunting well-known and well-worn terrain to investors. What neither investors nor the ANC nor the country need in 2008, though, is a paralysing "two centres of power" saga of epic proportions, infighting, dramatic policy turns or uncertainty over respect for the rule of law and the independent nature of institutions.

This is where the "new" post-Polokwane and largely still untested ANC and ANC leadership will have to focus their attention today and tomorrow if the germination of concerns is to be allayed.

Ratings agencies ranging from Standard & Poor's to Moody's and Fitch emphasised prior to Polokwane that among the most important aspects were the need to have a unifier elected given the bruising nature of the battle inside the ANC; that no radical policy shifts would be desirable irrespective of who emerged victoriously and that some scope for spending existed given the small budget surplus recorded.

Influential international titles such as the *Financial Times* and others focused on possible leadership paralysis as a near and present danger.

Despite the election of new office bearers and a new NEC – much of which appeared vindictively inspired to outsiders given the near purge that occurred – these factors

remain alive and well to ratings agencies and investors alike as our country approaches 2008 and a new budgeting cycle.

Furthermore, some credit rating agencies, key among them Moody's, have already indicated where they would expect to see changes from the "new" ANC and its leaders and NEC that would include a better application of the country's social agenda.

This must include better action in areas of human capital formation as critical as HIV/Aids and education, especially after the woeful matric results that are a reminder of the uncompetitive skills base our economy will have in the future when it becomes the key determining factor between winning nations and the also-rans in the modern economy.

The financial markets appeared to shrug off and price in a Zuma win and responded relatively benignly to the new NEC lists and even the new charges against Zuma. There has not been too much volatility even in thin festive season trading.

However, what will not be so easily shrugged off is a long and protracted and highly acrimonious and personalised fight between Mbeki and Zuma from their perches in government and the ANC respectively.

What will also not be easily shrugged off is an assault on monetary policy or the framework of inflation targeting in a global context where all countries are confronting inflationary fears due to various manifest

ations of the energy and climate change conundrum – higher oil and food prices (oil as a source of fuel chases up the price of basic foods).

Apart from the amorphous "developmental state" – which remains ill-defined post Polokwane – monetary policy received a lot of attention in policy discourse and newly powerful factors and power brokers expect change in this area – change that cannot be brought about without tampering with the constitution.

Hopefully the ANC will find enough wise elders to do what they did not succeed in doing prior to Polokwane – ask for cool heads and tranquil hearts to prevail today and beyond into the State of the Nation address and the tabling of the Budget.

In an ideal world, the drama in the party will leave the state unaffected. It is this nexus though where the bulk of 2008's challenges will lie given the extent to which barriers between party and state have eroded during the 14-year transition.

While countries are not governed by ratings agencies, their views matter and could be decisive as we saw this week. After the headline-grabbing troubles in Kenya flowing from electoral concerns last week, it took ratings agencies less than 72 hours to respond with a ratings downgrade to the chaos that had emerged in one of our continent's well-respected democracies.

We must not delude ourselves that these "force multipliers" of global capital will treat us any less favourably if paralysing trench-warfare or guerrilla tactics erupt between party and state tomorrow and beyond.

The uncertainty for all of us has only become as we approach 2008's new reality of two centres of power and a lack of clarity of the nature of the policy changes the "new" ANC will seek with a mix of curiosity and concern.

But whatever configurations the battles or victories may take, let us always remind ourselves to minimise uncertainty that causes emerging market nations to stumble and fall on their growth paths.

Already *Newsweek* has stated: "Like a number of hot emerging markets, South Africa's made great progress in recent years – but its leadership is faltering dangerously."

Uncertainty is not a currency the international community likes and it is not an added complexity South Africans need given the magnitude of challenges we need to focus on as a nation.

Our country's leaders cannot afford to fight and cause us all to falter.

■ Raenette Taljaard is the director of the Helen Suzman Foundation.

# In memoriam

CAPE TIMES, 8 JANUARY 2008

SIKO'S REFRESHING APPROACH

## Generous, colourful artist


ONE OF the Cape's colourful artists died over Christmas. The community where he lived and contributed for many years, Mbekweni, outside Paarl, will miss him. Solomon Siko died of TB-related illness at the youthful age of 42.

Not a man for the flashy spotlight or artistic highlife, Siko provided a particular, individual and typically Cape point of view in his bright, crisp paintings and engaging drawings. His work was inevitably chosen to be part of exhibitions or presentations which showcased Cape social culture.

Born in Sakkieskamp, Wellington, Solomon somehow always related to the community and culture of the region. When he settled on an art career, he made his home in Mbekweni.

Humour and satire frequently invaded his pictures which he executed with a dedicated sense of style and theatrical skill. He simply loved to portray the scenes that surrounded him, lifting characters and personalities and recording the township landscapes. This made his art the valuable documents of that society that they are.

Gail Dorje, director of the Cape Gallery, which "housed" his art and offered it to Capetonians and visitors, wrote: "Siko's vibrant paintings on heavily textured and engraved board are the theatre for a richly imaginative portrayal of



**VIBRANT:** Solomon Siko loved to portray the scenes that surrounded him, an example being this oil on board titled *Dube I*.

street life. Siko loves to sketch the world around him. Humour is a positive force in our multicultural society and with his real gift for caricature, the application is (made) gently."

Siko studied art at the then Community Arts Project (CAP)

in Woodstock in the late 1980s, showing his first work at an exhibition held at St George's Cathedral and later a solo show at the Oude Pastorie-museum in Paarl.

Identifying with the credo of local so-called struggle art,

Siko's work got a stimulus when the South African Association of Art gave him a stipend to work at the then Dal Josafat art foundation near his Paarl home in 1992. He never looked back.

Central to his career –

which includes taking part in overseas group shows and having his work acquired for important collections – was to give back to his community in the form of art classes.

He leaves his wife, Phumla, and three children.